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Search for a
New World Order



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
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SASO to FMSO: Assessing the New World Order

After two years of turbulent change in Europe, the August 1991 revolution in the Soviet Union signaled the final demise of a Soviet Empire that had dominated Eastern Europe and contended with Western powers for European and global hegemony for more than 40 years. The failed coup and ensuing revolution has had an immense impact on political, economic and social structures within the former Soviet Union. Beyond the confines of the Soviet state, the regional and global ramifications are likely to be equally momentous. Many structures that had contributed to the maintenance of a tense international order have now collapsed, and if stability is to be created, the old order must be replaced with new, lasting, international institutions.

These revolutionary changes in Europe have taken place against the backdrop of other more subtle changes within the world as a whole. The basis of global and regional political structures had already begun shifting from a bipolar world, dominated by the two superpowers and their allies, to a multipolar system characterized by the emergence of new regional contenders. New economic relationships have formed among new economic powers, particularly in Europe and Asia. Simultaneously, the world has had to contend with a variety of new forces ranging from renascent nationalism, acting as both a unifying and a divisive force, to the international dilemmas posed by narcotics trafficking, terrorism, religious fundamentalism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These realities challenge the task of erecting a new global order.

Understanding change and setting the terms for the future in this more complex world is the challenge facing the United States and, for that matter, every nation. Within the United States, no institution faces a more challenging task than the military. For 40 years the military has understood the threats to the nation, as defined by the political leadership, and has prepared itself to deal with those threats. Intelligence and military research organizations have developed systems and methodologies focusing on a well-defined enemy. Regardless of the flexibility of those older systems, the world has now fundamentally changed, and so have potential threats and military challenges. Today, new approaches to traditional threat analysis are required to master the complexities of the future. In a sense, these new challenges are reminiscent of those faced in the interwar years, when threats were not clear-cut and when a premium was placed on anticipating, rather than reacting to, events around the world.

The Combined Arms Command has begun to restructure its military analysis accordingly. It has broadened its research to encompass areas well beyond the focus of recent threat analysis. Symbolizing this shift in emphasis, the Soviet Army Studies Office (SASO) has expanded to become the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO). Under its new charter, FMSO is applying methodologies used by SASO to investigate a wide range of transnational military issues on both global and regional bases. SASO continues to study the Soviet Union and its successor states, while the European Military Studies Office focuses on military and security issues in Europe. The Regional Military Studies Office investigates the military ramifications of a variety of transnational security issues (such as narcotics trafficking and terrorism) and assesses other operational categories of low-intensity conflict in key regions around the world. Through an active program of networking with other civilian and military research organizations, FMSO seeks to act as the focal point for information sharing and research on this wide range of issues.

This issue of *Military Review* reflects the diverse interest of FMSO researchers as well as the broadened range of future security challenges. The articles illustrate those sorts of issues that must be analyzed and mastered if we are to manage a peaceful transition to a more secure future.

***Lieutenant General Wilson A. Shoffner
Commander, Combined Arms Command***

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CHALLENGES OF THE FUTURE

Developing Security Issues in the Post-Cold War Era

Colonel David M. Glantz, US Army

The author points out that during the past few centuries, history has been characterized by periods of revolution, war, exhaustion and the process of evolutionary change. The collapse of the Soviet Empire swept out the bipolar power relationship that anchored global security arrangements for more than 40 years and replaced it with the uncertainties of a multipolar, shifting order. It has been accompanied by revitalized national, ethnic and religious forces that challenge a peaceful evolutionary process. He sees this period as one of great and complex challenges but even greater opportunities for lasting peace.



ACROSS the span of history stretch centuries of evolutionary changes embracing the political, economic and social organization of man's individual and collective existence. Peace and war have been the constant companions of such development. In retrospect, progress has been continuous and complex, and its speed and intensity have varied from region to region in different epochs. Punctuating this process of change have been stormy periods when special, often dysfunctional, conditions have combined to disrupt the evolutionary process and accelerate change. We term such epochs "revolutionary."

Within the past 500 years, we can identify several such revolutionary periods. The religious and dynastic struggles of the early 17th century, which culminated in the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), laid to rest the remnants of the religion-based European system and paved the way for the dominance of Europe and much of the world by powerful dynastic states. The period of the French Revolution and Napoleon (1789-1815) largely destroyed the dynastic base of the European political order and ushered in an age of nationalism, characterized by the emergence of powerful nation states and a colonial system that embraced much of the world. The cataclysm of World War I (1914-1918) destroyed the remnants of older dynastic empires, weakened European democracies and, ultimately, gave rise to communist and fascist totalitarianism. World War II (1941-1945) completed the destruction of the European old order and propelled the United States and Soviet Union into international dominance and competition in a Cold War that endured for over 40 years.

All of these periods were characterized by the same general progression of revolution, war, exhaustion and reassertion of the process of evolutionary change.

Global Changes of the Late 1980s

The year 1989 marked the beginning of a new era of accelerated evolutionary change, most vividly evidenced by burgeoning crisis and reform in the Soviet Union and in the collapse


of communism in Eastern Europe, but characterized and broadened by other changing world conditions as well. Most prominent among these latter were changing global economic re-

[Simultaneous to] the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. . . a technological revolution promised to accord smaller nations the ability to contest both militarily and economically (at least locally) with world military powers. Revitalized ethnic and religious forces began challenging traditional power elites . . . and the emerging power of multinational economic organizations further blurred the hitherto fairly clear lines of economic authority.

lationships, a virtual redistribution of economic power that has, until recently, been masked by the trappings of military strength. Simultaneously, a technological revolution promised to accord smaller nations the ability to contest both militarily and economically (at least locally) with world military powers. Revitalized ethnic and religious forces began challenging traditional power elites, if not the very existence of a variety of states, and the emerging power of multinational economic organizations further blurred the hitherto fairly clear lines of economic authority among modern nation states.

Set against the backdrop of these new realities, a variety of "transnational" forces had already emerged to challenge the authority, viability and well-being of modern nations and their populations. Especially threatening were international organizations that fostered narcotics trafficking and those that sponsored individual and state terrorism. These forces compounded the impact of the striking political changes in Europe.

All of these conditions, in themselves, were enough to cause major concern about national, regional and global security arrangements. Perceptions that the Cold War had ended, however,



A young Berliner offers a rose to an East German border guard shortly after the wall dividing his city was opened, November 1989.

[The] shift in global power relationships from bipolar to multipolar . . . offered new opportunities for the advance of peace and stability in Europe. The ensuing extraordinary global cooperation, so evident during the Gulf crisis and ensuing war, furthered prospects for greater regional and global stability.

tended to obscure these problems and instead created a sort of euphoria over prospects for world peace. The Gulf crisis of August 1990 and the subsequent Gulf War burst this bubble of euphoria (perhaps fortuitously) and caused world leaders to reflect more soberly on national, regional and collective security needs of the future.

The end of the Cold War, prompted by a shift in global power relationships from bipolar to multipolar and signaled by the Soviet Union's loss of control over Eastern Europe, offered new opportunities for the advance of peace and stability in Europe. The ensuing extraordinary global cooperation, so evident during the Gulf crisis and ensuing war, furthered prospects for greater regional and global stability. It was very clear, however, that the absence of the Cold War and the reinvigoration of international security mechanisms had created new, perhaps unprecedented, challenges.

The end of "militarized" bipolar confrontation in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact reduced tensions, but also left a security vacuum. Well-understood rules and procedures that, in reality, had maintained an often tense state of peace, now had vanished. New rules, accepted by new players, had to evolve to handle not only great power relations but also relations with and between new East European governments. Each of these reborn nations evidenced to varying degrees those revived forces, such as nationalism, that were born of the past and now had to be harnessed if stability was to be created. Each also harbored traditional internal and external animosities and tensions that had characterized its pre-Cold War past.

Revolution in the Soviet Union

Hard on the heels of these significant international trends, a revolution has broken out in the Soviet Union. This, in itself, is a momentous

Sobiesednik



Interethnic and national conflict has often resulted in tragic confrontations between security forces and civilians.

The end of "militarized" bipolar confrontation in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact reduced tensions, but also left a security vacuum. Well-understood rules and procedures that, in reality, had maintained an often tense state of peace, now had vanished. New rules, accepted by new players, had to evolve to handle not only great power relations but also relations with and between the new East European governments.

event with immense global ramifications. The failure of the August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union opened a new revolutionary chapter in Soviet (Russian) history. As has been the case in any revolution, prediction of the ultimate outcome has been futile in the face of the immensely dynamic forces that the revolution inevitably unleashed. It is safe to say, however, that, as in the past, months or years will pass before those forces stabilize. In the meantime, some rudimentary judgments can be made regarding basic forces and general tendencies.

First, individuals involved in the initial stages of revolution often shrivel in importance and become transitory in the face of contending forces, leaving history and fate to accord fame to those now unknown persons who will rise to prominence in the future. A few especially capable fig-

ures have challenged this tendency and emerged as dominant figures of their time. Only time will determine who these dominant persons will be.

Second, issues of national security, whether of the Soviet Union, of Russia or of the likely numerous successor states, will continue to be a major concern to the nations themselves, to neighboring countries and to the rest of the world. The strategic paradigms articulated by Soviet strategic theorists A. A. Kokoshin and V. V. Larionov after 1986 as a synthesis of reform and tradition charted possible strategic futures for the Soviet Union and will retain their utility for whatever states emerge and in whatever circumstances they are applied (see Foreign Military Studies Office publication *Soviet Military Art: Challenges and Change in the 1990s* for these paradigms).

Successor states to the Soviet Union must now address perceived threats and challenges, singly or in combination. They will respond with security policies and strategies, only in part

Issues of national security, whether of the Soviet Union, of Russia or of the likely numerous successor states, will continue to be a major concern to the nations themselves, to neighboring countries and to the rest of the world.

reminiscent of those of the past. Where reformist views prevail, strategists will tend to reject "traditional" threats and instead focus on the internal economic, social and political challenges, perceived as the most important obstacles to future development. While this is a positive development, it can lead to conflict with other successor states as their economies go deeper into collapse, and each state seeks to protect its own interests at the expense of the others.

New military reform programs will reduce the size and stature of military establishments to levels analogous to those of the 1920s. This means for the Soviet (Russian) state the maintenance of a force near or well below the 100-division level. Nuclear deterrence, supplemented by a smaller and leaner conventional military establishment formed around a nucleus of combat-ready, rapid-reaction forces, will likely emerge as the military component backing up strategic concepts. Military doctrine and military art will focus on the fundamentals of defense, internal security, low-intensity conflict and local war. In time, and as reform mellows, traditional aspects of strategy will tend to reemerge. Most important, reform programs will place the military under firm civilian control in an attempt to guarantee an open society.

In the newly independent republics, a mixture of reform and traditional strategies will predominate, depending on the conditions surrounding the achievement of independence and individual political and economic circumstances that

each confronts. Because of these varied conditions, the ultimate strategic stance of successor states is difficult to predict. At a minimum, their strategies will react to the stance of the Soviet (Russian) central state and the policies of their immediate neighbors, in a continuum ranging from cooperation to antagonism. In this regard, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic may advance the concept of a Soviet "NATO"; that is, a consensual alliance of 15 or 20 states as the best option for all.

The overwhelming predominance of reform and republican sentiments will, for a time, largely negate traditional Soviet General Staff concepts of military strategy and future war. For example, the civilianization of the Ministry of Defense will make the chief of the General Staff the highest-ranking soldier. In the midterm and long term, however, many of these traditional concepts will reemerge both in the Soviet (Russian) state and in some of the successor states as well. Economic, political and strategic realities will cease operating as centrifugal forces drawing these states apart and will instead act as centripetal forces impelling greater cooperation and perhaps even unity.

In the midterm and long term, fundamental national, economic and geographical factors will reassert themselves as new, more mature political systems evolve, as they must if they are to avoid a Yugoslavian situation, in the lands of the former Soviet Empire. The great Soviet strategic debates of the 1980s and 1990s, influenced by reformer and traditionalist alike, which preceded the August revolution will leave a lasting imprint on the future. Ultimately, the debates and their legacy will affect the successor states of the Soviet Empire and those other nations of the world who now rest easy in the bright light and euphoria of a new global order.

Implications for Global Security

The August 1991 revolution in the Soviet Union will undoubtedly compound the effects of over two years of turbulent change in Europe and the world. The net result of these changes is massive and, at the least, involves a basic shift in the axis of global relationships from the previous



Czechoslovakia's first non-Communist president since 1948. Vaclav Havel, meeting with German chancellor Helmut Kohl in Munich, 2 January 1990. Since his election, Havel has been outspoken in his desire to see Czechoslovakia join NATO.

The Warsaw Pact's demise and political changes in Central and Eastern Europe have rendered the existing security architecture obsolete. Europe must struggle to redefine new security structures to include those emerging nations that expect to share in the fruits of European political stability and economic prosperity.

East-West orientation to a North-South one. Virtually every region of the world will be in some way affected by these changes. One need only catalog the challenges and ponder the potential implications, region by region.

In the Western Hemisphere, a US-sponsored movement toward reduced tariffs promises long-term economic benefits of closer economic integration throughout the Americas and strengthens already expanding prospects for increased democracy throughout the region. On the negative side, the persistent and spreading problem of narcotics production and trafficking threatens economic and social stability in North America. Insurgencies, ethnic conflict, economic problems and narcotics production and trafficking in Latin America continue to pose great challenges for selected nations and their neighbors.

Europe faces a wide range of imposing new challenges. While the drive for greater econom-

ic and political integration so characteristic of the last decade reaches culmination, prospective unity symbolized by "Europe 1992" clashes vividly with the divisive forces that resurgent nationalism has unleashed in eastern and southeastern Europe. A federated Europe protecting its markets by exclusive trade barriers will only exacerbate problems in other, more fractious regions of the Continent.

The Warsaw Pact's demise and political changes in Central and Eastern Europe have rendered the existing security architecture obsolete. Europe must struggle to redefine new security structures (on the basis of NATO, CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] or another, as yet undetermined, structure) to include those emerging nations that expect to share in the fruits of European political stability and economic prosperity. Moreover, it must do so within a more reasonable global



The potential for widespread population dislocations has now become a serious planning consideration for military and security forces in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Successor states to the Soviet Union must now address perceived threats and challenges, singly or in combination. . . . Strategists will tend to reject "traditional" threats and instead focus on the internal economic, social and political challenges, perceived as the most important obstacles to future development. While this is a positive development, it can lead to conflict with other successor states as their economies go deeper into collapse, and each state seeks to protect its own interests at the expense of the others.

framework. In practical terms, Europe must solve the age-old dilemmas of ethnic and political turmoil in Eastern Europe and the Balkans and, in addition, establish a viable framework for its relations with the Soviet Union (Russia) and its successor states.

Africa, despite recent movement toward more pluralistic government and a lessening of great power involvement, is beset by recurring and persistent economic crises, ethnic strife (the Horn of Africa and South Africa), and religious fundamentalism (the Mahgreb). Disease, most notably AIDS, afflicts a large segment of the population, and lack of control of population growth, combined with continued economic backwardness, may condemn the region to chronic famine.

In Asia, problems are as diverse as the extensive regions that make up the continent. The political dilemmas of Southwest Asia (the Middle East), exacerbated by religious and ethnic hatreds, remain a riddle that only the collective agreement of world powers and the nations in the region can solve. The likely endurance of

authoritarian (religious and secular), dynastic and even feudal political and economic systems throughout the region prevents the attainment of lasting solutions to these problems.

Finally, the technological revolution in weaponry equips these states with the wherewithal to threaten stability in the region and actively challenge those great powers that attempt to assist the achievement of regional stability. Collapse of the political and military power of the Soviet Union will inevitably propel Iran into new prominence in the region, especially if the forces of ethnicity and religious fundamentalism penetrate the steppes of central Asia.

New power centers have emerged in south Asia, whose strategic role will undoubtedly be enhanced by the decay of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the potential decay of the traditional Soviet-Indian "alliance," that counterbalanced the Chinese-Pakistani "alliance," raises the specter of increased Chinese influence in the region. The existence of a potential power vacuum in Afghanistan, once the Afghan civil war has been resolved, could be further complicated by

the decay of Soviet power in central Asia. Other equally serious problems abound in the region, ranging from longstanding national hostility (India-Pakistan), through internal and ethnic strife and tension (Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia), to state-sponsored (Myanmar) and indigenous narcotics trafficking (Thailand, Laos and others). It remains to be seen whether burgeoning economic progress in some of the nations of Southeast Asia will spread and translate into greater stability and peace throughout the region.

East Asia may well be the region of greatest geopolitical change in the future, as the United States, China and Japan redefine their roles in the region and the world. The diminution of Soviet power; the economic and inevitable political transformation of China; an end to the dysfunctional relationship between the economic, political and military power of Japan; the likely emergence of a unified Korea; and the reformulation of US policy in the western Pacific characterize revolutionary changes that should transform the face of this region and its role in world affairs.

History indicates that, in the past, regional and global changes of this magnitude have not occurred peacefully. On the contrary, they have normally been accompanied by unprecedented strife. In recent centuries, this strife has been on a global scale, most recently in the form of "total war." Since 1945, the specter of total war and its associated nuclear threat has been kept in check by clear understandings on the part of the two great powers and their allies. Today, that US-Soviet context has eroded and been replaced by the uncertainties of a multipolar world subject to the divisive forces of ethnic unrest on an unprecedented scale. Civil war in Yugoslavia represents

The technological revolution in weaponry equips these states with the wherewithal to . . . actively challenge those great powers that attempt to assist the achievement of regional stability. Collapse of the . . . the Soviet Union will inevitably propel Iran into new prominence in the region, especially if the forces of ethnicity and religious fundamentalism penetrate the steppes of central Asia.

in microcosm the kinds of problems requiring urgent solution if a new global order is to be established and stability is to be restored.

While recognizing these realities, one must also recognize that the existence and proliferation of modern weapons of mass destruction (whose effects cannot be limited to warring powers alone) promise unprecedented destructiveness. While war has not become obsolete and nations will undoubtedly resort to conflict to settle future disputes, a new imperative has emerged for responsible nations of the world to work more closely together and erect those regional and global security arrangements necessary to promote greater stability and avoid the specter of unlimited regional or global conflict.

Future regional and global stability depends on the ability to define, control, manage and, ideally, eradicate the many problems touched upon here. This means understanding and coping with an extended revolutionary period, a skill that often eluded our forebears. We must do better if we are to avoid the catastrophic consequences of failing to understand and master the conditions and opportunities that we face. **MR**

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The PGM-equipped defender can now inflict unacceptable casualties on an attacker before the attacker can close for battle, while a PGM-equipped attacker can also reciprocate. Consequently, there has been a change of meaning and blending of the terms "offense" and "defense."

fully prepared NATO defense, backed by PGMs, seemed impenetrable to Soviet forward-deployed forces.

In 1987, the Soviets announced the adoption of a defensive doctrine under the aegis of the now defunct Warsaw Pact. As Soviet forces began their withdrawal from Eastern Europe, a new era in East-West relationships also commenced. The new Soviet military doctrine was not, however, solely based on the good will and peaceful vision of then General Secretary and President Mikhail Gorbachev. Rather, it was an evolving doctrine prompted by monumental ongoing changes in the technological, economic and political realities facing the Soviet Union. The Soviet military had to adapt to these new realities and, while doing so, determine how to best defend the Soviet Union under very different and difficult conditions. Subsequent Soviet force reductions, reorganizations and redeployments actually suggested that the orientation of Soviet "defensiveness" was genuine. The recent revolution in the nation has confirmed likely future Soviet (Russian) defensiveness.

The specter of the by now "classic" Soviet threat has virtually disappeared with the Soviets' pronouncement of defensive doctrine, their withdrawal from Eastern Europe and their ensuing internal revolution. The West, however, must not simply assume that the Soviet Union (Russia) is now, or will be, a benign former superpower that no longer warrants military vigilance, awareness or attention. The uncertain future of Soviet reform, the remaining large Soviet armed forces and their possession of strategic nuclear arms dictate that the West maintain an active interest; for although the Soviets do not present

a current threat, they do constitute a real or potential danger, especially if chaos or civil war ensues.⁵

On the other hand, should relations between the Soviet Union, its successor states and the West continue to move from confrontation to cooperation, the possibility of a future Soviet-US coalition also exists.⁶ In either event, the West must continue to monitor and understand the Soviet military.

Soviet Military Doctrine

The Soviet concept of doctrine differs from the West's. Soviet military doctrine has a rich historical background, a "scientific" substantiation process and, until recently, an explicit ideological content that defined how not only the armed forces but also the entire nation should be prepared and structured for future war. On the other hand, Western military doctrine focuses on warfighting. In addition, current Soviet military doctrine stresses war prevention. Such a new defensive doctrine does not, however, impose an exclusively defensive strategy. There are indications that under certain circumstances, Soviet (Russian) defensive doctrine could have an offensive or counteroffensive character at the strategic level and that the Soviets have not discarded time-tested, offensively oriented operational methods.⁷ Further, a Soviet goal in proclaiming a defensive doctrine may have been to gain the time needed to develop and field high-technology weapons before resuming a more assertive international stance.

The shift in Soviet military doctrine is shown by the questions that doctrine now addresses, including:

Pre-1987

- Who is the likely enemy and what is the possibility that war will be fought against that enemy?
- What will be the nature of the war that may be fought against this enemy?
- What are the goals/objectives of the armed forces in this war?
- What forms and methods will be employed?



Topped statues of communist heroes impounded behind Moscow's Tretyakov Art Gallery. The downfall of communism has left its impact on Soviet military doctrine which had explicit ideological content defining how the armed forces and entire nation should be structured for war.

Soviet military doctrine has a rich historical background, a "scientific" substantiation process and, until recently, an explicit ideological content that defined how not only the armed forces but also the entire nation should be prepared and structured for future war. On the other hand, Western military doctrine focuses on warfighting.

- What are the requirements for preparing the armed forces and country for these wars?

Post-1987

- How can war be prevented?
- What is the nature of the military threat and the probable enemy?
- What aggression should the state and the armed forces be prepared to repel?
- What armed forces should we have?
- What methods of military operations must be mastered for repelling aggression?
- What are the requirements for preparing armed forces and the country to repel this aggression?

The central theme of the new Soviet military doctrine purports to be war prevention. With the apparent withering away of the ideological tenet of the inevitability of war between capitalism and communism, the Soviet Union could underscore this new purpose. It can be argued, however, that in its relationship with the West, the Soviet Union has adhered to such an unstated goal, particularly regarding nuclear war, for several decades. The new doctrine still con-

tains many of the tenets of the old doctrine and admits that while war prevention is a goal, it is still prudent to prepare for war.

The retention of the defensive doctrine is currently being debated. Civilian academicians have become involved in this previously sacrosanct preserve of the General Staff and have succeeded in further obscuring the issues. Press conferences, Supreme Soviet committees, declarations, statements by renegade military reformers, and select statements and proposed models presented at various international seminars and symposiums have added to the confusion.⁸ Out of this complex mosaic, there are many indications that the announcement of defensive doctrine was a purely political decision made for economic and political purposes and imposed on the military with little regard for the military logic of that doctrine. Conversely, there are other indications that top military planners were themselves instrumental in formulating the initial pronouncement and that the General Staff considered a reasoned approach to military reform and modernization, under the rubric of



A Column of Iraqi armor destroyed on a Euphrates Valley road by aircraft flying from Rafhah, Saudi Arabia, February 1991.

As Operation *Desert Storm* demonstrated, the tank is very vulnerable to PGMs; yet the Soviet army has gone to great expense and trouble to move large quantities of tanks out of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty-limited area to holding areas east of the Urals. This gives the Soviets the potential to field large tank-heavy forces.

defensive doctrine, was a necessary condition for survival.⁹ The new chief of the General Staff, General V. N. Lobov, recently stated that the defensive doctrine was strictly a political invention that must now be radically revised.¹⁰ One fact remains clear: defensive doctrine has been profoundly shaped by events that preceded it by over a decade.

A wide range of events, including modern warfare, Western initiatives, arms control pro-

posals, technology, political events, economic realities and other factors, have all had an impact on the new doctrine (fig. 1). Soviet military writings have reflected these factors, especially the impact of new technology, as they try to forecast future war. The Soviet General Staff's vision of future war anticipates dynamic, high-intensity, high-tempo land-air operations extending over vast expanses, to include space.

Within this vision, tactical combat will be even more lethal than in the past and will be characterized by nonlinear (*ochagovyy*) combat. The front line will disappear and terms such as "zones of combat" (*zona boyevykh deystviy*) will replace the outmoded concepts of FEBA (forward edge of the battle area), FLOT (forward line of own troops) and FLET (forward line of enemy troops).¹¹ No safe havens or "deep rear" will exist. Nuclear war must be avoided at all costs, as it could escalate to strategic exchange and the destruction of the planet. A constant factor in those military-professional books, jour-



Figure 1. Factors of Soviet defensive doctrine




Figure 2. Events shaping, influencing and reflecting on Soviet defensive doctrine

nals and newspaper articles that forecast future war has been the lethality of PGMs and the necessity for developing countermeasures to offset these systems.¹²

This view of future war has been shaped by the factors portrayed in figure 2. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War demonstrated the vulnerability of tanks to modern antitank guided missiles. The wars in Vietnam, Angola and Ethiopia highlighted the difficulty of combating indigenous forces on rugged terrain with conventional forces and proved the value of heliborne mobile forces. The Iran-Iraq War provided a study on the value of surprise and deception in maintaining operational tempo and the difficulty of regaining the initiative once the enemy has had time to go to ground in a well-prepared defense. The Falklands War, Grenada and Panama underscored a spectrum of strategic mobility requirements, while the Falklands War, Bekaa Valley Campaign, tanker war and US air strike against Libya demonstrated the tremendous potential of PGMs and power of electronic warfare. Finally, Soviet experience in Afghanistan

Another indication of the reluctance of the Soviet army to abandon totally its traditional offensive operational methods is its retention of its older "triangular" division force structure, which is optimized for high-tempo, continuous offensive operations. At this writing, the bulk of Soviet divisions remains triangular.

demonstrated the importance of terrain, the value of shoulder-fired air defense weapons, the role of heliborne mobile forces and the need for low-level, combined arms forces and junior-leader initiative.

Western initiatives, arms control deliberations, the changing political climate and the collapsed Soviet economy all have had a significant impact on the Soviet posture for conducting future war. Battlefield modernization has demonstrated the pace that key weapon systems have gone into production. Development of these

As Soviet forces began their withdrawal from Eastern Europe, a new era in East-West relationships also commenced. . . . Subsequent Soviet force reductions, reorganizations and redeployments actually suggested that the orientation of Soviet "defensiveness" was genuine. The recent revolution in the nation has confirmed likely future Soviet (Russian) defensiveness.

There are many indications that the announcement of defensive doctrine was a purely political decision made for economic and political purposes and imposed on the military with little regard for the military logic of that doctrine. . . . The new chief of the General Staff, General V. N. Lobov, recently stated that the defensive doctrine was strictly a political invention that must now be radically revised.

systems began five to 15 years before their appearance in response to existing requirements perceived at that time. Note that Soviet introduction of systems optimized for deep offensive operations peaked just before Gorbachev's election as general secretary. New US systems, on the other hand, were introduced later and were clearly next generation, emphasizing the role of PGMs and electronic warfare in support of combined arms battle and operation. The Soviets were clearly being left behind.

Soviet professional books and journals reflected these realities and forecast the General Staff's view of the future nonlinear battlefield. However, there are two notable exceptions to this view of future war: M. M. Kir'yan's 1987 *Fronty nastupaly* (The Fronts Advance) and I. M. Anan'yev's 1988 *Tankovyye armii v nastuplenii* (Tank Armies in the Offensive).¹³ These respected military professionals focus on operational maneuver and nonlinear warfighting at the operational level. Yet, they seemingly ignore the profusion of PGMs, the lively Soviet interest

in nonlinear, low-level tactical combat and the impact of other modern technologies. They assert that traditional deep operations and employment of tank armies in their nonlinear operational role still have relevance today—almost as if PGMs and nonlinear tactical issues were irrelevant.

There have been other indications that support this conservative view of future war employing traditional Soviet operations and large tank armies. As Operation *Desert Storm* demonstrated, the tank is very vulnerable to PGMs; yet the Soviet army has gone to great expense and trouble to move large quantities of tanks out of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty-limited area to holding areas east of the Urals. This gives the Soviets the potential to field large tank-heavy forces.¹⁴ Another indication has been the Soviet ground forces' reluctance to abandon a large conscription-based army in favor of a professional army. Large armored and mechanized forces, massed or moving into a region, are vulnerable to PGMs, yet the General Staff apparently wanted to retain the conscript system in order to maintain what they assert is a critically important mobilization base for these large armored and mechanized forces. Such a mobilization base is more suited to meet the demands of large-scale, sustained operations rather than smaller, dispersed and highly mobile force groupings envisioned on nonlinear battlefields.¹⁵

Yet another indication of the reluctance of the Soviet army to abandon totally its traditional offensive operational methods is its retention of its older "triangular" division force structure, which is optimized for high-tempo, continuous offensive operations. At this writing, the bulk of Soviet divisions remains triangular. The General Staff is still debating what its future force structure will look like and assessing which structure is better designed for nonlinear combat. However, the Soviet army clearly is not retaining the "square" structure of those divisions deployed in Germany, once these divisions are withdrawn to the Soviet Union. This square structure ostensibly was optimized for defense.¹⁶



Soviet combined arms exercise utilizing Hind-A attack helicopters, BMP-1 armored personnel carriers and a ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun.

The Soviet General Staff's vision of future war anticipates dynamic, high-intensity, high-tempo land-air operations extending over vast expanses, to include space. . . . tactical combat will be even more lethal than in the past and will be characterized by nonlinear combat. The front line will disappear and terms such as "zones of combat" will replace the outmoded concepts of FEBA, FLOT and FLET.

The Offense as a Component of the Defense

Soviet tactical and operational defense combines positional elements (fortifications and positions), preplanned fires, maneuverable fire elements (aviation and artillery) and maneuver elements (mobile reserves, counterattack forces and counterstrike forces). Maneuver defense, in the form of security zones and covering armies, is used to provide tactical and operational depth in advance of the more positional main defense.¹⁷ Maneuver and countermove forces are used to ensure the viability of the main defense and create the conditions necessary to mount an offensive or counteroffensive. The tempo and scale at which maneuver and countermove forces are used have allowed the Soviets to build tactical counterattacks into operational/tactical counterstrikes and to build operational/tactical counterstrikes into opera-

tional/strategic counteroffensives.¹⁸ Successful Soviet defensive operations have always culminated in the counteroffensive, and the resources and percentage of forces devoted to the positional defense have been secondary to the forces and resources devoted to the operational reserve and counteroffensive capability.¹⁹

The purpose of a Soviet defense is not merely to blunt an aggressor's advance. Rather, it is to seize the initiative while creating the conditions necessary for the destruction of the enemy.²⁰ A key concept in seizing the initiative is preemption and counterstrike.²¹

Maintaining offensive capability is central to Soviet defensive planning from the highest levels down to battalion. This, in itself, is not "bad," nor does it discredit the defensive doctrine. What is of concern is the Soviet predilection to consider the strategic "defense" and the counteroffensive as practically the same concept.

Soviet soldiers leaping from a KV-1 tank during a counterattack against German forces, circa 1941-1942.



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A Readiness Structure

In 1990, Major General V. D. Ivanov, a General Staff officer and instructor at the General Staff Academy, offered a radical transformation of the Soviet strategic posture.²² He proposed creating a three-tiered system consisting of combat-ready forces and equipment, reserve forces and equipment, and training and alternative service personnel. The combat-ready forces are those of the strategic rocket forces, space command, air defense forces, part of the air force, part of the navy and highly mobile ground forces. These highly mobile, largely professional ground forces resemble a rapid reaction force of airborne, air-assault, *Spetsnaz* and elite combined arms units that can be coupled with select Committee of State Security (KGB) and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) units.²³ The largest ground contingent is composed of less ready forces, which resemble the cadre-

strength divisions of today.²⁴ Ivanov's three-tiered readiness structure emphasizes a nucleus of highly mobile, professional forces, yet retains the bulk of future Soviet ground forces in cadre-strength, mobilizable units. While much is new, this is still an evolutionary change and indicates that the General Staff is not currently prepared to abandon totally its traditional successful operational orientation for an untried, politically driven hybrid.

The Growing Influence of a Nonperson

In recent doctrine debates, the Soviets have rehabilitated the concepts of once suppressed theorist A. A. Svechin, who wrote on strategic issues in the 1920s. A former czarist general, he became director of the History of Military Art Department of the Red Army General Staff Academy. He is best known for his work

Thin-skinned vehicles like this 1st Armored Division M113 can move freely only across battlefields already cleared of enemy antiarmor threats.



A reduced-strength US Army may deploy contingency forces to conduct limited operations such as those in Panama and Grenada, counterterrorism and counternarcotics. This will reduce incentive for the United States to procure great quantities of these very expensive weapons. But as the Gulf War has shown, their role has become so critical to success that large stocks are required as a hedge against a large, but as yet unforeseen, threat.

titled *Strategiya* (Strategy).²⁵

However, from the 1930s until the Khrushchev reforms, Svechin was a nonperson. Although his name was allowed back into the Soviet lexicon, it was not until 1987 that discussion of his works gained any currency. Then, in 1989, the Soviets announced that they would republish the collected works of this great military theoretician. What is relevant today are Svechin's formerly repressed views of attrition warfare. In his view, the best way for the Soviet Union to defend itself would be by using frontier border troops backed by mobile, lightly armed defenders who would not become decisively engaged, but rather would lure the attacker into the depths of the country. While the attacker overextended his lines of communication and diffused his combat power, the Soviets would mass forces for a powerful counterstroke or counteroffensive. At the optimum

time, they would annihilate the attacker deep within the confines of the Soviet Union.

This view was opposed by M. N. Tukhachevsky, V. K. Triandafillov, N. E. Vartolomeyev, G. S. Isserson and other prominent theoreticians of the mid-1920s. In their view, it was best to annihilate enemy forces on enemy territory and, when war breaks out, to begin immediately an offensive on enemy territory.²⁶ This offensive (annihilation) school of military thought has held sway in the Soviet armed forces for 60 to 65 years, despite the fact that Joseph Stalin, S. K. Timoshenko and G. K. Zhukov lost the bulk of the Red Army during the initial period of the Great Patriotic War by massing forces forward in the vain hope of launching an immediate and decisive counteroffensive against an invading foe.

Svechin's view has current appeal in that it was then and is now a strategy of necessity for a




Figure 3. Creeping-up-to-war scenario with preemption

Soviet introduction of systems optimized for deep offensive operations peaked just before Gorbachev's election as general secretary. New US systems, on the other hand, were introduced later and were clearly next generation, emphasizing the role of PGMs and electronic warfare in support of combined arms battle and operation. The Soviets were clearly being left behind.

"backward Russia." With the loss of a Messianic ideology that threatened to spread Marxist-Leninist ideology on the point of a bayonet, the Soviets have lost their past definition of a just war—a definition that provided impetus for their offensive views. Now, repulsion of an invading enemy is the foundation of a just war, whereas retributive invasion of enemy territory is not required.

Svechin's writings are relevant today not only because his views support a defensive doctrine. Although many civilian academics initially seized on Svechin, the Soviet General Staff may also see value in his works. The new chief, Lobov, has written favorably about Svechin.²⁷ The General Staff is not likely to adapt the works of Svechin *in toto*. Rather, it is more likely interested in assisting the dialectical process in which the opposing views of the attrition school (Svechin) and the annihilation school (Tukhachevsky) combine to produce a synthesis that may solve the problem of future war. Further, the

General Staff is interested in preparing for future war while employing austere resources, lessons learned from recent wars, a faltering research and development effort and as many current systems as possible.

A Probable General Staff Plan for the Future Theater War

Despite internal difficulties, the General Staff will undoubtedly continue to be concerned with defense of the nation's entire periphery. Although the Western (European) strategic direction will continue to be preeminent, it no longer possesses the same importance that NATO has understandably given it. The Soviet General Staff likely foresees future theater war, however it may begin, in two phases. The first is the defensive, counter-PGM phase, during which border troops, air forces, defensive forces such as machinegun-artillery divisions, other limited-scale forces optimized for nonlinear tactical combat, *Spetsnaz* and forces equipped with high-technology weapon systems would be engaged as each side attempts to gain the advantage. The meeting battle, meeting engagement, combat for point defenses and tactical-scale counterattacks would be the main forms of ground combat. Each side would target the other's PGMs and supporting systems to cause attrition of enemy forces, defeat/suppress enemy troop control and force him to deplete his high-tech munitions.

While this phase is being fought, larger conventional forces and highly maneuverable forces would mobilize, using stocks held east of the Urals. As the supply of PGMs dwindled, con-




Figure 4. Short notice war scenario

ventional mobilization stocks would be delivered forward to mobilization bases closer to the conflict. Once the "smart bombs" stocks are depleted or destroyed, only "dumb nukes" and "dumb bombs" would remain in the enemy arsenal to attack operational targets.²⁸

At this point, phase two (the counteroffensive) would begin. Strategic nuclear weapons would guarantee that dumb nukes would not be employed (deterrence) and that only dumb bombs could be used against operational targets. At that time, operational forces, including operational maneuver forces (tank armies) and other conventional massed forces, would begin operations in time-tested Soviet fashion.

This war phasing permits mobilization to be conducted either before or during the war. Should there be adequate political or military warning arising from a period of crisis, mobilization could begin before the initiation of combat in a "creeping-up-to-war" process (fig. 3). Mobilized forces would be relatively safe from enemy PGMs as long as they stayed out of the forward area where phase one would be primarily fought.²⁹ With limited warning, mobilization could begin simultaneously with phase one, again relying on separation from the primary battlefield to provide security (fig. 4).

Planning for such a phased conflict would allow the Soviets to maintain a varied and viable force well into the future while their force is being modernized.

A Decade or Two Down the Road

Economic concerns, reform and republican sentiments will, for a time, largely negate tradi-

The meeting battle, meeting engagement, combat for point defenses and tactical-scale counterattacks would be the main forms of ground combat. Each side would target the other's PGMs and supporting systems to cause attrition of enemy forces, defeat/suppress enemy troop control and force him to deplete his high-tech munitions.

tional General Staff concepts of strategy and future theater war. However, in the midterm and long term, traditional concepts will reemerge in the Soviet (Russian) and some successor states. The nature of the Soviet Union's future military posture largely depends on the corresponding posture of the United States, Germany, China, Japan and other potentially threatening countries. Should the Soviet Union, its neighbors and traditional foes continue to move toward more cooperation, or should these countries not rearm or modernize forces rapidly, there will be less pressure on the Soviet General Staff to prepare for the future, high-tech battlefield. Conversely, with the spread of technology, many Third World nations are, or will be, acquiring the technology that now concerns the General Staff. Proliferation of high-tech systems is of concern to the United States as well—particularly if future foes field more capable forces than those of Iraq.

The United States expended sizable PGM stocks against Iraqi forces during the Gulf War.

The United States expended sizable PGM stocks against Iraqi forces during the Gulf War. Some of these systems will be replaced, but the administration has announced its intention to develop second-generation systems and reduce purchases of current technology. Without the Soviet Union as a threat, the United States may not actually stock these new PGMs in quantity.

Some of these systems will be replaced, but the administration has announced its intention to develop second-generation systems and reduce purchases of current technology. Without the Soviet Union as a threat, the United States may not actually stock these new PGMs in quantity. However, US perceptions of all threats and the forces required to deal with them may, in fact, be credibly larger than at present. In future missions, a reduced-strength US Army may deploy contingency forces to conduct limited operations such as those in Panama and Grenada, counterterrorism and counternarcotics. This will reduce incentive for the United States to procure great quantities of these very expensive weapons. But as the Gulf War has shown, their role has become so critical to success that large stocks are required as a hedge against a large, but as yet unforeseen, threat.

The Soviet armed forces, due to the collapse of the Soviet economy and the catastrophic state of their research and development effort, is years, if not decades, behind the West in the PGM field. It will take time and money for the Soviet army to field comparable systems. If the General Staff forecasts a threat involving a large number of PGMs, the Soviet (Russian) army will require large PGM stocks. If, however, the projected threat has a limited amount of PGMs, the Soviet General Staff could expect that phase one operations, conducted over a large area and involving destruction of PGMs by both sides, would be over in a relatively short period of time. This

would require less time and resources for the Soviet army to prepare to offset a potential foe's PGM advantage. In either case, the Soviet (Russian) army needs "breathing space" in order to develop or purchase PGM technology. A nonthreatening Soviet Union (Russia) may purchase off-the-shelf, late-generation PGM systems or technology on the world market like any other nation.

Reality Check

The Soviet economy has collapsed, and the union is now faced with dissolution and civil war. Will the Soviet Union survive and will its military system survive with it? The General Staff cannot accept the demise of the total nation, so it must prepare for the future—as either the Soviet or Russian General Staff.³⁰ The question is, does its vision of future theater war and theater or strategic preparations really matter?

Is future large-scale war plausible? The Soviets publicly subscribe to war prevention, at least in theory, but continue to contemplate war prosecution. The inevitability of war and the spirit of the offensive, so tied to their former ideology, may be a genetic implant in the current generation of General Staff officers, but will it always be so? Winds of change have swept the Soviet Union, and it cannot return to the old ways. How much must the army change to keep pace with the nation and how will it get the necessary resources to make those changes? History indicates that at least some traditional aspects of Soviet thought will endure.

Key questions for the General Staff in the future must be the posture of the US military vis-à-vis the Soviets. Will it be hostile, cooperative or wary? Will the US principal focus be on containing Soviet or Russian power or will it be preoccupied with regional threats or such transnational security issues as terrorism, narcotics trafficking and disaster relief? Will US force development continue to invest in high-technology systems, or will other priorities divert funds and interest?

Increasingly, Soviet concerns over low-intensity conflict (LIC), local war and civil war

compete with theater warfare concerns. In the past, the Soviets developed LIC tactics in the airborne, air assault, Spetsnaz and MVD and KGB forces. These LIC tactics may need to be modified and applied to all Soviet (Russian) maneuver forces. Existing contingency plans will be scrapped or radically altered as new relationships between military and civilian planners develop within a truncated state. A new military support infrastructure will be hampered by changing political boundaries

and relationships.

Finally, the Soviet General Staff must consider the future political course of the nation—be it the Soviet Union or Russia. Will the nation continue playing the same old game and keep falling further and further behind, or will it emulate the German and Japanese examples and gamble on the military-technological potential implicit in a modernized economy? Prudence alone dictates that the nation follow the latter path. **MR**

NOTES

1. N. Ogarkov, *Vsegda v gotovnosti zashchite otechestva* [Always in readiness for the defense of the fatherland] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982), 34–36. See also, N. Ogarkov, "Zashchita sotsializma: opyt istorii sovremennosti" [The defense of socialism: Experience of the history of modernity], *Krasnaya zvezda* [Red Star, hereafter cited as KZ], 9 May 1984: "... rapid changes in the development of conventional means of destruction and the emergence in developed countries of automated reconnaissance-strike complexes; long-range, highly accurate, terminally guided combat systems; remotely piloted vehicles; and qualitatively new electronic control systems make many types of weapons global and make it possible to increase sharply (by at least an order of magnitude) the destructive potential of conventional weapons, bringing them closer in terms of effectiveness to weapons of mass destruction. The sharply increased range of conventional weapons makes it possible to extend combat not just to the border regions, but to the territory of the entire country. This was not possible in past wars. This qualitative leap in the development of conventional means of destruction will inevitably entail a change in the nature of the preparation and conduct of operations, which will in turn predetermine the possibility of conducting military operations using conventional systems in qualitatively new, incomparably more destructive forms than before."

2. Tass translation of Italian newspaper *Il Giorno* interview with Soviet Union Defense Minister D. T. Yazov, KZ, 16 May 1991.

3. V. G. Reznichenko, ed., *Taktika* [Tactics] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), 28–29. High-precision weapons can now perform many of the missions of nuclear weapons without the collateral damage. "In terms of their capabilities, high-precision weapons systems such as hypersonic guided missiles and smart bombs resemble the capabilities of tactical nuclear weapons. They could sharply increase the losses of personnel, armament and equipment as a single rocket could knock out entire tank or motorized rifle companies." These weapon systems "change the nature of modern combined-arms combat. ... Combat is becoming increasingly dynamic and fluid and the significance of the long-range fire battle to the course and outcome of the combat is growing dramatically."

4. "Today, battle may be initiated by a bitterly contested, long-range engagement well before the combatants come into contact. Under these circumstances, defending forces in prepared positions, which are deployed with fewer forces and combat power than the attacker, may obtain a definite superiority. This is done by the more effective protection of personnel and weapons systems during the [long-range], massive fire strikes and the preservation of the combat potential of one's own armies and divisions." I. N. Manzhurn, "Nekotoryye voprosy podgotovki i naneseniya kontrudarov v oboronitel'nykh operatsiyakh" [Some questions on the preparation and conduct of the counterattack during de-

lensive operations], *Voyennaya mys'* [Military thought, hereafter cited as VM], January 1989, 14.

5. The late Marshal S. F. Akhromeyev used a similar description of the United States in a television interview this year. He stated that the United States was "ne ugroza, no opasnost'" [not a threat, but a danger].

6. Lester W. Grau, "Confrontation to Cooperation: An American/Soviet Military Coalition?" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1991).

7. Counterattack and counterstrike preparations in defensive doctrine are acceptable and prudent. However, should a defensive doctrine incorporate the potential for a strategic counteroffensive or offensive, then that doctrine requires close scrutiny. For recent discussions on the nature of Soviet military doctrine, see Jacob W. Kipp, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Conventional Arms Control," *Military Review* (December 1988): 2–23; "Western Threat Perception and the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Organization," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1990); "A Gde Zhe Ugroza? (Where Then is the Threat?): Soviet Military Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era," *Military Review* (December 1990): 2–15; "The Changing Soviet Strategic Environment: Soviet Military Doctrine, Conventional Military Forces, and the Scientific-Technical Revolution in Military Affairs," in *Strategic Power USA/USSR*, edited by Carl G. Jacobsen, 1990, 435–56; and John G. Hines and Donald Mahoney, *Defense and Counteroffensive Under the New Soviet Military Doctrine* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1991).

8. In the past, pronouncements of the General Staff were authoritative and unchallenged, as they were sanctioned by both the party-political hierarchy and the top military. Today, it is often unclear who these authorities and "experts" actually represent and what weight their pronouncements carry.

9. This reemergence of the dominance of the political side of doctrine should be expected. The Soviets are basically Clausewitzian and as "war is a continuation of politics by other means," the political side of doctrine needed to reestablish its dominance. Politics defines threats, not capabilities. The United States is unconcerned about French and British nuclear capabilities because of our political symmetry of interest. Our past concern with Soviet nuclear capabilities has been shaped by political realities of the past. For a discussion of the military role in shaping defensive doctrine, see Dale R. Herspring, *The Soviet High Command 1967–1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 217–96. On the technological side, perestroika simply promised the creation of a breathing space, and the ultimate provision of high-technology weaponry. In fact, the Soviet General Staff saw perestroika as a national security programme, not designed to cope with the strategic dilemmas occurring in the Soviet Union in the 80s and 90s, but with strategic challenges of the 21st century. The Soviet General Staff did get the end of the Cold War and slowed down the

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momentum associated with the arms race, but it cost them the Warsaw Pact. Stephen Covington in "The Soviet Union—Quo Vadis?", record of proceedings of a tri-service seminar held at the British Staff College, Camberley, 26 March 1991, 19.

10. Interview of V. N. Lobov, "Policy, Doctrine, and Strategy in a Changing World: Army General Vladimir Lobov on Military Reform," KZ, 23 October 1991, 1–2. In an interview with TRUD on 1 October 1991, General Lobov saw the new doctrine as a "united coalition doctrine" incorporating the doctrines of union republics, maintaining qualitative parity with potential threats and allowing incorporation of Soviet forces under UN command.

11. An excellent discussion of this battlefield is contained in V. M. Yevlakhov, "K voprosu o primeneni vozdushnykh desantov v oborone" [On the question of employing air assault forces in the defense], VM (May 1990), 35–40.

12. F. D. Sverlov's premier tactical work, *Peredovyye otryady v boyu* [Forward detachments in combat] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986), was given an overall excellent review, but was criticized for not adequately discussing the impact of PGMs (precision-guided munitions) on the forward detachment. See P. Lashchenko, "Deystviya peredovogo otryada: Knizhnaya polka komandira" [Actions of a forward detachment: The commander's bookshelf], KZ (5 August 1986). For a discussion of the Soviet view of nonlinear warfare, see Lester W. Grau, "Soviet Nonlinear Combat: The Challenge of the 90s," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1990); David M. Glantz, "The Soviet View of Future War," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1990); and Christopher Bellamy, *Soviet Future War*, 2 volumes, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1990).

13. M. M. Kir'yan, *Fronty nastupali: Po opytu Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny* [The fronts advance: From the experience of the Great Patriotic War] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987); I. M. Ananyev, *Tankovyye armii v nastuplenii* [Tank armies in the offensive] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988). Both books were signed into press the same year in which they were published, so this is not a matter of books in a printing queue which go out of date.

14. This also may be an attempt to postpone the expense of destroying this treaty-limited equipment or a desire to sell large numbers of Soviet tanks on the world market. However, a reasonable interpretation of the withdrawal and stockpiling of tanks—in some measure at least—can also be that the Soviet army wants to maintain a large tank force.

15. There are other reasons why the army does not want to professionalize their forces, including the higher cost of financing a professional army, the smaller size of a professional army and the loss of influence on the daily life of the citizen. However, partially trained conscripts will probably do a poorer job of protecting their equipment from PGMs than will professionals.

16. Analysis of *Informatsiya o mestakh raspolozheniya, kolichestvakh i tipakh obychnykh vooruzheniy i tekhniki, nakhodyashchisya na vooruzhenii Vooryzheniy Sil SSSR* [Information on the location, disposition, quantity and types of conventional weapons and equipment which are found in the military of the armed forces of the USSR]; *Informatsiya o strukture Sukhoputnykh voysk, Voenno-vozdushnykh sil i aviasii Voysk protivozdushnoy oborony Vooryzheniy Sil SSSR v rayone primeneniya* [Information on the structure of the ground forces, air forces and aviation of air defense forces of the armed forces of the USSR in the region of application]; and *Iskhodnyye dannyye dlya rascheta koefitsientov sootnosheniya obraztsov vooruzheniya i voyennoy tekhniki i voyskovykh formirovaniy SSSR i NATO* [Initial data for the calculating coefficients of commensurability for models of weapons and military equipment in the combat formations of the USSR and NATO]—all data provided in November 1990 by the Soviet General Staff in support of the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) negotiations. The triangular motorized rifle division's maneuver forces are three motorized rifle regiments and one tank regiment. The triangular tank division's maneuver forces are three tank regiments and one motorized rifle regiment. The square motorized rifle division's maneuver forces are four motorized rifle regiments and a tank battalion. The square tank division's maneuver forces are two tank regiments and two motorized rifle regiments. For further information on division structure, see David M. Glantz, "Soviet Force Structure in an Era of Reform," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1989).

17. For a discussion of the security zone battle, see Lester W. Grau, "Defending Forward: Soviet Activities in Front of the Main Line of Defense," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1990).

18. "In the theory of Soviet operational art, considering the strong defensive character of the defense in Soviet military doctrine, special attention is being given to the creation of a staunch, previously prepared, deliberate defense. At the same time, questions of ensuring its insurmountability are directly connected to preserving a potential for aggressiveness in the form of counterattacks and counterstrikes." Gregory Ivanovich Sal'manov, "Sovetskoye voyennoye isskustvo za 70 let" [Soviet military art after 70 years], VM (February 1988), 35.

19. "In the history of the Great Patriotic War, the battle of Kursk is the classic example of the organization of a positional defense, deeply echeloned and heavily reinforced with antitank and antiaircraft defenses. Despite its positional nature, the Soviet forces' defense of Kursk was exceptionally aggressive. The reserves which were created in advance of the operation in the armies and fronts were strategic in nature. They added depth and stability to the defense while providing the potential for the counteroffensive. . . . The idea of the counteroffensive was at the core of the concept of the [defensive] operation." V. V. L'arionov, "Triumf prednamerennoy oborony" [The triumph of the premeditated defense], VM (July, 1988), 21. During the Lake Baikal defensive operation in Hungary, Soviet main force units in the main defense were below 50 percent strength, yet personnel replacements were directed mainly to 6th Guards Tank

Army and 9th Guards Army—the operational counteroffensive force which was committed to take Vienna and knock Austria out of the war. See David M. Glantz, *From the Vistula to the Oder: Soviet Offensive Operation—October 1944–March 1945* (Carlisle, PA: US Army Art of War Symposium, 1986), 717–56.

20. "Experience has shown that [the defender] cannot gain the initiative by merely parrying blows. The aggressiveness of the defender's actions must grow constantly, not only to stop the enemy, but also to resolve the primary mission—to create the conditions for the utter destruction of the foe." S. L. Lushchyan and A. V. Zlobin, "Manevr v oboronitel'noy operatsii" [Maneuver in a defensive operation], VM (January, 1989), 20.

21. "The counterstrike is the aggregate of massed fire strikes, coordinated as to objective, place and time with the strikes of formations and large formations [divisions and armies] of the ground forces and the other branches and services, with the objective of destroying those enemy forces which have penetrated into the defense or are preparing for an offensive. The counterstrike is executed from a single plan in close coordination with those forces conducting combat in the enemy rear area." I. N. Manzhurnin, "Nekotoryye voprosy podgotovki i naneseniya kontrudarov v oboronitel'nykh operatsiyakh" [Several questions concerning preparations and conduct of the counterstrike in the defensive operation], VM (January 1989), 15. A preemptive counterstrike can do more than blunt the enemy advance. In modern times, in the course of combat with an attacking enemy, the counterstrikes undertaken by the forces of the operational reserve may exceed the limits of resolving the strictly defensive missions and prove to be the initial stage of the counteroffensive operation. V. N. Andrenko, "Ot oborony k kontrastupleniyu" [From the defense to the counteroffensive], VM (December 1988), 27.

22. V. I. Ivanov, "Korennoye obnoveniye a ne 'kosmeticheskyy remont'" [Fundamental restructuring, not "cosmetic repair"], *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* [Communist of the armed forces], no. 15, (August 1990), 15–20.

23. In late August, most of the KGB and MVD combat units were resubordinated to the Ministry of Defense.

24. These divisions normally contain 5 to 50 percent of their personnel and are filled with reservists before the division is deployed.

25. Aleksandr Andreyevich Svechin was born into a military family on 17 August 1878. His father was a major general, and Aleksandr followed his footsteps from his boyhood in the cadet corps and the Mikhailovsky military school. He entered active service in 1895 and later completed the Nikolayevsky Academy of the General Staff. He served in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. During World War I, he advanced from regimental commander to army and then front chief of staff. He voluntarily entered the service of the new Red Army in 1918. *Sovetskaya Voenennaya entsiklopediya* [Soviet military encyclopedia], vol. 7 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979), 264.

26. Discussion of the Svechin-Tukhachevsky debates and the eventual triumph of the primacy of the offensive over the school of attrition are found in Jacob W. Kipp, "Mass, Mobility, and the Red Army's Road to Operational Art," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1988); and Vitaly Rapoport and Yun Alexeev, *High Treason: Essays on the History of the Red Army, 1918–1938*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985).

27. A. A. Kokoshin and V. N. Lobov, "Predvideniye" [Foresight], *Znaniya* [Banner], February 1990, 170–71.

28. This description holds many similarities with the old General Staff plans for the conduct of general nuclear war. "Each of the opposing sides will try to inflict heavy losses in a short time on the enemy. In such wars, the capability of the military to conduct planned and organized action will decrease rapidly, and nuclear stockpiles will be exhausted. This does not mean that a nuclear war will be terminated very quickly. Even after the exhaustion of the principal nuclear stockpiles, military actions will carry on for a long time, and the war will assume a special character unprecedented in history. Following massive nuclear strikes, the war will surely not end, but the opposing sides will continue to launch their strikes at a lower level of force. The forces must be prepared to continue the war, despite the fact that they may have suffered enormous losses. They should continue to advance and prosecute the war." Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, *The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy. Volume I: Issues of Soviet Military Strategy*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989), 71.

29. The Soviets consider that US high-precision weapons deployed in deep battle in the initial period of war will strike primarily in a zone 100 to 150 kilometers deep and secondarily, in a zone out to 450 to 500 kilometers deep. Andrenko, 24–25. With a limited stock of PGMs and the immediate demands of forward combat, priority of PGM fires would be given to the most threatening forward targets. Follow-on forces targeting, directed at forces located over 1,000 kilometers from the main area of hostilities, is problematic and would probably lack the necessary quantity of dedicated PGMs. Unlike the Persian Gulf War, future war will involve active use of PGMs by both sides. PGM stocks on both sides will decrease much more quickly than did coalition stocks in the Gulf, since counter-PGM targeting will demand the highest priority.

30. Already, elements of the Soviet General Staff have taken positions with Boris Yeltsin's government of the Russian republic.



The Receding Soviet Military Threat

Lieutenant Colonel William D. O'Malley, US Army

FOR the last 40 years, the NATO/Warsaw Pact confrontation was both militarily threatening and intellectually comfortable. Each change in military hardware, force structure or tactics could be examined against a well-structured and well-known environment. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, and the political and military revolution in the Soviet Union have reduced the direct military threat to the West but increased the uncertainty. While we recognize that the possibility of a major East-West war—as long envisioned—seems to have virtually vanished, as military professionals and planners we must strive to understand how military forces might operate in future conflicts whose character we cannot now predict.

When the West began its latest European arms control efforts in the mid-1980s, its overriding objective was to reduce the direct threat posed to NATO by the overwhelmingly superior numbers and offensive orientation of the Warsaw Pact forces, especially in the Central Region.

In strictly numerical terms, the disparity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact conventional forces in the mid to late 1980s was indeed dramatic. To underscore the scope of this disparity, let us focus on one key ground combat system, the tank. In 1988, NATO had roughly 23,700 tanks, of which 6,200 belonged to US forces. The Warsaw Pact maintained over 56,000 tanks, of which more than 41,000 were Soviet.¹ Across the board during this period, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies maintained a better than 2-1 advantage in the numbers of

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In 1988, NATO had roughly 23,700 tanks, of which 6,200 belonged to US forces. The Warsaw Pact maintained over 56,000 tanks, of which more than 41,000 were Soviet.

key ground combat systems deployed throughout the region. Furthermore, in addition to the forces provided by their Warsaw Pact allies, the Soviets maintained 30 maneuver divisions of their own, with their air and sustainment support forward deployed with the Soviet Groups of Forces in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.²

The Soviets and their former Warsaw Pact allies had spent decades and many millions of dollars putting the logistics infrastructure in place.³ They had also forward deployed in quantity key military consumables such as ammunition and POL (petroleum, oils and lubricants).⁴ This potent first-echelon force in and of itself represented a significant short-warning threat to NATO's Central Region. It was clear where the Soviet military perceived its principal threat lay, as better than two-thirds of its overall conventional military power was deployed west of Urals in the European portion of the Soviet Union.

After more than two years of intense negotiations, members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO signed the CFE Treaty, which would significantly reduce the numbers of key conventional combat systems stationed in Europe.

Although it was signed . . . by representatives of all parties to the two alliances, it has yet to become binding, pending ratification by all states.

The Change Begins

By 1987, growing political pressure led to change in the strident political content of the Warsaw Pact's military doctrine.⁵ Observable change began modestly with the May 1987 declaration of the Political Consultative Committee, stating that the pact's "...military doctrine...is strictly defensive and proceeds from the fact that the application of military means to resolve any dispute is inadmissible under current conditions."⁶ Statements in July 1987 by General D. T. Yazov, the Soviet minister of defense, went a little further by defining the Soviet Union's military doctrine as: "...a system of basic views on the *Prevention of War*, on military organizational development, the preparation of the country and its armed forces for repelling aggression, and methods of conducting warfare in defense of socialism."⁷

At the time, these and similar statements did not yet appear to be backed up by concrete changes in the structure and disposition of Soviet or Warsaw Pact forces that would indicate they were becoming any more defensive in character than before. Before long, however, and despite evident military reluctance, the Soviet political leadership pressed ahead. First, it negotiated a bilateral (US-Soviet) agreement on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated a whole class of theater nuclear systems. Second, it agreed to push ahead on negotiations of a Europe-wide conventional forces arms control agreement. Third, in December 1988, Gorbachev an-

nounced in a UN declaration a unilateral Soviet force reduction package.⁸ There was also to be a restructuring of Soviet forces to give them a more defensive character.⁹

All of these events, especially the Soviets' unilateral force reduction that implied acknowledgment of their European-based conventional force superiority, gave reason for new optimism in the West and opened the door for further European arms control agreements.

Conventional Forces Arms Control

After more than two years of intense negotiations, members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO signed the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which would significantly reduce the numbers of key conventional combat systems stationed in Europe. Although it was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990 by representatives of all parties to the two alliances, it has yet to become binding, pending ratification by all states.¹⁰

If the CFE Treaty is ratified, it will limit the overall numbers of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) that can be maintained in the "Atlantic to the Urals" (ATTU) treaty area.¹¹ This, of course, will require a reduction in the numbers of Soviet combat formations within the treaty area.¹² Moreover, when taken in concert with the subregional limits that preclude force concentrations, these limits will generally dictate where their residual conventional ground and air forces can be deployed.¹³

Although the treaty would significantly affect the numbers of Soviet army and air force equipment and units deployed within both the ATTU and the Eastern Europe subzone, the CFE Treaty alone would not have ended the Soviet Union's Eastern Europe presence. Under the treaty's provisions, the Soviets would still be able to maintain their bridge into Central Europe and control of and access to the forward-deployed stocks and facilities in the sustainment base. It would, however, have radically changed the pattern and density of that force deployment, eliminating the ability of these East Europe-based forces to conduct independent, short-



The Soviet General Staff, in anticipation of a CFE agreement, sought to . . . maintain the conventional combat systems necessary to temper the treaty's impact on their overall wartime force generation capability . . . by moving combat equipment out of the treaty area. In doing so, they have shifted the center of gravity of their conventional forces east of the Urals, where more than two-thirds of their conventional combat systems are now deployed.

warning offensive operations and limiting the role of that composite force—unreinforced—to defensive and LOC (lines of communication) security operations during the initial phase of any conflict.¹⁴

If the CFE Treaty is finally ratified, established TLE constraints will require the Soviets to reduce their 1988 holdings in the ATTU by about 50 percent, which would mean a Soviet ground force structure of about 60 to 65 maneuver divisions. Furthermore, in order to field even this number of divisions, the Soviets have had to reduce the numbers of treaty-limited combat systems with each of the formation types, decreasing their combat capability. This will represent a force of less than 50 percent of that held by the

Soviets in the region just three years ago. In fact, the Soviet General Staff, in anticipation of a CFE agreement, sought to shelter large quantities of their conventional forces from destruction under the provisions of the agreement.¹⁵ The Soviets began to build down their Europe-based conventional force structure as early as 1988. Their intention was to ensure that they could maintain the conventional combat systems necessary to temper the treaty's impact on their overall wartime force generation capability, in this case by moving combat equipment out of the treaty area. In doing so, they have shifted the center of gravity of their conventional forces east of the Urals, where more than two-thirds of their conventional combat systems are now

Clearly, it is the loss of [the Soviet military's] bridge into Central Europe and its operational and sustainment base—more than the loss of their former allies' force contribution—that has effectively forced the General Staff planners to toss out, rather than retool, their contingency war plans for the Western Theater.

deployed. The Soviet General Staff has, through this mass movement eastward of equipment into the newly evolving strategic reserve, significantly reduced the overall effect of the treaty on their future conventional force potential. But at the moment, that large stock of combat equipment remains only a potential. Even if the Soviets were able to actualize the combat capability of these assets, would they—over time—be able to circumvent the arms control constraints and reestablish the military position vis-à-vis NATO that they held just three years ago? And at what cost?


The Importance of Eastern Europe

Clearly the CFE Treaty alone is not affecting the build-down in Soviet military capability. Nor is it really the factor most dramatically influencing the changes we have seen in the threat posed to NATO. Soviet operational planning for war in Europe had been heavily dependent on the forward deployment of large quantities of critical consumables and other stocks.


Along with their forces forward deployed in Eastern Europe, the Soviet General Staff had put much time, effort and money—along with former Warsaw Pact allies—into the development of the infrastructure necessary to support the pre-positioning of large stocks of ammunition, fuel and other critical supplies necessary to support combat operations in Central Europe. Over the last two decades, the Soviet military has substantially increased the numbers of depots and the quantities of military supplies within the Western Theater's logistics infrastructure. Western intelligence assessments placed the quantities of forward-deployed ammunition at an estimated 3 million metric tons and POL at 9 million.¹⁶ About 45 percent of that total was stocked in Eastern Europe.¹⁷ These theater

The key to Western TVD operational planning had been a pre-positioned sustainment base


Estimated total
POL & Ammunition
9 million metric tons




6 million metric tons



Distribution pattern
represented by shading



Jubilant young Berliners gathering atop the Berlin Wall in front of the Brandenburg Gate the night after the East German government announced that all checkpoints would be opened. 10 November 1989.




The speed of the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to intervene took everyone by surprise. . . . These events effectively overturned the post-World War II security order and operational structure the Soviets had so assiduously constructed around the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization. It became clear early on that the days of both the Warsaw Pact and Soviet presence in Eastern Europe were numbered.

quantities of ammunition and POL have been assessed as sufficient to support high-intensity, multifront combat operations against NATO for 60 to 90 days.¹⁸

These stockage levels of ammunition and POL represent only a fraction of the overall logistics and transportation infrastructure that the Soviets and their former coalition partners had put in place, including engineer stocks necessary to support the wartime maintenance and continued operation of the critical LOC linking the Soviet Union with its forward-deployed combat forces.¹⁹ They had also established dedicated military maintenance and repair facili-

ties, dedicated and pre-positioned railroad rolling and repair stocks, a hospital network that incorporated both existing fixed and tactical facilities, an integrated national air defense network, hardened wartime command and control facilities, and so forth.²⁰ Soviet operational and force structure planning for contingencies in the Western Theater was highly dependent on the existence of this pre-positioned operational and sustainment base. It appears that Soviet operational planning through early 1989 continued to emphasize their alliance linkage and the continued forward-deployed presence in Eastern Europe of Soviet forces, facilities and

A POL storage facility in the former East German state, circa 1983.



[Pre-positioning played] a critical role in the movement of combat forces from within the Soviet Union to their staging areas in Eastern Europe. Without [it], logistic stocks and other combat support assets and facilities . . . would have to be deployed forward from the Soviet Union and compete with the forward-deploying combat forces for access to railroads, which will carry an estimated 75 percent of all military traffic to the fronts, during the important buildup and initial combat phases of any European conflict.


stocks albeit at a much reduced level.

Through this pre-positioning, the Soviets had relieved the rail network of a tremendous burden. This would play a critical role in the movement of combat forces from within the Soviet Union to their staging areas in Eastern Europe. Without the pre-positioning, these logistic stocks and other combat support assets and facilities, so vital to the support and sustainment of combat operations, would have to be deployed forward from the Soviet Union and compete with the forward-deploying combat forces for access to railroads, which will carry an estimated

75 percent of all military traffic to the fronts, during the important buildup and initial combat phases of any European conflict.

Impact of the 1989 Revolutions

The speed of the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to intervene took everyone by surprise. In June 1989, Solidarity handily won its first election in Poland, in November the Berlin Wall came down and by the end of the year, all of Eastern Europe's communist dictatorships had fallen. These events effectively overturned the post-



World War II security order and operational structure the Soviets had so assiduously constructed around the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization. It became clear early on that the days of both the Warsaw Pact and Soviet presence in Eastern Europe were numbered.

In April 1991, the Warsaw Pact military alliance was officially disbanded and with it any pretense of a continued adherence to its coalition warfare concepts was terminated. The Soviets completed the withdrawal of their forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary by June 1991, negotiated the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany and are in the process of negotiating a withdrawal agreement with Poland.²¹ It is the loss of this bridge into Central Europe and its operational and sustainment base—more than the loss of their former allies' force contribution—that has effectively forced the General Staff planners to toss out, rather than retool, their contingency war plans for the Western Theater.²² Additionally, the General Staff is undoubtedly reassessing the Soviet Union's evolving security concerns and struggling to

Although the Soviet Union or its successor state(s) will potentially retain the largest single military force in Europe, the . . . key components of its direct military threat to Western Europe, have been significantly reduced. In fact . . . the Soviet General Staff for the first time finds its active force structure in Europe conventionally inferior to or, at best, at parity with its longstanding adversary NATO in peacetime.

adapt its military doctrine and strategy to this new and uncertain security environment. Besides the withdrawal of forces, the Soviets must also move the principal components of the operational command, control and communications (C³) and support/sustainment infrastructure and put them in place—at a tremendous cost in manpower and rubles—in their new first echelon based in the Soviet Union, in the pattern and density necessary for effective

Pressures for major military reform, directed not only at the armed forces, per se, but also at the overall national security apparatus . . . have grown. The "liberals" are forcing an opening up of this process, displacing the military's long-held uncontested control and demilitarizing the economy, reducing the amount of rubles, manpower and production capacity controlled by the defense sector.

conduct of operations, even defensive.²³

Effects on the Military Environment. Within this new environment, we have seen a quick and dramatic change in the region's balance of military power and an ongoing disengagement of opposition forces along and near the long-contested Inter-German border (IGB). With the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, the "entire military geography of Europe is changing."²⁴ Moreover, the Soviets have not only lost their presence in Eastern Europe, but also their assured access.²⁵ Although the Soviet Union or its successor state(s) will potentially retain the largest single military force in Europe, the overwhelming size, offensive capability, forward-deployed position and operational buffer and capacity for surprise attack, which were all key components of its direct military threat to Western Europe, have been significantly reduced. In fact, the tables are now turned and the Soviet General Staff for the first time finds its active force structure in Europe conventionally inferior to or, at best, at parity with its longstanding adversary NATO in peacetime. And the General Staff must now focus its efforts on developing plans and force deployment patterns and retailoring its combat formations to support defensive and possibly counteroffensive operations from within Soviet territory. But compounding these difficult planning problems for the General Staff are the unresolved questions about its identity and the composi-

tion of the nation it must now serve.

The Soviet Domestic Environment. The dramatic developments outlined here have overturned the basic assumptions that have so long served as the foundation for Soviet military planning in Europe. The Soviet General Staff has thus had to adapt to a transformed strategic environment. Planners have sought to address the long-term uncertainties they face through a series of interim measures, designed to ensure the basic defense of the state and to provide some sense of institutional stability within the military. The approach has entailed making refinements to existing operational plans and planning parameters, rather than making major changes to the system, until this transitory phase passes and a more precise picture of the world and, in turn, Soviet national security concerns emerge.²⁶

In their attempts to hedge against an uncertain future, however, the Soviet military leaders have been severely constrained in pursuing their desired ends by political developments at home. Pressures for major military reform, directed not only at the armed forces, per se, but also at the overall national security apparatus and its decision-making and budgetary processes, have grown. The "liberals" are forcing an opening up of this process, displacing the military's long-held uncontested control and demilitarizing the economy, reducing the amount of rubles, manpower and production capacity controlled by the defense sector.

Following the 19 August 1991 coup attempt, the new and more reform-minded military leadership finds its political position eroded even further and the pressures for radical change even more pronounced. Moreover, the union continues to fracture and the weight and influence of the republics continue to grow. The ultimate shape of any new "union" is uncertain, as is the willingness of its component parts to contribute to collective defense. Under these circumstances, it seems increasingly implausible that any central government will have the ability to maintain for long an armed force of the size and character that the Soviet Union fielded even at

the beginning of 1991, after two years of reductions had already occurred. Although both the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff will likely have some direct input, the decisions that will determine a mutual defense structure and, in turn, the future organization, structure and size of a new union's post-Cold War armed forces appear now to be in the hands of those negotiating a new "all-union" treaty. The outcome remains highly uncertain, to say the least, as even the shape, powers and geography of any new union are still far from evident. So, too, is the nature of any new security arrangements that may emerge.

Some Final Thoughts

Unquestionably, the great European war scenarios involving a NATO/Warsaw Pact confrontation, played out in agonizing detail in numerous books and war games and which for so long provided the focus for US and NATO contingency planning, weapons development and acquisition, and force design, are a thing of the past.²⁷

That is not to say that during this period of conventional force retreat and declining combat capability, we should reduce or eliminate our monitoring of the "Soviet" strategic and conventional forces. Rather, we must acknowledge the gravity of the changes in the security environment that have occurred. Even more impor-

It seems increasingly implausible that any central government will have the ability to maintain for long an armed force of the size and character that the Soviet Union fielded even at the beginning of 1991, after two years of reductions had already occurred. Although both the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff will likely have some direct input, the decisions . . . appear now to be in the hands of those negotiating a new "all-union" treaty.

tant, we must recognize that the Soviet Union, along with its military establishment, is at a political watershed as well, and that the process of change is far from complete. Undoubtedly, a very different and clearly defined armed force will emerge from all of this. How it evolves will be critical to any future assessment of its roles, missions and capability. Like Soviet planners themselves, we cannot know the exact shape of the future. Hence, we should not plan now for a single view of that future, but we must keep in place an apparatus that continuously examines the military situation and how best to use our limited forces and resources to meet any military needs. **MR**

NOTES

1. These comments are derived from the text of the Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney's testimony on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 16 July 1991.

2. There were 19 divisions in East Germany (Western Group of Forces—WGF, formerly GSFG—Group of Soviet Forces, Germany), 5 divisions in Czechoslovakia (Central Group of Forces—CGF), 4 divisions in Hungary (Southern Group of Forces—SGF), and 2 divisions in Poland (Northern Group of Forces—NGF).

3. This logistics/support infrastructure included hospitals, maintenance facilities, storage depots, a transportation network, construction assets (supplies and equipment) necessary for the upkeep, repair, and peacetime and wartime operation of lines of communications.

4. Western estimates suggest that 60 to 90 days of ammunition and petroleum, oils and lubricants were stockpiled in fixed storage facilities in the Western TVD to support Soviet and Warsaw Pact (WP) combat operations against NATO in the Central Region. *Soviet Military Power (SMP)* (Washington, DC: US Gov-

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eminent Printing Office [GPO], 1987), 101; *SMP* (1990), 95.

5. This pressure was being directly applied by Mikhail Gorbachev, who had been, since he assumed power, trying to remove or deemphasize those military issues and developments that fostered Western threat perceptions and anxiety in an effort to demilitarize the political-ideological competition with the West. Furthermore, with *perestroika* [restructuring] came an opening of the national security process and, for the first time, the fostering by the political leadership of alternative "civilian" sources—both inside and outside the governmental structure—of information and analysis to those of the Ministry of Defense. Many, if not most, of these evolving national security "experts" presented views and analysis that were much more "liberal" and reform-minded than that of the ministry.

6. The full text of the declaration was carried in *Pravda*, 30 May 1987.

7. *Pravda* (27 July 1987); Marshal D. T. Yazov, *Na Strazhe Mira i Sotsializma* [On Guard for Peace and Socialism], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), 23. The quote was found in Jacob W. Kipp's, "Soviet Military Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era," *Military Review* (December 1990):4 and 5. This article does an excellent job of placing all of these military changes in the context of the domestic and international political environment that has been their breeding ground. As Michael McGwire points out in *Perestroika and Soviet National Security* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991), 364–68, a focus on war prevention versus the inevitability of conflict means a massive change for the Soviet military planner in the way things are done in general and specifically how future force requirements will be determined:

"For forty years military doctrine and science had been primarily concerned with the worst-case contingency of world war, and the Soviet Union had structured and postured its forces to fight such a war. Henceforth the military must plan on the assumption that world war could be averted and prepare instead for lesser contingencies . . ."

8. In his UN Speech, Gorbachev announced that there would be a reduction over the next two years in several categories of Soviet military equipment and in total Soviet armed forces, including the withdrawal of six tank divisions and 5,000 tanks from Eastern Europe. Overall cuts in the Soviet armed forces would include: 500,000 troops, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 820 aircraft from the European part of the Soviet Union. He further declared the intention to change the structure of Soviet maneuver divisions so that it would be unambiguously clear that they were defensive. *Krasnaya zvezda* (8 December 1988).

9. Further clarification by the General Staff indicated that the offensive character of these divisions was being reduced by decreasing their tank density—tank divisions by 20 percent and motorized rifle divisions by 40 percent. In order to do this, the basic maneuver division was altered from its traditional triangular structure (three regiments to one) by replacing one of the tank regiments in both the tank and motorized rifle divisions with an IFV-equipped motorized rifle regiment. The result was that the tank division then had a balance of two tank regiments and two BMP-equipped motorized rifle regiments, and the motorized rifle division had four motorized rifle regiments. With the replacement of the tanks by newer variants of the BMP infantry fighting vehicle and a couple of other equipment upgrades, the resulting divisions were a better combined arms mix, had lost little of their overall combat power and were well designed for either defensive or offensive operations on the anticipated high-tech Central European battlefield. At the time, it was anticipated that all of the Soviets' East Europe-based forces and some of those in the western Soviet Union would convert to this "Division 89" structure; however, the world changed once again before they restructured more than a half-dozen divisions in Eastern Europe, and this structural concept has not survived the next series of shocks, as they are reverting back to variants of the traditional division structure.

10. It is quite likely that the West has dropped all of its opposition to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty's ratification. But for members of the Soviet central government, especially the military leadership, they have to see the treaty as being even less favorable and of less utility to them today than it was six months ago. For one thing, because of the accelerated changes occurring in Europe, we are becoming ever more removed from the European political and security environment that served as a basis for our negotiations. Additionally, in its current form, the treaty, which was negotiated on a bloc-to-bloc basis, does not establish conventional force parity in Europe for the Soviet Union, since the WP Treaty Organization has been disbanded. This point was argued by General V. N. Lobov in his February 1991 article, "Ways of Realizing the Concept of Sufficiency for Defense," in *Voennoye Mysl'* [Military Thought], 3: "In such a situation (a breakup of the Warsaw Pact) the Soviet Union will have to count only on its own forces to ensure security." In April 1991, General M. A. Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, argued that following reductions the correlation in ground-based systems (tanks, artillery and armored combat vehicles) between the Soviet Union and NATO will be roughly 1.5–1 in NATO's favor and approximately 1.3–1 in airborne systems (combat aircraft and attack helicopters). See "Problems of Security: A Considered Approach is Needed," *Izvestiya* (6 April 1991), 6. Second, with the establishment of the independent Baltic states and the growing pressure for further independence by the remaining republics of the union, the principal WP signatory of the treaty is no longer the nation it once was and its future remains unclear. Therefore, there should be some doubt over whether the treaty will be ratified by the Soviets and even if it was, the question would remain over how binding the treaty would be on newly independent states emerging from further breakup of the empire. Despite the growing number of national security questions and other concerns that appear to surround this treaty and call for renegotiation, as a minimum, Soviet ratification will most likely proceed and be determined by political and economic imperatives.

11. Under the provisions of the CFE Treaty, the Soviets will be permitted to retain, in the treaty area, a maximum of 13,150 tanks, 20,000 armored combat vehicles, 13,175 artillery pieces, 1,500 attack helicopters and 5,150 combat aircraft. Moiseyev, 6, as reported in *USSR Report: Arms Control and Disarmament*, FBIS-SOV-91-067, 8 April 1991, 1–4.

12. These treaty ceilings will go a long way toward reversing the tremendous conventional force disparity that the Soviets and their former WP allies had long enjoyed over NATO in Europe, by establishing parity between the two alliances. Although the WP no longer exists as a military alliance, the established ceilings will still effectively force the Soviets to remove or destroy large numbers of these combat systems to meet the established ceiling of 13,150. The 1989 Soviet total of around 41,000 was by itself almost twice the NATO total of roughly 23,500 tanks.

13. The CFE Treaty area has been divided into four subzones, with subceilings for the amount of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) that can be maintained in each. In this way, the treaty has effected an overall conventional force reduction and also precludes force concentration.

14. Kipp, 8.

15. During the two years preceding the final signature of the CFE Treaty, the Soviet General Staff aggressively pursued a program aimed at reducing its "destruction liability" and sheltering large quantities of TLE from the treaty constraints by moving more than 50,000 (estimates range as high as 70,000) items of TLE east of the Urals, out of the treaty area.

16. *SMP*, 101.

17. For example, in discussing the problems associated with withdrawal of their forces from Eastern Europe, the Soviets acknowledge that about 2.5 million metric tons of ammunition were stockpiled in eastern Germany alone. Draft of article by Kerry L. Hines, "Eastern Europe and Soviet Security Challenges," scheduled to be published in *Defence Analysis Special Edition* (Fall 1991).

18. The Soviets have acknowledged that their logistics stocks in eastern Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia alone were sufficient to support operations up to 40 days. *SMP* 1990, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990), 95.

19. These included the storage of bridging repair and replacement stocks at key crossing points, stocks of rails, ties and other stocks necessary to repair and replace key rail lines, tactical pipeline and construction supplies and equipment.

20. For an excellent discussion of the scope and depth of this infrastructure, see Hines, 23–24.

21. In February and March 1990, the Soviets signed bilateral agreements with Czechoslovakia and Hungary for the withdrawal of their troops from these countries by July 1991. As part of the two-plus-four agreement, which solidified the reunification of Germany, the Soviets agreed to withdraw their forces from eastern Germany by the end of 1994. Indications are that this withdrawal from Germany is proceeding on schedule. Negotiations are still under way with the Poles to establish a time schedule for the removal of Soviet forces from Poland. Kipp, 8.

22. In order to update their longstanding operational orders for the Western Theater, as a minimum, Soviet forces would have to conduct a new two-phase military operation into Poland to reestablish their bridge into Western Europe. Critical to the timing involved and the allocation of forces for the successful conduct of this initial phase of any operation against NATO would be the role played by any remaining East European allies. However, even under the best of circumstances, with the Poles inviting them in, it would still take them about a month to concentrate and secure the transportation assets and lines of communication (LOCs), move in the combat and combat support units, reestablish the forward-deployed C³ facilities and strategic air defense network, and put in place the stocks and logistics infrastructure necessary to support and sustain any large-scale combat operations against NATO. If the Poles resist in any way, the time, manpower and assets required for both the occupation and consolidation/reestablishment phases of this operation would increase proportionately. With the loss of their forward-deployed infrastructure, assured access to Polish facilities and support by Polish military and civilian manpower and equipment in securing, operating and maintaining key LOCs and facilities, the Soviets would have to structure their forces and plan their operations very differently.

23. General V. N. Lobov in his article, "Ways to Realize the Concept of Defensive Sufficiency," *Voennoye Mysl'* (March 1991): 14–15, underscored the fact that " . . . facilities in that amount [present in Eastern Europe are] nonexistent on the European part of the USSR."

24. John J. Yurechko, "New Soviet Thinking on Unwinnable Wars: Mobilization and Military Doctrine," in *European Security Policy After the Revolutions of 1989*, ed. Jeffrey Simon, (Washington, DC: The National Defense University Press, 1991), 62.

25. For further discussion of the planning implications of this changing environment, see Paul K. Davis, *Planning for Long-term Security in Central Europe: Implications of the New Strategic Environment*, RAND Report, R-3977-USDP.

26. Yurechko, 58.

27. *Ibid.*, 55.



TWO CASES

...from the states
...European
...security
...ethnic strife
...response
...The
...Yugoslavia
...movements
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...military estab-
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The Yugoslav People's Army Between Civil War and Disintegration

Jacob W. Kipp and Timothy L. Sanz

AUGUST, a crisis in the Balkans and a revolutionary upheaval in part of Europe—these words raise the hair on the back of the neck. Just a bit less than 80 years ago, Europe inaugurated this century of total war, thanks to the inability of its monarchs, statesmen and generals to deal with a Balkan crisis, the latest manifestation of what diplomats then called the “accursed Eastern Question.” In the wake of that failure of statecraft, million-man armies marched into battle from one end of the Continent to the other. Looking back on the long interval of peace that Europe has enjoyed since the end of World War II, the present crisis confirms the reality of a profound shift in the European security system and raises the question of whether the emerging security system in Europe will be able to deal with new Balkan crises.

For several decades, while the military might of two ideologically hostile blocs stood poised for action in Central Europe, a hypothetical internal crisis in Yugoslavia was often seen as an element in a scenario for bringing about a NATO-Warsaw Pact military confrontation. It is symptomatic of the new situation in European security that the onset of such a blowup, pitting ethnic groups against one another and the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), has not set off a systemic crisis in Europe. At the same time, existing European institutions for intervention and crisis resolution, such as the European Community (EC) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), have not been able to check the ethnic violence that threatens to dismember the Socialist Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia (SFRY), create a sea of refugees within and outside Yugoslavia and resurrect a climate of communal violence and fear that could go unchecked for decades. The international community at the onset of the Yugoslav crisis spoke with one voice about the need to maintain the territorial integrity of the SFRY. But, two months

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into a bloody conflict, some began to fear that Yugoslavia had become a “Humpty-Dumpty” that all the EC's horses and men could not put together again.

New security problems connected with ethnic tensions, economic disorders and the collapse of older sociopolitical institutions have not, in this case, proved easy to resolve. For four decades, thanks to the bloc stability of the Cold War, Europe has not been forced to face so serious a threat of ethnic violence challenging existing borders and usurping an existing state's monopoly on violence within its borders.

An M-980 of the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav army passes a Croatian police armored car during ethnic unrest in Pakrac, Croatia, 3 March 1991.



There is no Yugoslav party that bridges the cleavages of ethnic politics. . . . The northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia are set upon *de facto* independence, while Serbia, along with Montenegro, is committed to the existing federal systems, which the Slovenes and Croats believe has been a disguised "Greater Serbia." Bosnia-Herzegovina, a microcosm of the ethnic diversity that is Yugoslavia, favors a new federalism, a moderate position between the two extremes.

In post-Cold War Europe, these issues have emerged with full force in central and eastern Europe. Yugoslavia is the first test of the post-Cold War security order in Europe. At the core of the current crisis is the fate of the YPA. Its survival or transformation into a Serbian national army will, in large measure, determine the fate of Yugoslavia and provide a solid indication of the viability of Europe's post-Cold War security system. What makes this situation most disturbing is that, according to some analysts, the Yugoslav crisis is not an anomaly but the manifestation of a specific stage in post-Cold War eastern Europe and a potential scenario for future developments on a grander scale in the Soviet Union.¹ The recent, mutual recognition of each other's independence by the republics of Lithuania and Croatia make such linkage explicit.²

Moreover, the Yugoslav case, like that of the Soviet Union, carries with it a host of international ramifications relating to disputed territories and the status of ethnic minorities (Kosovo, Macedonia and Vojvodina being the most prominent). The number of scenarios for a

peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis gradually narrowed in the spring of 1991, until the prospects of civil war and dissolution of the SFRY outweighed the likelihood of a constitutional transformation into a confederative state. This prospect raised the risk of a "Balkan Lebanon."³

Background of the Current Civil War

Until the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence in June 1991, the YPA was the last functioning federal institution of Marshal Tito's state, and was itself in deep crisis. The Yugoslav League of Communists has disintegrated as a ruling party. Successor elements hold power in some of the republics, most notably President Slobodan Milosevic's socialists in Serbia. But there is no Yugoslav party that bridges the cleavages of ethnic politics. The collective presidency, which assumed *de facto* and *de jure* executive authority after Tito's death, has been unable to act because of divisions in its ranks, reflecting the tensions among Yugoslavia's six republics and two provinces.



Belgrade, Serbia



Rijeka, Croatia

The tourist industry, which has earned Yugoslavia about \$2.5 billion annually, has been brought to a halt by the fighting. By late March 1991 . . . 7,293 firms, or 23 percent of all those in Yugoslavia, were insolvent in late February. With a current unemployment rate of 20 percent and the prospects of a other 1.5 million [jobs lost] by the end of the year, Yugoslavia faces economic collapse.

The northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia are set upon *de facto* independence, while Serbia, along with Montenegro, is committed to the existing federal systems, which the Slovenes and Croats believe has been a disguised "Greater Serbia." Bosnia-Herzegovina, a microcosm of the ethnic diversity that is Yugoslavia, favors a new federalism, a moderate position between the two extremes. In the wake of the outbreak of fighting, its leadership has called for the internationalization of the crisis and expressed fear of "far-reaching interethnic conflict" within its own borders.⁴ Macedonia, with its own ethnic ten-

sions and international complications, has moved toward independence, with talk of a Balkan federation and a "union of sovereign states."⁵

Elements of the old League of Communists in Serbia (renamed the Socialist Party of Serbia) promoting Serbian nationalism have remained in control but were, until the outbreak of fighting, challenged by a Serbian opposition for more democratic reforms. Milosevic has spent the last several years promoting a program of Greater Serbia at the expense of any compromise in support of the federation. He rode to power as a defender of Serbian minority interests in Kosovo against the claims of its Albanian majority for self-rule and has brought the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina directly under Serbian control. In Kosovo, where 90 percent of the population is Albanian, this meant imposing rule from Belgrade by force of arms.⁶ The deteriorating economic situation in Serbia itself, combined with efforts to limit democracy there, finally resulted in confrontations between Milosevic and the opposition in Serbia in March 1991, leading to mass protests over control of the Serbian media and federal military deployments to Belgrade.

The present crisis is more than just a reassertion of old ethnic conflicts. The regionalization of economic decision making in the 1980s undercut any prospect of federal leadership. Milosevic refused to support federal economic reforms unless his claims in Kosovo were recognized. At this juncture, as Robin Remington has pointed out, "The road to Yugoslav market socialism had detoured down the ally of national and ethnic strife."⁷

Yugoslavia entered a deep economic crisis. Over the past several years the country has experienced a declining GNP (gross national product) and runaway inflation that reached the incredible rate of 2,000 percent in 1990. Despite the best efforts of Prime Minister Ante Markovic's government, it has shown no signs of abating. His administration did manage to bring inflation temporarily under control and carried out currency reform. The federal government's program collapsed, however, as the economy continued to deteriorate in the face of growing civil unrest.

The Yugoslav socialist-market economy faced a rising tide of closed firms and increasing unemployment.

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This dire economic situation makes the repayment of Yugoslavia's \$18 billion foreign debt very problematic. A breakup of the federation would create serious problems for foreign creditors, who would find it difficult to collect from the successor states. Moreover, the division between the more prosperous republics of the north (Slovenia and Croatia) and the Balkan south, led by Serbia, has fueled ethnic unrest. Croats and Slovenes accuse the current federal system of bleeding their republics to support development in the more backward regions, especially for the benefit of Serbian interests.⁹

This spring, as Slovenia and Croatia moved closer and closer to declaring their formal independence from Yugoslavia and circumscribing the power of federal law and institutions within their borders, ethnic tensions rose between the Croatian majority of 4 million and the Serbian minority of 600,000. Serbian enclaves took steps to leave Croatia, once that republic declared its independence, setting in motion confrontations between local Serbs and Croats and pitting Serbian irregulars against Croatian police and police reserves, who were viewed with distrust by the Serbs as the embryo of a Croatian national army. For the last several years, and with greater intensity since last August when Croatian nationalists won local elections, Yugoslavia has moved ever deeper into a political crisis fanned by ethnic unrest and communal violence, punctuated by scandal and mutual accusations.

Wide World Photos



Croatian paramilitary police restraining crowds "celebrating" the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from their border village, Mursko Središće, 28 June 1991.

The intention of the Croatian Republican government to hold a plebiscite on secession from the existing federation set in motion the efforts of the Serbian majority in Krajina in western Croatia to hold their own vote for secession from Croatia. . . . Located several hundred miles from the nearest Serbian territory, Krajina became a tinderbox waiting for the match to spark a civil war.

In the latest round, the intention of the Croatian Republican government to hold a plebiscite on secession from the existing federation set in motion the efforts of the Serbian majority in Krajina in western Croatia to hold their own vote for secession from Croatia. As part of that campaign, armed Serbs have sought to isolate Croat villages in the region, leading to the deployment of Croatian paramilitary forces. On 12 May 1991, this referendum was held, with 99

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percent voting to leave an independent Croatia and join Serbia.¹⁰ Located several hundred miles from the nearest Serbian territory, Krajina became a tinderbox waiting for the match to spark a civil war.

As an uneasy spring gave way to a bloody summer, rumors spread concerning a military coup to eliminate Yugoslavia's collective state presidency, thereby preventing the office from rotating from Serb Borisav Jovic to Croat Stipe Mesic. Communal violence ebbed and flowed, but each crisis saw an increased intensity, making civil war seem more likely. The killing of 12 Croatian police in what appeared to be a deliberate ambush at Borovo Selo in the Slavonia district, which has a Serbian majority, was a taste of things to come. In the wake of these events, tensions and hatreds between Serbs and Croats reached a postwar crescendo. Croats in the largely Serbian Krajina district of Croatia, Serbs in Croatia and even Yugoslav troops feared for their lives. Everywhere vigilance was the order of the day.

Some Serbs in Croatia fled into the neighboring Serbian-dominated province of Vojvodina. "Chetnik" and "Ustasha," the World War II terms for Serbian and Croatian armed nationalist bands respectively, came into open usage.¹¹ These very terms carry with them the horror of the violence that Croats and Serbs inflicted upon each other during World War II, when more than 10 percent of Yugoslavia's population was killed. Attempts by Catholic and Orthodox religious leaders and political moderates to defuse the incipient violence provided only momentary relief. The existing public order was un-

der attack by nationalists of all varieties, who insisted that Tito's postwar communist state was an ethnic prison for their nationality to the benefit of others, and declared their open hostility to the existing order.

The role of the military in a new confederative order pitted Croatia and Slovenia against Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia during discussions among experts in the spring of 1991. Croatia and Slovenia proposed the creation of republican armed forces and reduced the role of the YPA to a joint command in peacetime, while the other republics called for the retention of a unified armed forces for national defense, supported by reserve and territorial forces.¹²

Such opposition increasingly took the form of paramilitary groups. The YPA came under challenge as the sole military instrument of state through the creation of paramilitary groups in the various republics and their subordination to local police. By spring 1991, Slovenia had organized a militia of about 30,000 men and Croatia had raised a force of about 40,000 militia plus another 4,000 special forces troops to fight terrorism.¹³ The creation of such forces represented a serious challenge to the sovereignty of the SFRY and the legitimacy of the YPA. According to the YPA, such forces had targeted the YPA for destruction as a first step in preparation for an anticipated civil war.¹⁴ Moreover, the creation of Croatian paramilitary forces led the Serbs in Croatia to create their own paramilitary force.

Croatian sources initially pictured their militia as a self-defense force, designed primarily to counter the threat of Serbian terrorism. Its forces would not threaten to attack anyone beyond the border of Croatia, but they would be sufficient to deter an attack and prevent any attempt by the YPA to intimidate by force of arms the Croatian Republic, as Soviet forces did in Vilnius in January 1991.¹⁵ Special forces loomed large in the missions of the Croatian forces in the face of this threat.¹⁶ By April 1991, however, the threat had escalated into low-intensity conflict within Croatia itself and the republic set about creating the National Guard Corps, composed of profes-

sional, uniformed and armed formations.¹⁷ The appearance of such Croatian forces spawned the creation of Serbian paramilitary forces in Croatia and placed the YPA in the untenable position of trying to separate armed groups intent upon civil war. Serbian nationalists began to speak of these irregulars as "chetniks," the term for the Serbian nationalist, anti-Communist movement of World War II.

On 6 May 1991, in a further escalation of communal violence, Croatian protesters attacked navy headquarters in Split, killing a guard, a young Macedonian conscript. Federal Secretary of Defense General Veljko Kadijevic warned that "Yugoslav society has already entered a civil war" and the army would open fire on any attackers. Kadijevic presented an ultimatum to the collective presidency: if federal and republic officials "failed to ensure peace, [the Yugoslav armed forces] could efficiently do so themselves."¹⁸ The news of the guard's death sparked protests in Skopje demanding that Macedonian soldiers serve only in their republic.

Kadijevic, known to be a tough officer loyal to Yugoslavia, committed the YPA to protecting the state and constitution from its enemies, foreign and domestic. He has stated that the idea of a Yugoslav state is more than two centuries old and that a Yugoslav state has actually existed for more than 70 years. He supported the concept of a modernized "democratic socialism, based upon economic efficiency, political democracy, the rule of law, a humane and just society."¹⁹ In the face of a collective presidency that would not or could not act, Kadijevic had to deal with a situation in which both the constitutional order of the state and the army itself were under attack.

The Yugoslav People's Army

The YPA, which General Kadijevic commands, is composed of about 150,000 active troops and 510,000 active reservists. The military, which has experienced severe cuts in funding over the last decade—down from \$2.9 billion in 1988 to \$2.2 billion—is the chief institution still funded out of the Yugoslav national budget (50 percent of the federal budget).²⁰ Conscripts are called to service for 12 months.




Slovenia had organized a militia of about 30,000 men and Croatia had raised a force of about 40,000 militia plus another 4,000 special forces troops to fight terrorism. The creation of such forces represented a serious challenge to the sovereignty of the SFRY and the legitimacy of the YPA.

The officer corps of the YPA is drawn predominantly from among Serbs and Montenegrins. Current estimates suggest that 54.25 percent of the officer corps is Serbian.²¹ Until January 1991, when the YPA officially banned political party activities in its ranks, about 96 percent of the officer corps were members of the League of Communists.²² The regular YPA was only the tip of the Yugoslav spear.

The concept of national defense, which the SFRY had put into practice to protect the state from foreign intervention, now made the prospect of a Yugoslav "Lebanon" all the more likely. The YPA had emerged out of Tito's World War II partisan army and had incorporated the concept of partisan warfare into the scheme of national defense. In the wake of Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the

Yugoslav reservists
on a pre-civil war
training exercise.



In the wake of Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Yugoslav government embraced the concept of Total National Defense (TND). A conscript military system, backed by territorial defense forces (TDF)—large reserve contingents trained and equipped to carry out territorial defense—would support YPA regulars in resisting external attack. TDF reserves, in theory, can provide 1.5 million men under arms.

Yugoslav government embraced the concept of Total National Defense (TND). A conscript military system, backed by territorial defense forces (TDF)—large reserve contingents trained and equipped to carry out territorial defense—would support YPA regulars in resisting external attack. TDF reserves, in theory, can provide 1.5 million men under arms in wartime. The Yugoslav General Staff was expected to direct combat operations against an aggressor. The military districts provide army staffs and, in case of war, would oversee mobilization of reserves. The very features that made such a system so credible against external attack during the Cold War contributed to the collapse of the SFRY's monopoly on the instruments of violence and made civil war both more likely and more lethal.²³ Efforts in the early 1980s by Fleet Admiral Branko Mamula, as federal secretary of defense, to dismantle TDF in Kosovo in the face of Albanian

agitation for republic status were a first indication that the TND concept could not be adjusted to the mounting tide of ethnic tensions.

Without the League of Communists as a ruling party in all the republics, no political mechanism existed to check republican ambitions to create their own armed forces. Among the senior officers of the YPA, strong support emerged for the League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia [LC-MY]. They sought to use LC-MY to galvanize a transethnic Yugoslav political movement. One of the explicit objectives of the generals was to restore the YPA's monopoly on the instruments of violence in the SFRY.

YPA efforts to disarm the Slovenian TDF in 1990 proved unsuccessful. The YPA high command did manage to transfer the small arms assigned to Croatian TDF units to federal arsenals. However, the government of Croatia was able to purchase 20,000–30,000 small arms from external sources to equip already trained personnel.²⁴ The attempt to bring to trial the former minister of defense for Croatia, Colonel General Martin Spegelj, for importing arms from Hungary in preparation for an armed confrontation with the YPA, collapsed in the face of mass demonstrations before the court in Zagreb.²⁵ Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, speaking during an official visit to Budapest in April 1991, characterized the arms transfer as a contribution to a "democratic solution" to the Yugoslav crisis.²⁶ Croatia and Slovenia ceased sending conscripts to YPA garrisons outside their republics in the spring of 1991, leaving the YPA with only voluntary recruits from those republics for federal duty.

The Outbreak of Civil War

As the outbreak of fighting in Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991 demonstrated, in a national mobilization the active reserves and territorial defense forces split along ethnic lines, making mobilization the spark for civil war. The Army's heritage is Yugoslav, drawing upon the traditions of Tito's partisan movement, which denied the primacy of ethnic loyalties in fighting for a socialist Yugoslavia. That very loyalty is anathema to Slovenian and Croatian national movements, but has deep psychological roots for many of the

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senior officers, who remember well the communal violence of the war years. General Blagoje Adzic has been a frequent target in the Croatian press for his anti-Croat prejudice. He reportedly said, "so what if several thousand heads roll? The world will be in an uproar for a week, and then forget about it."²⁷ The Croatian weekly *Slobodni tjednik* contends that Adzic is consumed by a pathological hatred of Croats: "In all Croats he sees bloodthirsty Ustasha members who would once again butcher and cremate Serbs."²⁸ The fact that members of Adzic's family were killed in World War II by the Ustasha provides some foundation for his hostility toward Croatian nationalism. Indeed, 40 members of the general's family were killed in January 1942 when the Ustasha raided the village of Pridvorica.²⁹ However, Adzic does not picture himself as a Serbian extremist but a loyal Yugoslav, trying to avoid the very dismemberment that set off communal bloodshed a half-century ago. In a long interview with the Sarajevo newspaper *Oslobodjenje*, Adzic recently stated that the YPA has the basic task of preventing wider interethnic clashes and civil war and to create the time and conditions for true democratic solutions to overcome the Yugoslav crisis. He also stated that he was sure that Yugoslavia would continue to exist, although perhaps not with all its peoples and with the same territory and borders.³⁰

In May 1991, Croatian and Slovenian nationalists responded to Kadijevic's ultimatum as a threat directed against their sovereignty and independence, and Croatian leaders stated that they considered the military "enemy number one in Croatia." Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina used cars and other vehicles to block roads to hinder tank movements. The military claimed that its movements in Bosnia were "routine." Crowds in the Dalmatian town of Sibenik demanded the resignation of army Chief of Staff General Adzic and chanted "we want weapons." In Skopje, the capital of Macedonia, protesters continued to demand that local recruits do their military service in Macedonia. By the end of the month, the collective presidency was in crisis when Serbia and its allies refused to accept the normal rotation of the office from the Serb Borisav Jovic to the Croat Stipe Mesic. Although finally resolved, this manifestation of distrust and ill will was only another step toward disintegration of the SFRY.

On 25 June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence; two days later the YPA attempted a limited intervention to retake customs stations and the airport in Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, but proved ineffective in the face of Slovene militia using partisan warfare. The YPA continued to defend itself in the press against charges that it was an occupation force, stating that it was preserving the territorial and constitutional integrity of the SFRY and had been forced to act because of "hatred, terror, and extremely inhumane actions" directed against it by the Slovenian government and forces.³¹ A nasty stalemate with YPA units trapped deep in Slovenia threatened to escalate from a battle of nerves into heavy fighting. Worse still, the mobilization and deployment of forces against Slovenia broke the YPA. Croatian and Slovene officers, soldiers and reservists refused to serve. On 5 July 1991, in a speech to newly appointed commanders at the Military Academy's Center in Belgrade, General Adzic declared:

"[The] YPA is in a war imposed on it by the secessionists of Slovenia and Croatia, unscrupulously determined to crash the foundations of Yugoslavia, all of the achievements of socialist development within the Yugoslav community,

The YPA attempted a limited intervention to retake customs stations and the airport in Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, but proved ineffective in the face of Slovene militia using partisan warfare. . . . Worse still, the mobilization and deployment of forces against Slovenia broke the YPA. Croatian and Slovene officers, soldiers and reservists refused to serve.

as well as the interests of all Yugoslav nations."

Adzic also warned officers, mostly Serbs and Montenegrins, not to embrace the tempting slogan of "All Serbs united in one state," and he asserted that the only battle for the YPA is the battle for Yugoslavia.³² Three days earlier he had addressed the nation and declared:

"There has been betrayal in our ranks, mostly among the Slovenes. This is not a small betrayal. A few people have even surrendered whole units. They wished for the repetition of 1941 [that is, the dismemberment of the Yugoslav state following the German invasion]."³³

Intervention of the EC and pressure from the international community after several false starts led to a solution. On 7 July a compromise agreement between the federal government and Slovenia was worked out at Brioni. The agreement left the border posts and airport in Slovenian hands and called for the return of YPA units to their barracks. At the same time, Slovenia agreed to a three-month suspension of its declaration of independence. The EC agreed to provide a small detachment of observers to monitor the implementation of the agreement. After a number of attempts, the Brioni Agreement was finally implemented when the collective presidency on 18 July agreed to the gradual withdrawal of the YPA from Slovenia over the next three months.³⁴

The Serbian Insurrection in Croatia

As this element of the Yugoslav crisis was being defused, its sparks set in motion the main conflagration. On 28 June 1991, the an-

niversary of Medieval Serbia's defeat by the Ottomans, Serbian leaders of Krajina announced that the region would merge with the municipal community of Bosanska Krajina, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to form a greater Serbian community.³⁵ Shortly thereafter, simmering ethnic tensions inside Croatia exploded into open fighting in Krajina and Slavonia, with Serbian irregulars gaining the upper hand.

Croatian authorities have repeatedly charged that in that fighting, the YPA is aiding Serbian irregulars.³⁶ By bombarding Croatian settlements with mortar fire during the night and then attacking police stations and strongpoints, the Serbs were able to demoralize the Croatian civilian population and outmaneuver Croatian defenders. On 25 July, Austrian TV reported that federal forces had shelled Croatian national guardsmen in Erdut on the Croatian-Serbian border. YPA tanks were firing from the Serbian side of the line.³⁷

The seriousness of this situation has been reflected in the Yugoslav press. On 22 July, a Belgrade daily declared that "Yugoslavia has for all intents and purposes already disintegrated, even before all its republics make this act formal." The paper pointed out that the "price paid for the political insanity" is not only reflected by the bloodshed but also in the "total collapse of the Yugoslav economy." On 23 July, the daily commented on the failed Yugoslav summit talks in Ohrid, saying that because "there is no good will in some [politicians] . . . every talk ends where it started."³⁸ The fighting in Slovenia and Croatia has worsened a desperate economic situation.

This crisis prompted another round of EC and CSCE attempts to end the violence and resolve the Yugoslav crisis. Germany, which played a leading role in resolving the Slovenian crisis, has led these efforts. In the fighting over redrawing internal boundaries of Yugoslavia, demands for a greater Serbia and the support of the Milosevic government in Belgrade for Serbian irregulars in Krajina and Slavonia have made either the maintenance of the SFRY or its transformation into a confederal state seem more remote. In the face of Serbian military successes, the Croatian government has been forced to compromise, offering autonomy to its Serbian minority en-

claves.³⁹ The YPA's open identification with the efforts of Serbian insurgents in Croatia to seize territory has made clear the shift in its position.

This situation has, in turn, led to an explicit identification of the YPA with "Serbian imperialism" by some European spokesmen.⁴⁰ **MF**

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summed up the situation.

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33. Blagoje Adzic, "Izjava General-pukovnika Blagoja Adzica, glava Stabe Vrhovne komande" [Statement by Colonel General Blagoje Adzic, member of the Staff of the Supreme Command], *Narodna armija* (6 July 1991), 2.

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36. Patrick Moore, "Fighting Continues in Eastern Slavonia," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 134, 17 July 1991.

37. Patrick Moore, "Yugoslav Army Shells Croatian Positions," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 141, 26 July 1991.

38. Milan Andrejevic, "Yugoslavia Has 'Disintegrated'," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 139, 24 July 1991.

39. As this essay is being written, another cease-fire has been put into place, thanks to EC pressure upon Serbia. But it remains to be seen whether the outcome will be a political compromise or a renewal of violence. In either case, the YPA has been transformed by the events of the last year. It no longer possesses a monopoly on the means of violence in Yugoslavia and it can only regain that monopoly through a constitutional transformation into a different army or by force of arms.

40. Josef Joffe, "History Repeats, Europe Forgets," *New York Times*, 28 August 1991.

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Armed Forces and the Nation Searching for Trust in Czechoslovakia

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Thomas, US Army

IN *The Good Soldier Svejk*, a satire of war and military life, Czech writer Jaroslav Hasek provided his nation a folk hero still popular today, a pacifist who never professed his belief but manifested it by repeatedly getting lost on his way to the front, thereby managing to avoid World War I.¹ Many feel that Svejk, who served in the Austro-Hungarian army when there was no Czech national army, represented an unspoken Czech national tradition of passive resistance by the population and armed forces to resented authority.

From 1946 until 1989, the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic (CSFR) army endured a similar fate: during this period the Czechoslovak army, as part of the Warsaw Pact (WP), acted with restraint in confrontational situations. In 1968, when WP forces invaded Czechoslovakia, Czech troops stayed in their barracks; during 1989's so-called Velvet Revolution, a peaceful political change occurred without army intervention.

Nevertheless, there have been examples of Czech military prowess, such as the Czech Legion in the Russian Civil War and the Czech Brigade on the Eastern Front during World War II. Thereafter, the Czech Army proved to be a loyal, if largely untested, Soviet ally. During this period, however, Czech forces had little to do with Czech sovereignty, and Czech pride and initiative were stifled by Soviet dominance in the WP.

There is no core Czech military experience through which the population can view the armed forces as the sole defender of the country. This exacerbates the task of creating new CSFR

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military doctrine and strategy sufficient for the country's defense and requires a new positive identity and heritage for the armed forces.

Three key elements are necessary for the development of a new military heritage, defensive doctrine and strategy. First, Czech traditions crucial to the armed forces and the nation must be identified and integrated into the doctrine. Second, military resources must be clearly defined and credibility must be regained among the populace. Finally, the CSFR military-technical infrastructure must be reformed to provide reliable defense for the country. Successful development of these factors depends on a stable local and international environment, a condition that the CSFR cannot control, but to which it can contribute.

Traditions: Necessary Base Values for the CSFR Armed Forces

Some military professionals feel the public perceives the army as a "failure" because it lacks a legacy of defending the country's sovereignty and its past is associated with an unpopular communist regime.² This tends to foster self-doubt

among professional soldiers and conscripts. To change this perception and regain its credibility, the armed forces must clarify for itself and the nation those national values worth defending. It must build upon those Czech and Slovak popular traditions on which the nation was based, both at its inception 73 years ago and after the Velvet Revolution of 1989, and it must pursue those traditions and values rooted in the population. Defining national security concepts in terms familiar to the population will ease fears that military reforms are aimed only at saving careers in the ministry of defense (MoD). The military must also recognize positive lessons drawn from its experiences with the Soviets and incorporate them into new defensive doctrine and legislation.

The process of Soviet infiltration and reeducation of the Czechoslovak People's Army (CSLA) lasted 40 years. New information indicates it is still too early to determine the degree of the armed forces' loyalties in that period. When the CSLA failed to come out of the barracks in 1968, were they demonstrating "traditional" passivity (analogous to the German invasion of 1938 and the communist takeover of 1948)? Were they reacting to the reality of being vastly outnumbered? Were they still infected by a degree of anti-Sovietism and unwilling to support world socialism? Or were they responding to isolation and a lack of international support?

"The intervention was swift and bloodless. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) did not call upon the CSLA to defend its sovereignty and the Warsaw Pact command did not ask Czechoslovak soldiers to reverse the reform. Pledged to allegiance to both the KSC and the Soviet Union, the CSLA watched the clash between them from the barracks."³

With a military history based on apparent contradictions in their attitude toward the Soviets, and with an absence of military values and traditions over 40 years of WP domination, the armed forces must now forge a "new heritage" supported by the population. A starting point will be new legislation developed by a democrat-

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ic parliament; for example, the new oath developed in 1990, which all members of the armed forces must execute, and the Defense Act of 14 March 1990, which notes that "soldiers in active service, except soldiers summoned to military exercises, have their membership and activities in political parties and movements suspended." Hopefully, a military establishment responsive to the needs of the people will be created, acting as the glue to bond the military to society.

The MoD Educational and Cultural Administration was created in 1990 to facilitate this process. It draws upon the civilian educational system for information on principles of humanity, patriotism, democracy and scientific progress based on historical Czechoslovak experience and is responsible for formulating and implementing state educational and cultural policies in the army and elaborating on tradition-based education. So-called Halls of Tradition are used to educate military personnel.⁴

Much has changed in the military education system itself as the CSFR military searches for more cost-effective officer training. The last major reorganization of the school system occurred in 1972, when many secondary schools were reorganized into military academies. Approximately 85 percent of the officers graduated from these academies after four- to five-year programs.⁵ Officers also had to have a university degree, and almost 20 percent of them went on to even higher levels of education.⁶



Prague, 1968.

Over the last four decades, those who were once the guarantors of Czechoslovakia's security against a NATO attack caused more harm to the environment and civil-military relations than did any NATO threat. Soviet insensitivity and irresponsibility in these areas endangered public safety in Czechoslovakia and left an appalling aftermath. . . . The Soviets' actions in 1968 have not endeared them to CSFR citizens, and it will take more than public apologies from Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin to erase years of lies, deception and control.

Evolving Civil-Military Relations

The Vaclav Havel government's concern for the effect of an individual's rights on security interests and the influence of interstate ethnic relations on national security issues differs markedly from the WP's obsession with external threats. Although foreign to the CSFR's military doctrine of the past, these concerns must now be recognized. To accommodate this goal, Havel created the Czech Army Council on Cooperation with the Public.⁷

Much also depends on how well the new civilian defense minister, Lubos Dobrovsky (former deputy minister of foreign affairs), performs. His

replacement of General Miroslav Vacek in October 1990 was an attempt by Havel to reassert civilian control over the military.⁸ In this respect, the CSFR was reaffirming a Czech Republic tradition of civilian defense ministers.⁹

Dobrovsky must orchestrate a clean break with the army's communist past and simultaneously avoid alienating both society and his current professional army staff. Although the separation of the CSFR armed forces command structures from the WP is now complete, the new system may prove to be more difficult for Dobrovsky to control, since he has no military experience. On the other hand, as deputy minis-

ter of foreign affairs, he handled talks on Soviet troop withdrawals from the CSFR, which has given him some experience in this area.

Dobrovsky also moved to depoliticize the armed forces by creating a general inspectorate for the army. The inspectorate will be independent of the ministry and will control the reorganization, modernization and professionalization of the new army. Chosen by parliament, the inspectorate will cooperate with civilian representatives and consult closely with both the MoD and ministry of internal affairs.¹⁰ Outside of the inspectorate, local commanders must restructure military institutions to limit civil-military confrontation and promote cooperation.

In addition to efforts of the Havel government, other civil-military problems must also be solved, including alleviating local grievances against the former occupation forces, especially environmental concerns; limiting the role of the arms industry in the economy (and its impact on the budget); solving ethnic dissension; and reforming the military. There is also the paradox of the former Soviet presence: over the last four decades, those who were once the guarantors of Czechoslovakia's security against a NATO attack caused more harm to the environment and civil-military relations than did any NATO threat. Soviet insensitivity and irresponsibility in these areas endangered public safety in Czechoslovakia and left an appalling aftermath. There have also been many reports of the Soviets' careless handling of weapons and supplies.¹¹

Czech animosity toward the Soviet army and the political legacy of communist control has counterbalanced any positive Soviet historical effort as, for example, the Soviet-led World War II liberation. Some CSFR officials have attempted to defuse public contempt toward the Soviets when it is at the expense of historical accuracy.¹² Obviously, the Soviets' actions in 1968 have not endeared them to CSFR citizens, and it will take more than public apologies from Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin to erase years of lies, deception and control.¹³


The arms industry has placed another severe strain on civil-military relations. Although for



Czechoslovak army unit during a field exercise.

The armed forces must now forge a "new heritage" supported by the population. A starting point will be new legislation developed by a democratic parliament; for example . . . the Defense Act of March 1990, [states] that "soldiers in active service, except soldiers summoned to military exercises, have their membership and activities in political parties and movements suspended."

years it was a source of employment and, therefore, caused little civil-military friction, the fate of the arms industry is becoming a source of heightened ethnic tensions, mainly through the threat of unemployment in Slovakia. The CSFR is the seventh largest weapons exporter in the world. It is also, in per capita terms, the world's



A T-72 tank factory now manufacturing bulldozers for a German company in addition to tanks.

The CSFR is the seventh largest weapons exporter in the world. It is also, in per capita terms, the world's leading arms manufacturer. One hundred and eleven factories produce weapons worth more than \$800 annually per citizen versus \$700 per citizen in the United States. . . . To shut the doors on an industry vital to the livelihood of the CSFR economy will cause mass unemployment and severely affect Czech balance of trade. . . . Sources estimate that 80,000 jobs, the majority in Slovakia, depend on the arms industry.

leading arms manufacturer. One hundred and eleven factories produce weapons worth more than \$800 annually per citizen versus \$700 per citizen in the United States.¹⁴ These figures are the legacy of Czechoslovakia's contribution of 13 percent to the total military budget of the WP.

To shut the doors on an industry vital to the livelihood of the CSFR economy will cause mass unemployment and severely affect Czech balance of trade. Nevertheless, conversion from military to civilian output is gradually being implemented. CSFR sources estimate that rapid conversion will mean a loss of 30,000-40,000 jobs. The military-industrial work force will shrink from 75,000 to 15,000 workers in Slovakia alone, where the majority of arms industries are concentrated. Other sources estimate that 80,000 jobs, the majority in Slovakia, depend on the arms industry.

Once again the leadership is faced with a contradiction: "Czechoslovakia is not interested in producing tanks," according to Prime Minister Marian Calfa, "but we do not want to break the economy of a region." Sales to the CSFR's largest customer, the Soviet Union, fell by 40 percent last year, increasing interest in sales to the Third World. But political developments, particularly the Gulf War, helped cut off some of these markets.¹⁵ Defense officials argue that if the CSFR does not sell a product to a country, then someone else (implying the Soviet Union, United States or one of several other contenders) will, concluding that it is not improper to have a democratic country, moving toward a market economy, exporting weapons. Officials admit that care must be taken, however, concerning its clientele, especially if the sale of Semtex (the plastic explosive linked to the Pan Am Lockerbie bombing)



or tanks is involved. A list of those items the CSFR desires to sell abroad includes:

- Excellent aviation industry products, especially the L-39 training jet and the DV-2 aircraft engine, capable of competing on the world market.
- Airfield radars and passive radar reconnaissance systems able to detect stealth, with proven climatic adaptability.
- A range of military items such as NBC protective devices (used in Saudi Arabia); night vision devices; Semtex, plastic explosives; and submachineguns (with or without stocks) and light machineguns.

A key step by Havel to improve civil-military relations is his intent to make defense budget information public. This will be reported to the Parliamentary Military and Security Committee. In general, the military budget reflects ongoing reform. It was cut by 40 percent (adjusted for inflation) in 1990 from 35.6 billion koruny (\$3.68 billion) to 31 billion koruny, and is expected to be 26.5 koruny by the end of 1991.¹⁶

Another crucial internal issue being addressed by Havel is the ethnic problem, which is closely related to the arms industry problem. He has pledged to Slovakia the right of political self-determination and has promised not to use mili-

tary force against the separatist movement in Slovak-ia.¹⁷ He may, however, be faced with an unsolvable dilemma where ethnic pride and jobs in the military-industrial arena intersect. He must support conversion to eliminate the arms industry stigma, yet to do so will aggravate the already-strained ethnic tensions between Slovaks and Czechs. Havel has also promised not to involve the army in resolving ethnic conflicts; yet the arms industry is at the heart of the problem. In fact, this area is probably the litmus test for civil-military relations in the country at large.

Recent comments by leading Slovak officials (including the prime minister and minister of internal affairs) indicate that, despite Havel's work, trouble is brewing. They advocate the formation of a Slovak "home guard" to combat crime and deal with potential refugees from neighboring countries. Czech officials counter by stating that the national police are charged with fighting crime, and the military is tasked with controlling refugees, underscoring the blurry distinction between law enforcement and military responsibilities in low-intensity situations. But Slovak officials continue to press for their home guard. Extremist groups have called for the creation of a Slovak army and for "the liquidation of the irredentists, the Hungarians, all enemies of the

Military reforms are helping to improve civil-military relations. Such innovations as reducing conscript service from 24 to 18 months; providing for alternate civilian service options, new food allowances, longer leave time and permission to wear civilian clothes on leave; and the introduction of religious services have made service more humane and tolerable by putting a human face on the military.

Slovaks and the renegade Slovaks."¹⁸ This ethnic strife has exacerbated an already dangerous security environment (see map).

Despite these problems, military reforms are helping to improve civil-military relations. Such innovations as reducing conscript service from 24 to 18 months; providing for alternate civilian service options (27 months), new food allowances, longer leave time and permission to wear civilian clothes on leave; and the introduction of religious services have made service more humane and tolerable by putting a human face on the military and easing the tension between the military and society. The military office of the president, headed by Lieutenant General Ladislav Tomecek, is also helping in this process. In addition to guarding the president, the office is charged with ensuring the constitutional interface between the president and the ministry of defense, and is responsible for answering letters concerning military affairs sent to the president's office by the populace.

Restructuring the Armed Forces


At a February 1991 meeting with NATO representatives in Oslo, CSFR representatives elaborated on the future restructuring of the Czech armed forces.¹⁹ By 2005, a three-stage restructuring of the armed forces will be complete. Phase one (through 1992) will reduce the armed forces to 130,000 men from a current strength of

198,000 (this number is possibly already at about 140,000 and could go as low as 110,000 by 1993).²⁰ This stage will also restructure equipment and organization of units to conform to the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement. Phase two (1993 to 1996) will result in professionalization of half of the armed forces. No guidelines were given for the third period (1996-2005). It is believed that the reserve system will enable the armed forces to reach 600,000-700,000 in wartime.²¹ The General Staff will command all forces, but only the air force and air defense forces will remain centralized within it.

The CSFR armed forces will be organized into Czech, Moravian and Slovak territorial military commands. Each will serve as a field headquarters, in contrast to the old-style military district where each organized an army headquarters. Each command will have subordinate divisions and will handle mobilization affairs within its area. The goal is to create a single national army and abolish all links with paramilitary organizations and the Party. In peacetime, the ground forces will number seven divisions—five located in the Czech and Moravian commands and two in the Slovak command. Two of the five Czech divisions and both of the Slovak divisions will be fully active, ready combined arms divisions, and three of the Czech divisions will be maintained at lower readiness. Eight inactive divisions will bring CSFR army strength to a total of 15 divisions. These ground forces will be supported by three air defense divisions (one in Slovakia and two in the Czech command) and one air corps. Tank strength will be reduced from current levels (4,500); spare parts for some tanks and armored personnel carriers will still have to come from the Soviet Union, making conversion to other weaponry difficult. Recently the first professional border police guards were established.²²

Force deployment will also change. Reportedly, 36 percent of the troops will be stationed in the eastern regions, due primarily to the requirement of controlling mass emigration, and not to a fear of possible Soviet actions.²³ This strategy could backfire if the Slovaks view this move as an infringement on their sovereignty.

Specialist Greg Davis Soldiers



[Havel] has pledged to Slovakia the right of political self-determination and has promised not to use military force against the separatist movement in Slovakia. He may, however, be faced with an unsolvable dilemma. . . . He must support conversion to eliminate the arms industry stigma, yet to do so will aggravate the already-strained ethnic tensions between Slovaks and Czechs.

Developing a New Doctrine

In the past, military doctrine was the domain of the Czechoslovak and Soviet General Staffs and was dominated by Soviet military influence. While the Czechoslovak General Staff was allowed to plan the operations of Czechoslovak forces, the Soviets assigned objectives and the time allotted to seize them. The Soviet General Staff also introduced "corrections" to bring Czechoslovak plans into agreement with Soviet plans. In addition, direct Soviet liaison, the Soviet political apparatus and advisers to Czechoslovak military counterintelligence all provided additional "checks" on the Czechs.²⁴

Now the CSFR has its own doctrine. The text of the new *Military Doctrine of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic* was published in April 1991. It is based on five principles, the most important

being a declaration of reasonable defensive sufficiency.²⁵ Chief of the General Staff Karel Pezl further clarified this approach. He noted:

"In our country, we do not talk about acting as a deterrent. This would be setting ourselves too great a task. However, under the given conditions, our Army must be capable of mounting a sufficient defense. . . . Anyone wanting to establish their desired superiority would first of all have to carry out a number of measures and, consequently, there would be sufficient time for the necessary reaction. Therefore . . . we also have to carry out intelligence activity to make sure that we have enough time to decide how to adequately react to a possibly dangerous situation. We cannot be equally strong everywhere, but we will be strong where it is necessary and we will be strong within the scope of our state's resources."²⁶

Two of the five Czech divisions and both of the Slovak divisions will be fully active, ready combined arms divisions, and three of the Czech divisions will be maintained at lower readiness. Eight inactive divisions will bring CSFR army strength to . . . 15 divisions.

The General Staff is still working on a military strategy that will support reasonable defensive sufficiency. Strategies of armed neutrality, unarmed neutrality and small mobile defensive units have been proposed. It is believed that a strategy of armed neutrality will be implemented until the formation of a European multinational force or some other security apparatus.

The General Staff is still working on a military strategy that will support reasonable defensive sufficiency. Strategies of armed neutrality, unarmed neutrality and small mobile defensive units have been proposed. It is believed that a strategy of armed neutrality will be implemented until the formation of a European multinational force or some other security apparatus. General Staff concerns also focus on the so-called technological vacuum resulting from the Soviet withdrawal.²⁷

Contingency planning is also under way, made more urgent in light of the recent coup attempt in the Soviet Union. A special security staff, composed of representatives of the Interior, Defense, Foreign, and Communications and Transport ministries, ordered stepped-up border patrols and the transfer of border guards to specified areas.²⁸ Measures were put in place to prevent the reincarnation of the old Czech Secret Police (StB).

New special security staff proposals were submitted at a meeting of the CSFR Defense Council on 20 August by Interior Minister Jan Langos

in response to the coup. Langos and Defense Minister Dobrovsky were, in turn, asked to submit some of the proposals to the federal government. These proposals include an agreement between the army and the Interior Ministry for cooperation in guarding the state borders, which involved the allocation of some 6,000 soldiers to the border defense mission. Military equipment, however, was not moved to the eastern border. Motor fuel stores were guarded and airport security increased. A "mobile rapid deployment unit" was also set up at Prague's Ruzyně Airport, and police ammunition and arms stores were guarded.²⁹

The Czechs are attempting to replicate defensive postures of such smaller NATO countries as Belgium. The size of the CSFR and its central location between the Soviet Union and Germany pose one of many security risks that cannot be avoided. The intensification of ethnic conflicts of the past (such as the Hungary-Slovakia and Poland-Ukraine borders, and the common border with Poland) and internal issues, especially the possible collapse of the Czech economy and resulting destabilization, pose other risks.³⁰ Consequently, the CSFR is seeking military cooperation with its neighbors. It has already concluded military pacts with Hungary and Poland and is prepared to conclude a new agreement with the Soviet Union as well, since their bilateral defense treaty expired in December 1990. The changed nature of the Soviet Union makes any such agreements "uncertain." Yet the CSFR also desires an agreement with the Soviet Union that includes an exchange of information, school exchanges and a mutual obligation to resist aggression.³¹

The Czechs regard NATO as a positive security apparatus that should endure. Havel has warned that Eastern Europe, due to social unrest and economic deprivation, has become a security vacuum, and urges NATO to forge closer ties with young democracies in the region.³² Since NATO membership is currently impossible for the Czechs, they argue for conversion of all European armed forces into professed "defensive structures" or into a "European multinational

force" under CSCE auspices. In any case, Havel prefers a pan-European security system with NATO as its core.³³

What Is Ahead?

The road to a new CSFR military doctrine, strategy and armed forces identity will be very rocky. Resilient ethnic hostilities may erupt along the path over minor issues, similar to those plaguing neighboring Yugoslavia. Economic conversion could be the catalyst to set off the explosion if thousands of Slovaks become unemployed. The resulting ethnic conflict would place the military squarely in the middle of the nightmare of civil war. Hopefully the "reformed" CSFR armed forces will not be baptized under such circumstances.

In the final analysis, the CSFR would like to play a political role in future security arrangements:

"The most important future agency for the CSFR's national security would not be the restructured defense ministry in Prague, but the European Security Commission, for which Havel has already reserved one of Prague's most beautiful palaces. That is to say, Havel and [Foreign Minister Jiri] Dienstbier do not envision a 'territorial defense' system as the defense posture of a neutral CSFR. A neutral CSFR would be nothing more than the battlefield of choice for opposing alliances, or for a Russo-German war. In no circumstances would the CSFR ever again commit its military forces to a bloc security system which would deny the CSFR national control over national armed forces."³⁴

The ability of CSCE to solve the Yugoslav cri-

The new civilian defense minister[s] . . . replacement of General Miroslav Vacek in October 1990 was an attempt by Havel to reassert civilian control over the military. . . . [Defense minister] Dobrovsky must orchestrate a clean break with the army's communist past and simultaneously avoid alienating both society and his current . . . army staff.

sis will be closely monitored by the CSFR. If it fails, other changes may be in store for CSFR military doctrine and strategy in the future. During the recent coup attempt in the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary and the CSFR met in Warsaw to discuss the event, try and find a common perspective and review mutual understandings reached at Visegrad. Herein lies the country's dilemma: either to resort to an all-European security process like CSCE or the Economic Community, or to rely on regional pacts such as Visegrad.³⁵ This time, however, the people and the armed forces will act as one to make a democratic decision on the country's fate. As coup events in the Soviet Union have shown, it is possible for the armed forces (or at least elements more committed to democratic values and a greater national good than to narrower institutional or personal agendas) and the people to work together to protect the nation's sovereignty and democratic tradition, even from internal enemies as strong as the security services. **MR**

NOTES

1. Alan Richman, *Czechoslovakia in Pictures* (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 1989), 33-34.

2. The author is indebted to SAIC analyst Dan Beck for pointing out this and several other issues in the Czech military periodical, *A Report*.

3. Condoleezza Rice, *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948-1983: Uncertain Allegiance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 3.

4. The departments of this administration are: military and patriotic educa-

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tion; sociopsychological and legal education; cultural education; artistic activities; club activities; planning and implementation; economic and legal affairs; audit group of educational material; cultural and educational facilities of the ministry of defense (MoD); cadre group; and a financial group.

5. Under the old Warsaw Pact (WP) method, logistics personnel and commanders went to school for four years, engineers and scientists for five years, and those working on a doctorate, for six years. In the past, higher military education included the Soviet General Staff Academy option. The Czech and Slovak Federated Republic (CSFR) is still in the process of establishing its own General Staff Academy.

6. The four-year military academy in Brno remains the heart of the officer schooling system. After graduation, officers remain in the service a minimum of ten years, working in units for up to three or more years. Some are then selected to attend other academies to train for command or division staff duty. The ground forces, air defense, social services, technical/transport services, and the air force conduct such courses, designated as first-level academy courses. This organizational structure should continue until at least the end of 1993. Those selected to be deputy commanders of divisions, corps, and armies attend second-level academy courses in Brno. These are now 6 to 10 months long, (versus three years under the old system). Officers chosen for military district jobs attend an 8-month course. A final option is postgraduate study for those interested in pursuing the aspirant, candidate and eventually doctoral track.

The CSFR schooling system does not include correspondence courses in its curriculum. However, there are special 1 to 6-month courses which can be arranged for certain interests if warranted by job demands. The entire CSFR schooling system may be altered again in the near future if the professional army bill is passed. Conceivably, up to 50 percent of the armed forces will be professional.

7. Prague CTK Service (unattributed interview with Major General Cestmir Hrbek), 23 July 1991, as translated in JPRS-EER-91-110, 7. Army opinion polls indicate that 65 percent of the adult population trust the army this year as opposed to 43 percent last year. These figures were given on Prague TV Service (unattributed speaker makes public an answer sent by Defense Minister Lubos Dobrovsky to Michal Maly), 13 June 1991, as translated in JPRS-EER-91-088, 22.

8. There are speculations that Dobrovsky's appointment may have resulted from student calls for the dismissal of all former communists holding important government positions, from an investigation of the army's involvement in halting the November 1989 revolution and Vacek's role in it, or from suggestions that Vacek was working with the KGB in an attempt to install a moderate, reform-minded communist government.

9. Interwar defense ministers were not professional military men. The first professional military defense minister was Army General Jan Syrový, at the time of the Munich Accords; he later became president.

10. Jaroslav Spurný, "Still Without Public Supervision," *Prague Respekt*, 14 August 1990, 4-5, as translated in JPRS-EER-90-148, 26 October 1991, 17-19.

11. The large Soviet base at Mimon, 70 kilometers north of Prague, is a good example of environmental damage. A large artillery kaseme and an airfield (Hradčany) with supporting facilities for pilots and aircraft are located nearby. The housing area consisted of about 900 flats built to Soviet, not Czech norms (USSR and CSFR norms regarding electricity, and so on do not match), which was a point of contention for the Czechs. A heating system using coal had been constructed without permission. Approximately 37 million liters of jet and armored vehicle fuel were stored in an area located one half mile from the housing area and one mile from the airfield. Three and a half million liters of oil leaked into and remain in the soil. Three times each training year all of the petrol was expended and replaced by the Soviets. Thirty cubic meters of pure petrol are extracted each month from the soil near the airfield. It is likely that the families in the housing area had been drinking contaminated water for quite some time.

12. Peter Matuška, "Plan to Sell Prague Soviet Monument Criticized," *Radio Free Europe Daily Report*, 13 February 1991. Several officials recently opposed attempts to remove the Prague memorial to the first Soviet tank to enter the Czechoslovak capital in 1945, fearing that it might erase an important piece of their past. Other Czech parliamentarians, however, supported the decision, which caused Soviet spokesman Vitaly Churkin to state that "this is an attempt to rewrite history to suit the current political situation."

13. Former Soviet Minister of Defense Yazov set even this simple process back by declaring that the WP had been invited into Czechoslovakia in 1968, thus negating the prior public apology. See Prague CTK Service (unattributed press report), 25 June 1991, as translated in JPRS-EER-91-095, 1 July 1991, 9.

14. James L. Graff, "Confronting a Thankless Task," *Time* (June 1991), 2.

15. Ibid.

16. Based on a conversation with National Defense University analyst Jeffrey Simon on 3 April 1991.

17. Peter Matuška, "Havel Promises Self-Determination for Slovaks," *Radio Free Europe Daily Report*, 25 March 1991.

18. See Jan Klepac, "Concerning a Home Guard and a Confederation...," *Bratislava Narodna Obroda*, 16 July 1991, 3, as translated in FBIS-EEU-91-138, 18 July 1991, 10-11; "Establishing a Slovak Army," *Bratislava Pravda*, 19 June 1991, 2, as translated in JPRS-EER-91-093, 27 June 1991, 12; and "Text," *Budeapest Kapu*, No. 6, June 1991, 47-48, as translated in JPRS-EEU-91-108, 23 July 1991, 1. The "liquidation" call was made by the Slovak Republic Army.

19. The material in this section is the result of notes taken at the conference by the author.

20. Discussion with Jeffrey Simon of the National Defense University.

21. Oslo Conference (see note 19). In the future, the MoD will handle economics (supply, finance, etc.), strategic planning, and the social/psychological preparation of the army (to be considered as education and not political propaganda). Obviously, with the dissolution of the WP, the CSFR will no longer participate in large-scale WP maneuvers, but will take part only in smaller local CSFR exercises. This redeployment and regrouping of the armed forces is part of a new military strategy being worked out by the CSFR General Staff, based not on a specific enemy, but designed to defend the country against "any potential aggressor."

22. Prague CTK Service (unattributed interview with Major General Karel Rysavy), 12 June 1991, as translated in JPRS-EER-91-088, 20 June 1991, 22.

23. Unattributed Hrbek interview.

24. Phone conversation with Thomas S. Szayna, RAND CSFR analyst, on 23 August 1991. See also Lester W. Grau, "Confrontation to Cooperation: An American/Soviet Military Coalition?" (Fort Leavenworth, Soviet Army Studies Office, March 1991).

25. "Text 'Military Doctrine of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic'" *Prague Report*, 11 April 1991, 7, as translated in JPRS-EER-91-073, 31 May 1991, 34-35.

26. Jan Bauer interview with Major General Karel Pezl, "Military Service for One Year Only," *Ceske A. Moravskoslezske Zemedelske Noviny*, 1 August 1991, 5, as translated in FBIS-EEU-91-152, 7 August 1991, 14-16.

27. The CSFR recently claimed that it has developed a system capable of detecting US "Stealth" technology. If true, then this "vacuum" may be less threatening to the CSFR than it may want the West to believe. Nevertheless, the message is still clear: the West must remember that deterrence thinking occurs in developing countries as well as superpower countries, and the CSFR must keep a balance of old and new weaponry to ensure its security.

28. Prague CTK Service, 19 Aug 1991, as translated in FBIS-EEU-91-163, 22 August 1991, 8.

29. Prague Czechoslovak Rozhlas Radio Network, 20 August, 1991, as translated in FBIS-EEU-91-162, 21 August, 1991, 13.

30. The withdrawal of Soviet forces, which had been another major security concern, has been concluded.

31. Today the mission of the General Staff is supplemented with forecasting by the new Czech Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS), and this institute is helping formulate new security thinking such as the bilateral pacts. ISS was chartered in April 1991 to analyze and research issues of defense, security and protection of the CSFR. It is organized into three divisions: Division for Strategy and Prognosis, with six offices: cybernetics, military-political connections, military-social connections, military-economic connections, scientific and technical connections with the military, and management and organization; Division of Technical Sciences, with four sections: department of systems management of science and technology, department of science and technology for policy and education, department of special programs for research (military use only), and a department for civil defense (based on an integrated reserve system); and Division for Cybernetics, which coordinates the plans of research and its interactivity with foreign relations, and is in charge of finance and services (library, printing, etc.). University professors work with the institution on the basis of competitive admittance. Only one of ten applicants succeed in gaining a contract with the institute for a project. Currently, there are about 120 people at the institute, with 10 working on modeling, 60 doing scientific tasks, 40 in a support role and another 10 performing unspecified tasks.

A most important project now underway at ISS is an assessment of the CSFR army to the year 1995. Other projects involve the study of security mechanisms: state interests; influences on the development of military thought; new images of the army in the country and Europe; CSFR military strategy; CSFR professional development from 1991 to 2000; social sciences in the CSFR army; steps to meet CSCE requirements; limits of militarism; Europe, Asia and the CSFR; military doctrine; and the 1968 memorandum that deals with the circumstances of the Pact invasion. Hopefully, ISS will provide key support in supplementing General Staff forecasting.

32. Barbara Kroulik, "Havel in the Benelux," *Radio Free Europe Daily Report*, 22 March 1991.

33. Barbara Kroulik, "Havel praises NATO," *Radio Free Europe Daily Report*, 12 February 1991.

34. Christopher D. Jones, "Czechoslovakia and the New International System," in *European Security Policy after the Revolutions of 1989*, edited by Jeffrey Simon, 312-13.

35. On 15 February 1991, Czech and Slovak, Hungarian and Polish representatives met at Visegrad, Hungary to sign a declaration of cooperation in the economic and political spheres.



DRUGS AND TERROR



Eastern European and Transnational Security Threats

Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Harold S. Orenstein

As the Eastern European nations celebrate the second anniversary marking the demise of the Iron Curtain, they also must face the realities of political, economic and social problems. The authors point out how the nations are faced with a restructuring of their armed forces amid a growing threat from terrorism, narcotics and organized crime. They also point out some of the initiatives taken to combat these growing areas of concern.

THE SECOND anniversary of Eastern Europe's revolutionary autumn and winter of 1989 is finding its earlier euphoria considerably tempered as the realities of political, economic and social problems facing new and aspiring democracies continue to grow. In the area of national security, traditional concerns with external military threats remain important considerations for Eastern European states seeking to restructure, redeploy and reorient their armed forces. However, these concerns have been joined, and in some cases overshadowed, by the potential of interethnic and other internal violence in the region and the possibility that spillover from conflicts in neighboring countries will threaten national stability and integrity.

Some military establishments in the region have even begun to develop their own concepts of "low intensity conflict" in an effort to address defense issues far removed from the "theater-strategic" contingencies that recently dominated former Warsaw Pact (WP) planning.¹ Law enforcement and internal security forces also face new national security challenges.

In this regard, geometric increases in the rates of general and organized crimes have been in evidence throughout the region over the last two years.² Most notable from a national security standpoint, however, are those security threats of a transnational nature—specifically international narcotics trafficking and those forms of political, criminal and random violence often defined

More open borders, the disruption and reorganization of security and law enforcement agencies and a growing array of highly mobile international criminals seeking new opportunities and vast profits threaten to undermine state institutions struggling to achieve some measure of stability and effectiveness.

in Eastern European states as "terrorism." More open borders, the disruption and reorganization of security and law enforcement agencies and a growing array of highly mobile international criminals seeking new opportunities and vast profits threaten to undermine state institutions struggling to achieve some measure of stability and effectiveness.³ It has been said that Hungary serves as an example for the entire region:

"The major problem . . . today is no longer crimes . . . by Hungarians, but rather the growing involvement by significant numbers of specialized and organized international criminals in domestic criminal activities, including Arab currency dealers, Turks and Yugoslavs, weapons and drug smugglers, Romanian pickpockets and burglars, Bulgarian counterfeiters, Poles, Soviets. . . . Hungary is now part of the Balkan trail; criminals have begun to carve out their own territories in our country."⁴

Latin American, African, Asian and Western narcotics traffickers and arms dealers have recently been added to this bizarre mixture. Coupled with the potential for interethnic conflict and volatile internal political disputes and antagonisms, a destabilizing milieu is created that not only affects Eastern European states and institutions but also has security implications for all Europe and far beyond its bounds.

Terrorism and Armed Violence

Among many intriguing revelations accompanying the sweeping change in Eastern Europe is the continuing confirmation of long-alleged support to a variety of international terrorist organizations by former WP members.⁵ This

ranged from passive acquiescence in providing safe havens to planned and active training and equipping of individuals and groups. In the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), for example, the State Security Service (Stasi) allegedly not only supported but also collaborated with the Red Army Faction (RAF) and West Berlin terrorist groups such as Rote Zora and the Kreuzberg Autonomists.⁶ The GDR's Ministry for State Security reportedly provided members of the "Carlos" terrorist group with 24 kilograms of explosives—and housed the organizer—for the 1983 attack against Maison de France in West Berlin.⁷ Also, the Stasi is said to have supplied intelligence to assist Palestinian terrorists in their planning of a number of assassination attempts in West Germany.⁸ Some assessments even link the 1972 massacre of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich and the 1985 terrorist attack at Rome's Leonardo da Vinci Airport to the Stasi. At the very least, they trained Palestinian terrorist commandos of the Abu Nidal group (Al Fatah Revolutionary Council), which claimed responsibility for these terrorist acts.

Some former WP countries have been forthcoming in investigating and reporting terrorist support activities of their former regimes. The Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR) acknowledges the role of its former security service (StB) in creating a "zone of peace" for some terrorist groups and supplying them with explosives (notably Semtex) and armaments, while current Hungarian law enforcement officials continue to report on past support to the Carlos organization.⁹ Bulgarian press and official spokesmen continue to investigate that country's alleged role in supporting Turkish and other terrorists (to include the 1981 attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II in Rome and the successful murder of Bulgarian dissident writer Georgi Markov in London a dozen years ago).¹⁰ Bulgaria's counterintelligence chief acknowledged, in August 1991, that weapons sold to Lebanon and Syria in the past had wound up in the hands of Bolivian terrorists and that some training support had been provided to terrorists.¹¹

Official or tacit sanctioning of safe havens,

technical support, supply and training created a terrorist infrastructure that reportedly did not simply disappear with a change in regime. Eastern European commentators assert that former security service agents in at least some of these countries are continuing illegal activities (drug and arms smuggling, terrorist acts, and so on), maintaining an effective organizational network and enjoying the support of former members of the People's Militia.¹² Earlier this year, for example, an illegal "arsenal," said to be intended for terrorist actions to be carried out by former security service and militia reserve personnel, was seized in Bytom (Poland) from a former security service agent.¹³ More recently, a senior Czechoslovak law enforcement spokesman said he could not rule out the possibility that terrorists familiar with the CSFR were still using the country as a hiding place. Of particular concern was the reinvigorated RAF, whose members German authorities feared would hide on Czechoslovak territory.¹⁴ Former security personnel are said also to have formed new underground organizations such as "Red Fist," (composed of former Stasi members), along with analogous groups in other former WP states.¹⁵

Longstanding and newly energized ethnic and national tensions have heightened the potential for politically motivated violence throughout Eastern Europe. For example, a text attributed to the Slovak Republican Army—an extremist organization that identifies its enemies as Hungarians, Czechs, Jews and renegade Slovaks—noted its contacts with the "Irish Republican Army, Vatra, Poland's 13 December Independent Group, and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]." The organization declared its intention to create an apocalypse in central and southeastern Europe by destroying nuclear power plants, petroleum and gas pipelines and other facilities, if the "Slovak nation is threatened with extinction."¹⁶

Certainly, the terrorism potential in the troubled Yugoslav republics has been underscored by many acts of violence accompanying, and separate from, the more organized military actions by federal and republic forces. There has

Wide World Photos



An Israeli bank damaged by a terrorist bomb, Paris, France, 13 April 1985. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the former East Bloc countries supported terrorist groups operating in the West.

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The Stasi is said to have supplied intelligence to assist Palestinian terrorists in their planning of a number of assassination attempts in West Germany . . . [and] trained Palestinian terrorist commandos of the Abu Nidal group.

been a threat of even greater violence amidst murders and bombings. For example, a pan-Serbian "Chetnik" faction has threatened to destroy the Krsko nuclear power plant owned jointly by

Official or tacit sanctioning of safe havens, technical support, supply and training created a terrorist infrastructure that reportedly did not simply disappear with a change in regime. . . . Former security service agents in at least some of these countries are continuing illegal activities (smuggling, terrorist acts, and so on), maintaining an effective organizational network and enjoying the support of former members of the People's Militia.

Croatia and Slovenia.¹⁷ A Serbian organization calling itself the "Black Hand" (after the group responsible for the 1914 assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo, which ignited World War I) threatened the lives of German diplomats in a letter delivered to the German Embassy in Ottawa.¹⁸

Added to this is the emergence of profit-oriented organized crime throughout the region and its involvement in both weapons sales and the procurement and sale of embargoed items (chemical, nuclear and bacteriological). In August 1991, customs officers at a Slovak post on the Polish border seized two boxes with some 40 hand grenades—a seizure said not to be an isolated one.¹⁹ A large shipment of machineguns, pistols and ammunition was confiscated at the Hungarian border in May 1991 after its discovery in the trunk of a car on its way to Yugoslavia.²⁰ Arms traffickers and other organized criminal groups perceive new opportunities for successfully conducting their business in Eastern Europe. With Eastern European law-enforcement agencies in a state of uncertain transition, a kind of "security vacuum" has been created in which a host of organized criminal activities are flourishing. Far looser border controls facilitate the

movement of men and materials and have opened new routes to a ready market for means of violence. Consequently, the potential for terrorism and terrorist support is judged substantial by both Eastern European and Western security specialists. No longer officially or implicitly endorsing terrorist organizations, the new regimes are now themselves potential terrorist targets.

Narcotics Trafficking

Eastern European states have become central players in the upward spiral of international narcotics trafficking and domestic narcotics abuse. To an even greater extent than arms dealers and terrorist movements, aggressive and well-financed "narcobusinessmen" have sought to capitalize on the "security vacuum" in which underresourced and reorganizing security establishments are unable to mount effective countermeasures. Open borders, variegated transportation systems and resources, proximity to lucrative western and northern European drug markets and a growing appetite for narcotics consumption in the region itself have further elevated the importance of Eastern Europe in the activities and planning of drug trafficking organizations.

While economic problems (and seductively high profits) in Eastern Europe are pushing some citizens and organized criminals there into the narcotics trafficking business, these same problems, for the present, eliminate most of Eastern Europe as an inviting consumer market; that is, the average user simply cannot finance an expensive foreign drug habit. The lack of convertible currency also makes narcotics sales inconvenient and unprofitable for foreign traffickers. Ironically, as the economies of these countries improve, they will become increasingly more attractive and lucrative markets for the international narcotics trade. As one 1990 Polish assessment candidly noted, Poland is not yet an attractive partner for outside drugs since "in narcotics the law of pure economics prevails." The author stressed, however, that a more prosperous Poland in a few years could "become a real market for opium and cocaine specialties."²¹

Pogranichnik



Soviet troops, like these on the Iranian border, face increasing difficulties stopping the shipment of narcotics from Southwest Asia to Eastern Europe and beyond.

Arms traffickers and other organized criminal groups perceive new opportunities for successfully conducting their business in Eastern Europe. With Eastern European law-enforcement agencies in a state of uncertain transition, a kind of "security vacuum" has been created in which a host of organized criminal activities are flourishing.

Unfortunately, the interim period is seeing abuse of cheaper drugs, especially pharmaceuticals and indigenously produced substances—a supply and demand situation that has generated a burgeoning “cottage industry” in Eastern Europe.²² Polish addicts, for example, are said to “fan out across Poland” every July to purchase, or otherwise acquire, poppy seeds and straw grown in legal (and presumably some illegal) poppy fields.²³ Czechoslovak police note that marijuana and hashish are among the most used organic drugs, while the Czech representative at an April 1991 international drug conference in Paris cited a cheap street drug called “brown” as one whose use is rapidly spreading. Hungary reports the presence of illegal laboratories in that country producing narcotic products from poppies and hemp.²⁴

Pharmaceutical abuse—the misuse of drugs available through prescriptions, often forged—is

becoming increasingly common, with codeine and pervitin being the most commonly used in the CSFR.²⁵ In Hungary, an increased demand was noted in early 1990 for certain medicinal drugs, especially guttahydrocodin and meristin suppositories, both of which produce an intensified narcotic effect when combined with small quantities of alcohol.²⁶

Of far broader import is the development of Poland into one of the leading producers and exporters of illegal amphetamines in Europe. According to an April 1991 Interpol report, Poland is second only to Holland in European production of amphetamine sulphate. However, Poland's product is said to be superior to that of the Netherlands and even of the United States. Polish-produced amphetamines are widely sold in Scandinavia and northern Europe in general, with the Polish product said to account for 6.9 percent of the total exported from Europe. Poles

living abroad appear to play a substantial role in the supply pipeline. While Polish amphetamine traffickers rank third in terms of arrests, even half the Germans arrested for drug smuggling are said

Longstanding and newly energized ethnic and national tensions have heightened the potential for politically motivated violence throughout Eastern Europe. . . . The Slovak Republican Army—an extremist organization — . . . declared its intention to create an apocalypse in central and southeastern Europe by destroying nuclear power plants, petroleum and gas pipelines and other facilities, if the “Slovak nation is threatened with extinction.”

to be of Polish descent. The amphetamines are produced in hidden laboratories using chemicals purchased in the West.²⁷

Former WP states have already become an integral part of key drug transit routes, a role that underscores the truly international dimensions of narcotics trafficking in the region. For heroin and other opium products originating in Southwest Asia (Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan), Turkey stands as the principal European distribution center. From there, a number of routes and variations have been described by regional specialists, using ground, air and sea transport in various combinations.

For example, there is the main “Balkan route,” running through Yugoslavia into Austria and on into western Europe, and a second Balkan route, increasingly used, through Bulgaria and Romania to Hungary. From Hungary, narcotics continue on into the CSFR and then to western and northern Europe. Some narcotics transit Hungary from Yugoslavia, entering at Hungary’s southeastern corner and exiting into Austria through a “northwestern gate.” Overall, an estimated 5 to 6 tons of narcotics pass through Hungary every year.²⁸ Illustrating the complexities of the Balkan routes, in February

1991, Romanian customs officials at the Giurgiu border crossing seized 10.5 kilograms of opium in a British firm’s vehicle driven by a Turk. Romania was to be a transit area for a subsequent destination. The driver had been given the drugs in Bulgaria by two Iranians. These were part of 30 kilograms of drugs divided into three parts; the other two parts were to be transited through Yugoslavia.²⁹

Bulgaria’s and Romania’s increasing roles as transit areas are reinforced by other evidence. According to Interpol, as of September 1990, more than 60 percent of the drug trade reaching Italy and Austria passed through Bulgaria, with this figure expected to increase; while in 1990, Romanian police uncovered three heroin shipments—totaling 150 kilograms—bound for western Europe.³⁰ Poland is also said to play a growing role in heroin distribution to western Europe.³¹ Of course, it is from western European distribution and transshipment points that Southwest Asian heroin continues on to North America.

A variety of non-European nationals is involved in the drug trade in Eastern Europe, including, among others, “Arabs” (Egyptians) said to be congregating near Budapest and involved in the storage of heroin, as well as its sale to Hungarian addicts, and a Lebanese resident of Timisoara arrested by Romanian police, in August 1991, for his effort to smuggle half a kilogram of heroin to Germany concealed inside a television set.³²

Organized crime links among European criminal groups overall are becoming more developed. For example, there are now Soviet–Polish, Soviet–Hungarian and Soviet–Bulgarian crime syndicates, with the Soviet–Polish organization ranked by some as the third most powerful drug-trafficking and production group in Europe in terms of “influence and financial turnover.”³³ Far more complex relationships have developed in the region as well. For example, in May 1991, Yugoslav police stopped two Poles who were trying to smuggle 10 kilograms of heroin (carried for Albanians in Kosovo) concealed in their car. The drugs were believed destined for the Ameri-

Sergei Zhukov, Soviet Life



Armed Soviet militiamen raid a poppy crop once destined for internal sale or a growing European export market, summer 1991.

Eastern European states have become central players in the upward spiral of international narcotics trafficking and domestic narcotics abuse. . . . Open borders, variegated transportation systems and resources, proximity to lucrative western and northern European drug markets and a growing appetite for narcotics consumption in the region itself have further elevated the importance of Eastern Europe in the activities and planning of drug trafficking organizations.

can market.³⁴ The profits of this sale were allegedly to be returned for use by the Albanian separatist leadership to buy arms and support terrorist activity in Kosovo and Metohija, as well as on Serbian territory.³⁵ It has been also charged that the Republic of Croatia used money from the sale of confiscated drugs to buy weapons for the armed forces, an accusation hotly denounced by Croatian officials.³⁶ Bulgaria has allegedly been a "central operator" in trading weapons for narcotics as well.³⁷ Whatever the factual basis of these allegations, the potential link between narcotics profits and arms purchases will remain an issue throughout Eastern Europe, given the

volatile environment in much of the region.

Narcotics smuggling via commercial aviation is as rampant in Eastern Europe now as elsewhere. Among the most alarming new developments in Eastern Europe narcotics trafficking patterns are the increased seizures of Latin American cocaine. Okęcie International Airport (Warsaw) is said to be a destination of cocaine shipments for subsequent transfer to the West, since police and customs officials here are believed to be stretched thin by the high volume of smuggling activity.³⁸ In June 1991, some 11.3 kilograms of cocaine, allegedly from Colombia, were seized at the Belgrade airport. The

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recovery was reported to have been carried out in cooperation with German police.³⁹ While cocaine is clearly transiting Eastern Europe on its way to other destinations, it is feared that it may soon become a more widely consumed drug in this region as well.

Countermeasures

Law enforcement and security organizations tasked to deal with armed violence, narcotics trafficking and a soaring general crime problem are simultaneously seeking to contend with four major problems:

- Forging a new identity to replace tarnished public image due to earlier employment on behalf of Communist Party oppression.
- Defining or redefining responsibilities in accordance with new legislation.
- Coping with acute personnel shortages and training deficiencies (particularly in investigative procedures and techniques).
- Overcoming debilitating equipment shortfalls and obsolescence that has seen law enforcement lagging far behind better-equipped criminal elements.

As the recent testimony of many Eastern European law enforcement agencies attests, this complex of problems has meant faltering progress on the general crime front and necessitated the creation of special units to meet the more serious threats of terrorism, criminal violence, narcotics trafficking and organized crime.

The need for specialized counterterrorist forces, apart from general and even more specialized police and military components, was expressed this way by a Yugoslav commentator speaking from the perspective of the Croatian Republic:

"The regular constabulary, with respect to a terrorist, is like a person looking for a black cat in a dark room at midnight. Special police units . . . with respect to terrorists are like a person seeking a black cat which is not there in a dark room at midnight. Local and border police units seeking terrorists, then, are like a person in a dark room who is hunting a black cat which is not there, but who still hopes that someday he will find it, and the . . . armed forces, with respect to a modern terrorist, are like a person in a dark room at midnight looking for a black cat that is not there, but who shouts, as ordered, 'I have found it!'"⁴⁰

The author emphasized that a state must be able to respond quickly, effectively and with surgical precision to acts of terrorism, a judgment with which most Eastern European states seem to concur. Special counterterrorist units and antiterrorist departments such as the Czechoslovak Antiterror Group, the antiterrorist division within the Hungarian National Police Command, and the Bulgarian Operational-Technical Department for Combating Terrorism (under the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and its apparently subordinate "Special Unit On the Struggle Against Terror" have been or are being formed. Although these are elite forces, they face many of the same problems as general law-enforcement agencies, that is, lack of fast vehicles, unreliable and outdated weapons and unsatisfactory communications.⁴¹

The Antiterrorist Division of the Polish Capital Police Command is a particularly good example of a restructured counterterrorist unit. Clearly, the depoliticized heirs of the old regime's counterterrorist force, the new organization is tasked "to physically combat acts of terror and terrorism," to protect members of the Polish leadership and important foreign visitors and to support rescue efforts in natural disasters. Mem-

(Right) Drug-sniffing dogs at Domodedovo Airport and (below) a stuffed mongoose that customs officials at Sheremetyevo Airport found filled with three pounds of heroin. Drugs frequently pass through these Moscow facilities on their way to points across Europe.



Soviet Life



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bers undergo vigorous preparation based on daily physical, tactical and theoretical training. They also attend special training camps (parachute training, mountain climbing, diving, swimming), acquire skills and competence in demolitions and explosives work, sniper activity, free diving and hand-to-hand combat.⁴² In short, the force is generally analogous in mission and training to the counterterrorist forces of other countries.

As with the fight against terrorism, special counternarcotics organizations and units have formed, or are forming, in Eastern Europe. While numerous national variations exist, in general the counternarcotics effort is shared

among reorganized internal affairs ministries and subordinate police agencies, intelligence services, border guard establishments, customs services, ministries of health and agriculture and even private organizations concerned principally with social or educational work. It is within these organizations that an increasing specialization in counternarcotics work is taking place. Developments include the creation of special narcotics strike and investigation units in police departments at various levels; putting together special interagency task forces to coordinate drug enforcement efforts or cover designated border zones; restricting poppy and hemp cultivation (Poland); developing programs to identify hard-

core and occasional users; establishing detoxification and rehabilitation centers.

International cooperation has become increasingly important for many Eastern European states in the area of both terrorism and narcotics trafficking. These countries are looking to the West for support in equipment acquisition and training. Western justice systems are also serving as possible models for Eastern Europe. Poland and the CSFR have rejoined—Hungary has applied to rejoin—Interpol, an association that provides member countries with access to information and a broad spectrum of training and expertise associated with combating terrorism, narcotics trafficking and other criminal activities.

Eastern European countries now frequently participate in international law enforcement conferences and seminars and are entering into bilateral and multilateral agreements on cooperation against organized crime, narcotics trafficking and terrorism. These include an operational agreement between the Polish Investigative Operations Office of the Police Headquarters and the 6th Main Directorate of the Soviet MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) on combating or-

ganized crime, narcotics trafficking, illegal arms deals and other crimes; the CSFR's agreement with 40 other nations to include detectable chemical additives in the exported explosive Semtex; a memorandum between the United Kingdom and Hungary on the joint struggle against drug abuse and trafficking and the production of drugs and psychotropic substances; an agreement on cooperation between police and customs officials of the United Kingdom and the CSFR on fighting drug trafficking and organized crime; an agreement between the Bulgarian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Greek Ministry for Public Order on combating terrorism, narcotics trafficking and a number of other organized criminal activities; and the CSFR's June 1991 announcement of its candidacy for a seat on the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Widespread information exchanges, cooperation and actions are taking place on a less formal level as well (Hungary's use of information provided by Austria and Germany to investigate its past support of "Carlos" and his terrorist group).⁴³

While the new regimes of Eastern Europe are seeking to make the difficult transition to stable democracies with effective economies and secure borders, the transnational and domestic security problems outlined above threaten to slow or undermine their efforts. Despite serious and continuing programs to deal with the destabilizing potential of planned and random armed violence and with the rapidly developing problem of narcotics trafficking and organized crime, the gap between criminal success and law enforcement effectiveness is widening at an alarming rate—an assessment made by most indigenous law enforcement establishments in Eastern Europe. One debatable recourse for dealing with the shortages of personnel and equipment is to employ elements of the armed forces, a path taken by a number of other countries when faced with internal security crises not typically within the purview of the military.⁴⁴ Poland has undertaken several initiatives in this regard. Indeed, at a January 1991 meeting involving Polish President Lech Walesa and the ministers of National

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Yevgeni Lukatsky, Soviet Life



Soviet militia task forces and their East European counterparts are now looking to the West for equipment and training.

International cooperation has become increasingly important for many Eastern European states in the area of both terrorism and narcotics trafficking. These countries are looking to the West for support in equipment acquisition and training. . . . Poland and the CSFR have rejoined—Hungary has applied to rejoin—Interpol, an association that provides member countries with access to information and a broad spectrum of training and expertise associated with combating terrorism, narcotics trafficking and other criminal activities.

Defense and Internal Affairs, it was agreed that the "two ministries should combine forces with the objective of establishing a common front in the struggle against crime."⁴⁵ One decision from this meeting was to divert conscripts from the military to the police forces. Legislation was passed, in March 1991, further defining the roles of the Polish police and military in internal security roles.⁴⁶ Such approaches, their appropriateness and effectiveness, are no doubt being considered by a number of the East European states.

In the meantime, carefully considered Western assistance to Eastern European law enforcement, security and military establishments mounting sustained efforts against transnational threats may directly advance the interests of countries in and out the region, including the

United States. The establishment of additional and more effective routes for heroin, cocaine and other drugs destined for Europe or North America would be a tragedy, but one that seems to be developing. The establishment of safe areas or support bases for alienated ethnic and national groups using violence as a means to their goals would present a serious security problem as well, particularly with the freer movement and intermingling of foreign nationals in Europe and a fragmenting Soviet Union. In short, while traditional measures of national security retain their importance in the post-Cold War period, increased attention needs to be directed toward those transnational issues that are benefiting from turmoil, instability and an increasingly interconnected world. **MR**

NOTES

1. For recent Polish thinking on low-intensity conflict (LIC) issues, see Stanislaw Koziej, "Reorientacja zadani" [A Reorientation of Missions], *Polska Zbrojna*, 25 June 1991. Soviet attention to the US LIC concept has been evident as well.
2. The overall crime picture is virtually the same throughout Eastern Europe. There has been a particularly noticeable increase in crimes against property (thefts, burglaries and robberies) and intensification in the violence associated with these crimes. People are not only being robbed, they are also being physically attacked while the crime is being committed. Murder and rape are also on the upswing, and there is more incidence of young criminals plaguing elderly victims. Crime in Eastern Europe is becoming more organized, and even in its domestic manifestation its makeup has an international flavor.
3. Since the revolutions of 1989, many Eastern European law enforcement officials and workers point to socioeconomic changes as major contributors to the swelling crime wave. Open borders have not only greatly expedited smuggling, whether it be drugs, arms, currency or any other kinds of exchangeable goods, but have also added to the international character of crime, facilitating the movement of men as well as goods. For example, illegal Third World migrants have poured into Bulgaria on their way west, only to collaborate with Bulgarian criminals. The transition period between the old communist regimes and the new political-economic systems is seen as a kind of "security vacuum," in which the combination of the necessity for law enforcement officials and workers to reorient themselves psychologically to a new definition of crime, so to speak, and the people's perceptions of the negative socioeconomic aspects during this period (unemployment, nonavailability of consumer goods, and so on) provide a fertile breeding ground for crime. The comparatively lower incidence of crime during the former regimes can also be attributed to the fact that during this time, criminals were dealt with harshly and often arbitrarily. (See Tom Yazdgerdi, "The Crime Epidemic," *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe*, vol. 1, no. 35, [31 August 1990], 10; although the article deals specifically with Czechoslovakia, it is applicable in many respects to all of Eastern Europe.)
4. Interview with retired chief of the Hungarian Homicide Division, Dr. Loric Laposi in Tallzo, 11 January 1991, as translated in JPRS-EER-91-028, 6 March 1991. In Bulgaria, Gypsies and Vietnamese guest workers are said to practice organized crime "with great professionalism" (see George Slavov, "Organized Crime in Bulgaria on the Rise," *Radio Free Europe (RFE) Daily Report* No. 8 May 1991).
5. For example, Ulrike Meinhoff, leader of the Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Gang) and world famous international terrorist "Carlos" are known to have resided in the Grand Hotel in Budapest. This and other such incidents were explained as a trade-off in hopes of redirecting terrorist activities that might be executed against the host country. See "Hungarian Investigation of 'Carlos the Jackal'" in FBIS Vienna MSG DTG 041539Z (June 91) and DTG 041543Z (June 91).
6. Ralf Georg Reuth, "The Stasi Supported the West Berlin Autonomists Too!" *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 12 April 1991, as translated in JPRS-TOT-91-016-L, 28 May 1991, 27.
7. Report from the Berlin Public Prosecutor's Office dated 18 April 1991, in JPRS-TOT-91-013-L, 26 April 1991, 23.
8. *Berliner Zeitung*, 18 April 1991, 5, as translated in JPRS-TOT-91-013-L, 26 April 1991, 23. The article, quoting from the magazine *Extra*, says that the minutes of a Stasi meeting with Abu Hisham, head of the office of the United PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization)-Security group, indicate that Hisham reported on PLO intentions to attack persons and installations in West Germany. "However, the PLO does not want to engage in any activities which are not also in the interest of the GDR (German Democratic Republic)." The Stasi reply was that the Ministry of State Security did not interfere in PLO internal affairs; nevertheless, Stasi did pass on information to the PLO security organization. Obviously, Stasi files, if they are ever made available, will contain a wealth of information concerning such activities and associations.
9. See, for example, the interview with Czechoslovak Police Chief Frantisek Maryska, Prague CTK, 0719 GMT, 29 July 1991, as cited in FBIS-EEU-91-147, 14; Josef Tucek, "Mlada Fronta Dnes," 13 July 1991, as translated in FBIS-EEU-91-138, 18; and the Hungarian chief prosecutor's report on the Carlos affair in FBIS Vienna message 090806Z July 1991.
10. Kjell Engelbrkt, "Probing into the Secret Services' Past Activities Abroad," *Report on Eastern Europe*, 12 July 1991, 1-5.
11. BTA (Sofia) 0933 GMT 6 August 1991, as translated in FBIS-EEU-91-152, 5.
12. "Head of Anti-terrorist Organization Issues Warning," *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe* (Weekly Record of Events), vol. 1, no. 34, 24 August 1990.
13. *Warsaw Pap*, 1650 GMT, 19 April 1991, as cited in JPRS-TOT-91-013-L, 2.
14. Maryska interview, FBIS-EEU-91-147, 14.
15. Among the agenda of such organizations is the intimidation of those officials investigating the activities of the former security establishments. Ian Geldard, "Terrorism: A World Perspective," presentation delivered at the VI Annual International Symposium on Criminal Justice Issues, Chicago, Illinois, 23 August 1991.
16. This alleged November 1990 Slovak Republican Army diatribe was published in "Text," *Kapu*, no. 6, June 1991, as translated in JPRS-TOT-91-021-L, 3. While its authenticity cannot be confirmed, it certainly captures the spirit of ethnic, national and political antagonisms so evident throughout Eastern Europe.
17. "Chetniks Threaten to Blow Up Krsko Nuclear Power Plant," *Neue Kronen-zeitung*, 19 May 1991, as cited in FBIS Vienna message 191505Z May 1991.
18. *Deutschland Network* (Cologne), 1100 GMT 15 August 1991, as cited in FBIS Vienna, 151318Z August 1991.
19. "Good for the Black Market. But Also Good for Hand Grenades," *Narodna Obrada*, 12 August 1991, as cited in FBIS Vienna message 131953Z August 1991.
20. Kossuth Radio Network (Budapest), 1000 GMT 21 May 1991, as cited in FBIS London message 211527Z May 1991.
21. Ewa Kozierkiewicz-Widermanska, "The Slender Thread of White Powder," *Rzeczpospolita*, 12 March 1990, as translated in JPRS-EER-90-071, 2; May 1990, 42. Polish officials have recognized the potentially spiraling narcotics problem; however, they feel that, for the present, they must turn their limited resources toward solving problems of a more immediate nature, for example, economic, ecological, and so on.
22. "Today Polish drug addicts satisfy themselves with domestically produced mixtures, but as society becomes richer, the market will increase, as will smuggling and drug trafficking," See Kozierkiewicz-Widermanska.
23. Weronika Kostyrko, "A Peasant Woman Was Sowing Poppies," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 10 June 1991, as translated in JPRS-TDD-91-029-L, 7. In October 1990 and June 1991, the Polish legislature passed laws banning poppy cultivation in many areas and putting the remaining cultivation under strict control.
24. "Hungary is on the Transit Route of Drug Smugglers—Drug Users Should Be Treated as Sick People," *Magyar Hirlap*, 10 August 1991, as cited in FBIS Vienna message 141533Z August 1991.
25. Ibid. See also "Phony Prescription, Real Danger," *Mai Nap*, 9 March 1990, translated in JPRS-EER-90-079, 7 June 1990, 40.
26. Other popular pharmaceuticals here included codeine, noxiron and morphine.
27. "The Amphetamine Trail," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 17 April 1991, translated in JPRS-TDD-91-018-L, 30 April 1991, 20; "An Army of Polish Coiners," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 18 April 1991, as translated in JPRS-TDD-91-018-L, 30 April 1991, 19; and Jorgen R. Lohne, "Amphetamine Smugglers Get Five Years," *Altenposten*, 7 June 1991, as translated in JPRS-TDD-91-029-L, 27-28.
28. Vienna Albert interview with Gyorgy Balogh, chief of the Hungarian Customs Service, "What Are We Doing Against Drug Smuggling?" *Tallzo*, no. 22, 31 May 1991, as translated in JPRS-TDD-91-027-L, 26-27.
29. ROMPRES (Bucharest) 1037 GMT 20 February 1991, as translated in JPRS-TDD-91-009-L, 10.
30. "Crime Rate Almost Triples," *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe*, 22 February 1991, vol. 2, no. 8, 51. The current situation in Yugoslavia has forced drug traffickers to switch their preferred route from the Middle East via Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, now much of this traffic is transiting through Romania. See *RFE Daily Report* No. 167, 3 September 1991.
31. "Number of Drug-Related Crimes Doubles in First Part of Year; Drug Use Spreads to More and More Cities," *Helsingin Sanomat*, as translated in JPRS-TDD-91-031-L, 11. According to an April 1991 Interpol report, apart from smuggling domestically produced amphetamine sulphate to Germany and Scandinavia, Poland also serves as a transfer point for marijuana, hashish, and heroin from Southeast Asia and Latin America. In addition, Polish ports serve as transfer points for hashish, marijuana and heroin between Singapore, Bangkok and Rotterdam.
32. "What Are We Doing Against Drug Smuggling?" 27; "Drug Dealing Through East Bloc States," *Die Presse*, 12 July 1991, as cited in FBIS message 121533Z July 1991; and "Police Seize Heroin, Destined for Germany," *UNU Radio Network* (Romania), 1700 GMT 2 August 1991, as cited in FBIS Vienna message 021759Z August 1991.
33. "Our Mafia in Europe," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 21 May 1991, as translated in FBIS-SOV-91-103, 40.
34. "Ten Kilograms of Heroin Found," *Politika*, 20 May 1991, as cited in FBIS Vienna message 101618Z June 1991.
35. Ibid.
36. Tanjug (Belgrade) 2058 GMT 11 July 1991, as cited in JPRS-TDD-91-029-L.
37. See "Narcotics Connection Resurfaces," *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe* (Weekly Record of Events), vol. 1, no. 12, 23 March 1990.
38. "The Bulgarian Connection: Stuff for Western Dreams," *Presse*, 12 July 1991, as cited in FBIS Vienna message 121923Z July 1991.
39. See Tanjug 1355 GMT 25 June 1985, as cited in FBIS London message 251602Z June 1991.
40. Fran Visnar, "Croatian Antiterrorist Forces," *Start*, 2 March 1991, 46-49, as translated in JPRS-EER-91-041, 2 April 1991, 53.
41. According to an unconfirmed report, a single terrorist suspect entered Hungary during the period of the Gulf War, but the slowness of the information network connecting the appropriate authorities allowed him to leave before being apprehended. See Attila Fekete, "Border Guards: Concepts Will Remain," *Nepszabadsag*, 13 March 1991, as translated in JPRS-EER 91-062, 8 May 1991, 27.
42. Many of the men in this unit are reservists of the 6th Air Assault Brigade. See Robert Kowal, "Policant strzela raz" [The policeman fires once], *Polska zbrojna*, 10 December 1990, 3.
43. Also of note in the area of cooperation, in August 1990 the Bulgarian director of Kintex (identified by Western intelligence agencies as a major arms firm to terrorist organizations) said that the company is willing to provide the West with information on arms exports. Kintex has records and serial numbers of all exported arms to Warsaw Pact and other countries such as Libya, Syria and Iraq. If Western governments provide the serial numbers of weapons linked to Bulgaria, Kintex will tell where the arms have been shipped. See "Arms Exporters Offer Information on Sales," *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe* (Weekly Record of Events), vol. 1, no. 32, 10 August 1990.
44. It is worth noting that counterterrorism and counternarcotics are both elements included under the US military's concept of LIC.
45. V. Runov, "Common Front in the Struggle Against Crime," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 31 January 1991.
46. For a text of this legislation, see *Dziennik Ustaw*, no. 26, item no. 104, 30 March 1991, as translated in JPRS-EER-91-106-S, 26-28.

United States-Colombia Extradition Treaty

FAILURE OF A SECURITY STRATEGY

Major Arnaldo Claudio, US Army

The fight against the drug cartels has been challenging US and Latin American officials for many years. The author takes a look at the extradition treaty between the United States and Colombia and how this treaty has changed with each government during the 1980s. He also reviews what the current Colombian government is doing about the treaty and the drug cartels.

[The treaty] . . . imposes an obligation on the Requested State to extradite all persons, including its nationals, in cases where the offense involves punishable acts in both countries and the offense was intended to be consummated in the Requesting State. This provision is especially important in prosecuting exporters of dangerous drugs and narcotics.

US-Colombian Extradition Treaty, 1979¹

FOR THE last decade, the Colombian drug cartels have had a tremendously disruptive influence on the Colombian government and nation. Initiated and sustained by the US-Colombian Extradition Treaty of 1979, this influence has been exerted through a systematic campaign of intimidation, kidnapping and murder against anyone seeking their extradition to the United States. Nearly 12 years after former President Julio César Turbay signed the treaty, the current Colombian president, César Gaviria

Trujillo, and the Constituent Assembly "barred" the extradition of Colombian criminals wanted by the United States and other foreign governments.² Gaviria emphasized that the decisions made by the Constituent Assembly will serve Colombia as a great instrument for coping with its problems, and he further stressed that "with every day, Colombia will gain more trust, security, optimism and hope to give a bright future to the new generations of Colombians."³

This sharp change in policy reflects Colombia's desire to take care of its own internal security problems. On the other hand, a leading Bogotá newspaper proclaimed "Terrorism Wins," suggesting the cartels had intimidated the government into accepting their terms.⁴ The first comments by US officials echoed this pessimistic view. For example, a disappointed Bob Martinez, director of the US Office of National Drug

Control Policy, cited Washington's hope that "extraditions would have been part of their [Colombian] criminal justice system."⁵ In the view of some US and Colombian commentators, the drug cartels seem to have assured themselves a "safe haven" in their own country by eliminating their enemies, including Colombia's justice minister, antidrug police commanders and more than a dozen supreme court justices. What happened, asked Martinez, to Colombia's will to fight the cartels? An examination of the chronological sequence of the complex events concerning the US-Colombian Extradition Treaty is instructive in assessing sharply differing perspectives of security strategies.

In his January 1978 inaugural address, Turbay declared war on drug traffickers and promised that his administration would restore order in Colombia. Ninety days later, taking advantage

By amending an existing law, the US Congress prohibited the sale of airborne radar, aircraft and communications equipment to Colombia, fearing that this equipment could be diverted by the nation's military for "other uses" instead of its intended purpose. . . . [Colombians felt] these restrictions severely hampered [their] ability to conduct antidrug operations.

of the state-of-siege powers granted by the National Assembly, he used the military to crack down heavily on drug traffickers. During more than two years of ensuing savage confrontations with the "enemy," the government seized more than 6,000 tons of marijuana and military equipment, including boats and aircraft.

The United States was very satisfied with Colombia's assault on the drug problem, especially after Turbay's government agreed to a US-Colombia extradition treaty. Consequently, the United States responded with \$16 million in additional assistance for Colombia's war on drugs. However, this US-Colombian consensus suf-

fered an early setback. By amending an existing law, the US Congress prohibited the sale of airborne radar, aircraft and communications equipment to Colombia, fearing that this equipment could be diverted by the nation's military for "other uses" instead of its intended purpose. In the view of Colombia's political and military leadership, however, these restrictions severely hampered Colombia's ability to conduct antidrug operations.⁶

While concentrating on narcotics trafficking, Turbay's government neglected the growing insurgency movement. Spearheaded by the M-19 Movement and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, these insurgent groups challenged the Colombian military as never before.⁷ With a massive wave of violence, including both rural and urban attacks, guerrilla forces compelled the Colombian government to concentrate on counterinsurgency operations, to the detriment of its counternarcotics efforts. Responding to heavy criticism by the United States, Turbay stated, "Colombians are not corrupting Americans. You are corrupting us. If you abandon illegal drugs, the traffic will disappear." US-Colombian relations deteriorated rapidly at this juncture, and extradition of Colombian drug offenders was suspended.⁸

When Belisario Betancur Cuartas assumed the presidency in 1982, he adopted a rigid attitude toward formulating a joint US-Colombian policy for the war on drugs and refused to honor the extradition treaty signed by Turbay.⁹ He wanted to test the Colombian judicial system on its own ground, with no foreign involvement. Betancur's perceived uncooperative attitude upset Washington. However, notwithstanding the deterioration of US-Colombian relations, Betancur took a hard-line approach against narco-traffickers. He appointed Rodrigo Lara Bonilla as head of the Ministry of Justice. The new minister wasted no time. Using Colombian military forces and police, and with the assistance of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), he conducted a massive operation against the powerful Medellín Cartel. By the end of the operation, the US-Colombian effort had seized

13.8 metric tons of cocaine, making this effort the largest drug interdiction in history. US officials were once again encouraged. Although the extradition treaty remained on hold, the Colombians had proved they could handle their own counternarcotics affairs.¹⁰

Lara's program disrupted cartel operations so effectively that on 30 April 1984, he was gunned down by a cartel hit man. One result of Lara's death was that it earned public sympathy and support for the Betancur administration. Betancur was furious at the assassination and, taking advantage of this popular support, he responded with a massive war against the Medellín Cartel. To the satisfaction of the United States, he decided to use extradition, a policy that he had previously opposed.¹¹

To the surprise of US and Colombian authorities, the Medellín Cartel responded with alarm and an intensifying concern, since extradition to the United States was considered the most threatening consequence. By the end of 1985, Pablo Escobar Gaviria, the architect of what had become the world's largest cocaine smuggling network, had control of over 70 percent of South America's cocaine distribution. Therefore, he thought he was in a position to negotiate with the Colombian government about his incarceration if captured. Supported by Panama's military commander Manuel Antonio Noriega—to whom some several million dollars for personal protection had been paid—Escobar went to Panama and secretly met with Colombia's attorney general, Carlos Mario Hoyos Jiménez Gomez. The main subject discussed was extradition. Escobar suggested to Jiménez that the extradition treaty be revised so he could turn himself in and be prosecuted retroactively.¹² Furthermore, Escobar offered the restoration of approximately \$15 billion to the government, which would have been sufficient to repay Colombia's current national debt. Upon learning about the offer, US State Department officials queried Betancur, who denied any involvement with Escobar and reiterated his position favoring strong action against the traffickers. In the meantime, the war against drug traffickers con-

tinued. To reinforce the president's promise, the Colombian government extradited 10 Colombians and three other foreigners to the United

Using Colombian military forces and police, and with the assistance of the US DEA, [Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla] conducted a massive operation against the powerful Medellín Cartel. . . .

Lara's program disrupted cartel operations so effectively that on 30 April 1984, he was gunned down by a cartel hit man. . . . Taking advantage of this popular support, [President Betancur] responded with a massive war against the Medellín Cartel . . . [and] decided to use extradition, a policy that he had previously opposed.

States, while continuing its internal drug eradication program.¹³ At this point, however, a searing event in Colombian security affairs took place.

On 6 November 1985, at approximately 11:40, the commander of the 13th Brigade, charged with security of the Palace of Justice among other tasks, received a phone call requesting immediate deployment of his troops—the Palace of Justice had been assaulted by members of the M-19 Movement. Armed with revolvers, M16 rifles, mini-Uzis, grenades, explosives and one 50-caliber machinegun, the insurgent group managed to take 17 supreme court justices hostage. The Colombian military did its best to deal with the M-19 force; however, ill-equipped and poorly trained for such an eventuality, the military failed in its mission. The consequences were devastating: all 17 judges and all the insurgents were killed, and there were considerable military and police casualties as well.¹⁴ This terrorist operation was believed to have been masterminded by the Medellín Cartel, which reportedly paid some \$1 million for the execution of the operation in retaliation to governmental efforts to continue its extradition policy. By the end of



Virgilio Barco Vargas

In 1986, Colombia's image in the world was that of a country totally possessed by the demons of cocaine. A battle for survival was underway against two formidable and intertwined threats to national security: narcotics trafficking and insurgency. Despite the magnitude of the threat, [President] Barco was more than willing to battle on both fronts. He signed the extradition treaty.


1986, more than 50 judges had been murdered by the narcoguerrilla alliance.¹⁵

When newly elected President Virgilio Barco Vargas took office in 1986, Colombia's image in the world was that of a country totally possessed by the demons of cocaine. A battle for survival was underway against two formidable and intertwined threats to national security: narcotics trafficking and insurgency. Despite the magnitude of the threat, Barco was more than willing to battle on both fronts. He signed the extradi-

tion treaty on 14 December 1986. Drug traffickers lost no time in sending the president a signal of their intentions to break the will of the Colombian government. Three days after Barco had signed the treaty agreement, a cartel hit man assassinated Guillermo Cano Isaza, an antidrug publisher working for *El Espectador*, Colombia's leading newspaper.¹⁶ Additionally, the Justice Department's enforcement of antinarcotics laws began to deteriorate, exemplified by the release of Jorge Luis Ochoa Vásquez. Ochoa, who had turned himself in on 15 January 1991, was a leading cartel figure involved in every aspect of the Medellín organization's operations.

Nevertheless, Barco was determined to go forward with his plan. In February 1987, he personally replaced Medellín's notoriously corrupt chief of police and top aides with personnel he trusted. This action stripped Carlos Lehder Rivas (Colombia's most wanted drug lord at that time) of his governmental and police protection. Shortly thereafter, a US-trained counternarcotics unit captured Lehder and 15 other members of the Medellín Cartel. Lehder was immediately extradited to the United States because Colombian officials feared he might purchase his release.¹⁷ Unfortunately, Lehder's extradition had little, if any, impact on the flow of cocaine to the United States and other parts of the world. On the contrary, it worked to the advantage of the Cali Cartel (in southern Colombia), providing it with the opportunity to increase its influence and markets while the Medellín Cartel regrouped. Once reorganized, the Medellín Cartel again undertook violent reprisals against the government, which included ordering hundreds of murders and bombings.

The years 1987-1990 proved to be the most important period for US influence on extradition matters. Colombia's president and government were ready to support the extradition treaty unconditionally. Barco, supported by the United States, directed all his key military and governmental chiefs to act jointly in a new offensive against drug traffickers, but the offensive against the cartels proved impossible to sustain. Barco's leadership and his strategy of close rela-



Colombian policemen hit the pavement as leftist guerrillas holding the Palace of Justice, behind the corrugated steel wall, open fire with automatic weapons, 6 November 1985.

Armed with revolvers, M16 rifles, mini-Uzis, grenades, explosives and one 50-caliber machinegun, [M-19 insurgents] managed to take 17 supreme court justices hostage. The Colombian military did its best to deal with the M-19 force; however, ill-equipped and poorly trained for such an eventuality, the military failed in its mission. The consequences were devastating: all 17 judges and all the insurgents were killed, and there were considerable military and police casualties as well.

tions with the United States had been shaken by the violent and brutal criminal actions of the cartels.¹⁸

Beginning on 7 August 1990, when Gaviria became president, a plan was launched to strengthen the justice system. The United States, however, severely criticized this plan. Among its most controversial aspects are decrees 20-47, 30-30 and 303, which reduce the penalties for people, including drug traffickers, who turn themselves in to Colombian authorities and confess their crimes. Changing Colombian approaches were evident in other ways as well. Of note was the Ninth International Conference on the Control of Drugs, held in Cartagena, Colombia (April 1991), attended by two US representatives, Thomas E. McNamara (then US ambassador to Colombia), and Robert Bonner (DEA agent-in-charge for Colombia), both of whom emphatically rejected the possible abolition of extradition. Colombian Foreign Minister Luis Fernando Jaramillo described, as "mere opinions," the statements made by the ambassador and the DEA chief. Furthermore, when

asked about McNamara's and Bonner's remarks he added, "Colombia does not accept pressure on the Constituent Assembly, the government, or anyone."¹⁹

On 15 May 1991, the First and Fourth commissions of the National Constituent Assembly decided to prohibit the extradition of Colombians. The full text of the article approved by the two commissions reads as follows:

"Extradition from Colombia is prohibited. Extradition of foreigners because of political charges or charges of opinion (*cargos de opinion*) will not be granted. Colombian citizens residing in the country who, while abroad, have committed crimes that are considered crimes according to national laws will be processed and brought to trial in Colombia."²⁰

In June 1991, four drug traffickers and terrorists from the Medellín Cartel turned themselves in to officials of the Criminal Investigation Directorate in Medellín. These included Escobar, considered to be the leader of the organization.²¹ The surrender of these criminals to the Justice Department came at a time when Colombia was

Colombian commentators stressed that the decision of nonextradition by the Colombian Constituent Assembly was a legislative one, and the executive branch had nothing to do with it. Moreover, the decision of the Constituent Assembly did not necessarily guarantee that Escobar would surrender.

redefining its national priorities and goals. Gaviria's government faced—and continues to

face—many complex challenges posed by turbulence and problems such as juvenile delinquency, poverty, prostitution, lack of rural health care, insurgency, drugs, and so on. In a news conference, he stated:

"The Colombian government and people have paid the highest price in the struggle against drug trafficking. We have given a large part of our nation's efforts, and sometimes all of the nation's efforts, to face drug trafficking. Under these circumstances, we expect the international community to do its part to turn this into a real multilateral effort by all nations, so that the

Uncovering the Venezuelan Connection

... The death of an officer in Cordoba and the capture of the killers lead to revelation that Venezuela is another victim of the extensive arm of narcotrafficking.

El Tiempo, 2 July 1991

It is Sunday, 23 June 1991, 10:30 a.m. Mario Schillia, an Italian, initiates an unusual telephone conversation from his residence in the center of Cúcuta, Colombia, with an unidentified man in Caracas, Venezuela. "I'll leave at 5:00 p.m., I'm driving a Chevrolet, license plates SAP 890 and I'm carrying 622 of you know what." The unidentified man responds, "OK, that is what we agreed." Unfortunately for the Italian, the communication was being intercepted by members of the Police Directorate for Judicial and Investigative Intelligence (DIJIN) in Colombia. Suddenly, what had earlier been mere speculation, proved to be reality—a Venezuelan-Colombian connection in regard to narcotrafficking had been discovered.

Following this and other similar incidents, the Venezuelan government announced that it had identified the leadership of the groups that manage the narcotrafficking in Venezuela. It said drug trafficking operations were directed by Colombians and that the ex-governor of Caracas, Adolfo Ramírez Torres, was also involved.

The breakthrough had begun two months earlier when Edgar Duque Lopera, a specialist in document falsification operating in San Antonio del Tachira, was captured by the Venezuelan police. After a very long interrogation process, the police learned that Duque had provided false passports to Colombians Darío Mendoza Parra and Luis Gerónimo Berrocal, both narcotraffickers and wanted by the Venezuelan authorities for the brutal murder of Captain Pedro Rojas, chief of an antinarcotics unit. In fact, the police also learned that Duque was the point of contact for




Figure 1. Colombian cartels in Venezuela

Mendoza's and Berrocal's men, providing them with information related to developments of the antinarcotics efforts of the Venezuelan and Colombian police in his area of operation. The DIJIN also became interested in why Duque had given Schillia his private telephone number.

Following the Schillia telephone conversation, the DIJIN needed to resolve why Mendoza and Berrocal were in Venezuela, the full nature of involvement with the Colombian drug traffickers and the extent of the Schillia-Duque-Berrocal-Mendoza connection. The DIJIN devised a plan and decided to follow Schillia to Venezuela. Several hours later, in cooperation with the Venezuelan Judicial Police (PTJ), the DIJIN arrested Schillia for alleged drug trafficking.

Half an hour after Schillia's car was searched, the Venezuelan-Colombian police alliance made the biggest seizure of cocaine in Venezuelan history. The connection was discovered. Schillia agreed to cooperate and put together a diagram of the cartel operating in Venezuela (fig. 1). He disclosed that San Cristobal on the Colombian border was the point of entry for

burden of this struggle will not be carried in such an excessive way, as it has been so far, by the Colombian people."²²

DEA Director Martinez, in his first public appearance since the surrender of drug lord Escobar, asked those who attended the Second Annual Conference on State and Local Policy on Drugs in June 1991: "Is there anyone who does not want to see Escobar with his feet chained, breaking stones in the quarry of justice?" Of course, the reply was unanimous.²³ Not only those who participated in the conference would like to see Escobar and the rest of the drug traf-

fickers in chains. A great majority of US politicians, citizens and directors of the principal media have the same desire. This may explain the overwhelming rejection, hostility and distrust of the Colombian judicial system that surfaced when Escobar surrendered to the Colombian authorities and was not turned over to the United States. It should be noted that there are similar guarantees for criminals in the US judicial system and in other countries like Italy, where there is a Mafia as strong as the one in Colombia. Objections, therefore, rest not on the law itself, but on the perceived ability of the Colombian

cocaine into Venezuela, after which it was transported to Caracas, where contacts in the Caribbean later would transport it to Miami. He also revealed that his brother, as well as two wealthy property owners in the area and exporters of shrimp, was part of his organization. One of the traffickers had already been identified with cocaine trafficking after the capture of her husband in Mendanos a month earlier.

The PTJ continued the interrogation of Schillia and began to piece together the Venezuelan narconet. They learned the identity of three Colombians probably in command of the narcotics operations in Venezuela—all three of whom were unknown to the Colombian police. After several days of investigations, DIJIN informed the Venezuelans that the three Colombians had been living in Venezuela for at least 10 years. The intelligence division also learned that the three Colombians possessed a sophisticated chain of laboratories to process cocaine in Cúcuta and the mountainous region of Catatumbo. They also revealed that the Colombian route for the transport of cocaine from Colombia to Venezuela was as follows:

Phase 1, initiated in Cúcuta, involved the movement of drugs via land transportation to Barinas, Venezuela.

Phase 2 saw cocaine transported to Caracas by aircraft.

Phase 3 involved the exchange of the cocaine with contacts in Caracas for later distribution to Miami, Italy and Canada (fig. 2).

More specific information was provided through another intelligence network. Based on this information, the Venezuelans confirmed that the cities of San Antonio el Tachira, San Cristobal, Barinas and Caracas and the Selvatic zone between the Colombian-Venezuelan border close to the community of Vichada



Figure 2. Cocaine routes

were the actual passage points from Colombia to Venezuela. Intelligence spokesmen maintained that other laboratories were located on the river banks of the Orinoco River where both countries are joined. From here, the narcotraffickers transported the cocaine by boat or aircraft to the community of Anzoategui. Mendoza and Berrocal were located and captured in a region of the city of Puerto de la Cruz. After their interrogation by the Venezuelan police, it was concluded that in this city, the cocaine was processed initially, prior to arriving in Caracas.

In another development link to the same issue, Venezuelan authorities announced that a man, detained in Canada last May, was identified as a member of the Venezuelan Civic Police (DICIV). His interrogation was followed by the arrest of an ex-member of the DICIV in the city of Anzoategui. He is believed to have provided members of the cartel with falsified police credentials.

This sudden wave of narcotrafficking has stunned the Venezuelan law enforcement community. The

continued on following page

judicial system to enforce sentences and achieve stated aims.

Why does the United States refuse to accept Gaviria's policy against narcotraffickers? According to Diego Cardona of the University of California, Los Angeles, a specialist in international relations, the US government does not understand that Colombia also has a division of power. If that issue were clear, then the United States would not have erroneously associated government policy directly with the Constituent Assembly's independent decision to approve the nonextradition of Colombians. According to Cardona, the US press has overstated the direct linkage; that is, the approval of nonextradition and the surrender of Escobar.²⁴ Any US analyst needs only review the controversial case of the former mayor of Washington, D.C., Marion Barry, to find an analogy: After the trial, Barry—in the opinion of many commentators—received only a “slap on the wrist.” This sentence created waves of discouragement in the Colombian government. At that time, Washington explained away the light sentence quite simply: “This is not a government decision, nor is it part of the government's official policy. This is an independent court decision and the government has nothing to do with that decision.” In the same manner, Colombian commentators stressed that the decision of nonextradition by the Colombian Constituent Assembly was a legislative one, and the executive branch had nothing to do with it. Moreover, the decision of the Constituent Assembly did not necessarily

Venezuelan Connection *continued*

Venezuelan authorities have said that at this time they do not have any effective control over the narcotrafficking, money laundering or even the judicial mechanism to fight the cartel. Fortunately, the Colombians do not appear to have established an infrastructure similar to the ones in their country, but Venezuelans are worried that this may not be long in coming. To their disbelief, they are discovering new routes every day, with more people implicated in the drug chain. **MR**

guarantee that Escobar would surrender.²⁵

The question to be asked now is, What does the Colombian government expect from the United States in support of its efforts regarding decrees 20-47, 30-30 and 303? Colombians are convinced that they are paying a high price to the international community. They are also fully convinced that the international community agrees that Colombia has already paid a very high price in its struggle against drug trafficking. Therefore, Colombians hope that the US government approves the initiatives included in the Cartagena Declaration (15 February 1990) referring to special concessions for Colombia and the Andean countries in their struggle against drug trafficking. In addition, they do not expect any sanctions as they did years ago after the release of drug trafficker Jorge Luis Ochoa.²⁶

Despite criticism and the initial reluctance of the United States to support this new way of dealing with the scourge of drugs, the Colombian government can show concrete results with this new policy. The National Directorate of Preliminary Investigations has disclosed that, as of 7 July 1991, 18 citizens accused of drug trafficking had surrendered in accordance with the new legislation. Three of the Ochoa brothers, Jorge Luis, Fabio and Juan David, all members of the Medellín Cartel, are behind bars, and on 21 June 1991, both Escobar's brother, Roberto, and Gustavo Flores, another Medellín Cartel member, surrendered to the Colombian authorities.²⁷ In Washington, President George Bush's administration would have preferred the extradition of Escobar and other drug offenders to the United States, but Colombians are convinced they deserve a chance to continue to fight on their own terms. As stated by Jaramillo, “An extradition treaty could easily do more harm than good at this time by halting the surrender of drug kingpins.” Colombia requests that we provide them with a helping hand with its economy, as promised by Bush, during the Cartagena drug summit. The Colombian government, while recognizing the controversial issues of the recent legislation and its implication, nevertheless believes that it has taken the proper steps to meet Colombia's

demanding security challenges.

The flow of drugs into the United States actually increased after the signing of the US-Colombian Extradition Treaty. Thus, the underlying intent of the treaty, to stop or at least slow the flow of drugs, was not entirely successful. It became extremely difficult to capture drug criminals slated for extradition, despite a concentrated effort to do so. There was no question of these individuals surrendering. Major components of the judicial system were in jeopardy through drug corruption. Rampant narcoterrorism, directed against the Colombian government because of its extradition policy, affected the entire populace, threatening its longstanding democratic system. After much bloodshed and minimal success, the Colombian government decided to take a different approach, that is, to repeal the extradition treaty and apply its own judicial solutions to this national security problem. This move by the Colombian government met with strong US opposition, as the United States feared that the Colombian judi-

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cial system would continue to be undermined by drug traffickers and felt that the treaty offered an effective tool by which Colombia could rid itself of narcotics trafficking.

The flow of narcotics continues to threaten the national security of both the United States and Colombia. It is imperative that both countries reconcile their differences in prosecuting the war on drugs to ensure a united approach in resolving this mutual problem. **MR**

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4. Steven Gutkin, "World's No. 1 Kingpin Gives Up, But Drug Trade Expected to Flourish," *The Associated Press*, Dialog Report No. 8, 20 June 1991, 10:35 EDT.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Bruce M. Bagley, "Colombia and the War On Drugs," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1988):80.

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The Cuban

'THREAT'

in the Southern Hemisphere

Goodbye to All That?

Graham H. Turbiville Jr.

Cuba's future is one of change. The author looks at how the recent Soviet coup attempt, the declining Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the return home of Cuban military forces have affected the nation. He points out how these changes have already influenced Cuba's military and economy, and he also discusses possible options for the island nation.

EVEN before the failed Soviet coup in August 1991 changed fundamentally the character of the Soviet Union and intensified the problems of those remaining Soviet client states around the world, the future of Fidel Castro's Cuba was generally assessed as bleak. By spring 1991, declining Soviet economic assistance to Cuba, coupled with Havana's loss of important trading partners in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, was having a severe impact on the Cuban economy. Soviet fuel deliveries were reportedly cut by 30 percent in 1991, and raw material deliveries for Cuban construction and industries in the first five months of the year were slashed.¹ Castro's openly stated disdain for ongoing internal changes in the Soviet Union, and

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's relative coolness toward the Cuban leader underscored tensions between two longtime communist allies that had been evident for some months.

At the same time, a Soviet foreign policy that more insistently discouraged the export of arms and revolution to the Third World, and vastly improved US-Soviet understandings on several issues (including cooperation during the Gulf crisis and war) suggested that Soviet military assistance to Cuba in the future might have definite limits. In short, by mid-1991 Cuba seemed increasingly isolated, more hard-pressed economically and far less potent as a regional military power. The completed withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola in May 1991—in accord with a 1988 United Nations-backed peace

plan—symbolized for many observers Cuba's declining importance as a global troublemaker, and its forced retirement as a Soviet surrogate.

In the face of such developments, radical changes in Cuba seemed imminent, however involuntary. Cuban emigre groups in Florida, along with a number of US advisers and supporters, began to plan for the transition of Cuba's economy to a "capitalist system" after Castro was gone. As part of post-Castro planning, a prominent Cuban exile spokesman, Jorge Mas Canosa, cited his secret meetings with high-ranking Cuban officials said to be part of Castro's inner circle.² In the Soviet Union itself, the new Soviet art of opinion polling suggested growing doubts about Castro's future.³ In the commercial realm, an international real estate speculator advised reducing south Florida and Puerto Rican land holdings, whose value would decrease in the face of burgeoning Cuban land sales sure to come, while US professional baseball leagues should prepare for an influx of talented Cuban players.⁴ Such thinking, of course, was bolstered in the wake of the failed Soviet coup.

Cuba and the Soviet Coup

While actual Soviet material support waned from last year to late summer 1991, supportive statements and visits by some key members of the Soviet leadership provided consolation to the Castro regime. Prominent Soviet military, security and Communist Party officials reaffirmed the Soviet Union's military and economic commitment to the island. Until the consequences of the failed Soviet coup became apparent, these actions likely gave Cuba hope that Soviet assistance would continue, at reduced levels at least, and held out prospects that Soviet leadership might someday return to a more traditional, harder line. The coup aftermath, however, only underscored for Cuba and the world the loss of many crucial, longstanding supporters.⁵

Whatever Cuba's initial thoughts about the coup, Havana remained uncharacteristically quiet during its course and the shock of its immediate aftermath. Initial comment was limited largely to a 20 August statement indicating that

this was an affair for the Soviet state to handle.⁶ By 29 August, as the enormous consequences of the failed coup emerged, the Cuban daily *Granma* reaffirmed Cuba's intention to follow a socialist path, expressed hope for a Soviet state that

Gorbachev's 11 September announcement that Soviet forces would be withdrawn from Cuba prompted a more vigorous and angry response. . . . The plan was denounced as a surprise move, put forth without prior consultation, and it clearly represented one of the most serious psychological blows yet to a regime that both celebrated its military strength and feared for its security.

remained unified and highlighted the mortal danger to Cuba represented by the United States.⁷ However, Gorbachev's 11 September announcement that Soviet forces would be withdrawn from Cuba (and the unstated implication that an estimated \$1.5 billion in annual Soviet military aid would also be chopped or eliminated entirely) prompted a more vigorous and angry response from Cuba. The plan was denounced as a surprise move, put forth without prior consultation, and it clearly represented one of the most serious psychological blows yet to a regime that both celebrated its military strength and feared for its security.⁸

These events have presented Castro with a dilemma that offers no good choices. He can seek accommodation with the United States and regional neighbors, which would entail holding free elections, releasing political prisoners, renouncing the export of revolution, reducing armaments and undertaking sweeping economic reforms. Yielding to such demands would mean the end of 32-year old socialist Cuba and the political power monopoly of Castro and his revolutionary associates. A host of Cuban exiles hostile to the Castro regime for three decades wait to

Energy is in extremely short supply. Public transportation and fuel for personal motor vehicles have been cut back sharply, with Chinese-manufactured bicycles now a popular substitute. Short-falls in grain have meant bread rationing and food substitutions; soap is difficult to obtain . . . and even cigars are reportedly now rationed. . . . Hard currency is in critically short supply, but required "up-front" for purchases abroad since Cuba suspended payments on its international debt.

take part in such a process, and some hope to speed it along through military action. The other option rests on proceeding alone, seeking new trading/joint-venture partners, benefactors or revenue sources, and somehow enforcing an even more severe economic austerity program at home, while preserving the Cuban armed forces, security apparatus and internal order. Limited economic opportunities, powerful external enemies and growth of internal opposition make the success of such a course problematic. As this is written, however, the latter option is one that Castro has publicly affirmed, and its security aspects are worth examining more closely.

A "Special Period in Peacetime"

Anyone familiar with Soviet military affairs will experience more than a flash of recognition when studying the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces and the overall Cuban security establishment. As with a number of other armies built on the Soviet model, the Soviet Union's stamp is clear and often remains long after actual support has been withdrawn. This is true for issues as basic as how tactical vehicles are parked and stored, as well as for larger national security concepts. At the lower end of the spectrum, for example, military instructional material recovered in Grenada and taught to the Grenadian armed forces

by Cuban instructors in English, still bore the earmark of Soviet basic tactics and seemed barely translated from original Russian military texts. Regarding strategic security concepts, the Cuban regime's imposition of a "Special Period in Peacetime" in September 1990 to deal with the many difficulties described above suggests a Soviet concept whose origins, content and implications are worth highlighting.

Castro imposed the awkwardly designated "Special Period in Peacetime" to deal with what he correctly saw as a time of mounting—and possibly apocalyptic—troubles for Cuba. The stilted language was due to its direct translation from a Russian expression whose origins lay in Soviet civil defense planning for general nuclear war, and was first associated with Soviet legislation three decades ago—virtually as old as Castro's regime itself. As Soviet Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy put it, "This special period is set by the Party, the government and the military command. The term refers to a time in which the Soviet authorities consider that hostilities may commence."⁹

The special period required that a broad range of organizational, control, protective and mobilization measures be carried out in the government, economy and military to deal with the severest of imminent trials. There was an apocalyptic tenor in planning that emphasized survival under extreme duress. Also referring less formally to a "period of threat" or an "emergency period," Soviet writings are replete with descriptions of strenuous actions to be undertaken to prepare the country for a potentially devastating conflict.¹⁰ The concept played an active role in Soviet crisis management and planning for 30 years, even as state institutions reorganized under *perestroika* at the start of the 1990s. Last year, for example, former Chief of the General Staff Mikhail Moiseyev noted that in a "special period" the then new and now defunct Presidential Council would be transformed into a State Defense Committee to oversee a multitude of defense-related issues.¹¹ With this background, it seems clear that Castro's imposition of a special period responds to a crisis having

Cuban soldiers shortly after the formation of Castro's revolutionary government. Within 20 years, the Cuban armed forces would expand to over 360,000 men.



The completed withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola in May 1991—in accord with a 1988 United Nations-backed peace plan—symbolized for many observers Cuba's declining importance as a global troublemaker, and its forced retirement as a Soviet surrogate.

both economic and broader dimensions, and one perceived by the Cuban leadership as equivalent to general war.

The stated goal of the Cuban economy in this period is to shift and focus all available resources on speeding up economic development, including boosting food production, acquiring and applying new scientific and technical developments, and focusing on the pharmaceutical, biotechnology and tourism sectors of the economy. It has meant severe restrictions and rationing and curtailment of a number of social programs.¹² Energy is in extremely short supply. Public transportation and fuel for personal motor vehicles have been cut back sharply, with Chinese-manufactured bicycles now a popular substitute.¹³ Shortfalls in grain have meant bread rationing and food substitutions; soap is difficult to obtain; cooking gas is carefully regulated; and even cigars are reportedly now rationed.¹⁴ Visitors describe a deteriorating infrastructure, with consumer items extremely difficult to obtain and very expensive.¹⁵ Hard currency is in critically short supply, but required

"up-front" for purchases abroad since Cuba suspended payments on its international debt.¹⁶ Finding new sources of hard currency will be a continuing challenge for the Cuban leadership.

But Castro is looking to the most extreme limit of the special period, a plan designated the "Zero Option." Envisioned as a response to a total cutoff of Soviet economic assistance and trade subsidies, measures under this option call for such actions as widespread conversion to animal-drawn transport, use of charcoal and wood for fuel in place of kerosene, virtual elimination of electrical power and possible conversion to a lifestyle that Castro himself characterized as resembling that of the Indians found by Christopher Columbus 500 years ago. How much of this is serious planning and how much is merely posturing for external and internal audiences is arguable. Castro has evidently convinced many of his countrymen, however, who are now obliged to rehearse portions of the plan.

The special period and zero option have military and security implications, in addition to their economic aspects. These promise to have

The "Zero Option" [is] envisioned as a response to a total cutoff of Soviet economic assistance. . . . [It calls] for such actions as widespread conversion to animal-drawn transport, use of charcoal and wood for fuel in place of kerosene, virtual elimination of electrical power and possible conversion to a lifestyle that Castro himself characterized as . . . that of the Indians found by Columbus.

a serious impact on the Cuban military establishment as Castro attempts to preserve the Revolutionary Armed Forces in the face of staggering resource stringencies.

Military Dimensions of the Special Period

The Castro regime's political power, its ability to project overt ("national liberation fighter") or covert ("clandestine fighter") military means beyond the island, and the defense of Cuba itself rely on the ground, air and naval components of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, the security forces of the Interior Ministry and other intelligence and security elements (see figure). The 180,500 members of the active and ready reserve components of the armed forces and 4,000 border and special designation troops of the Interior Ministry are most directly subject to special period measures, however. While dealing with economic problems and changing security relationships with old allies, the Cuban defense establishment has also had to manage the withdrawal of Cuban forces from around the world.

Combat and advisory duty overseas, particularly in Africa, is central to the Cuban military experience. However, over the last few years—and accelerating in 1990 and 1991—changing political situations and international agreements have sent Cuban forces home. "Internationalist" military contingents have been reduced or eliminated in Mozambique, Yemen and Nicara-

gua, among other states. The last remnants of Cuban military presence in Ethiopia, which totaled perhaps 3,000 men at its peak, have departed in the wake of the Communist regime's 1991 defeat there. In spring 1991, Cuba began withdrawing the so-called Special Tactical Group from the Congo where, since 1977, it had the stated mission of defending the Marxist-Leninist Brazzaville regime from anticommunist forces staging from neighboring states.¹⁷

However, it was the withdrawal from Angola that was of greatest material and psychological consequence. Returning troops and equipment had to be absorbed into the active forces or discharged into the reserves, employed in the economy and reintegrated into society. The 16-year Cuban experience in Angola had seen 377,033 Cuban military personnel serve there (56,622 officers), with some 2,077 killed in service (25 percent of them officers).¹⁸ It was revolutionary icon Ernesto Che Guevara himself who, in 1965, established the first contacts with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Thus, the Angola experience constituted a "milestone in Cuba's own history."¹⁹

In late spring 1991, Cuban media were filled with accounts of Cuban military forces returning home to the "beautiful green alligator" from Angola in accord with the negotiated end of the 16-year civil war in that African nation. Initial deployments of Cuban combat forces to Angola took place in 1975, reaching about 12,000 troops by 1976. With the immediate aim of providing direct military support for the Marxist government in Luanda, the force deployment—which reached more than 50,000 at its high-water mark—raised the specter of Cuban and other "Soviet surrogates" being employed throughout Africa and the Third World to advance Soviet foreign policy initiatives.

The return of the last Cuban forces from Angola was carried out under the code-name Operation Victory, with units returning both by air and sea. Returning troops were typically met by senior officers, Cuban Communist Party leaders and "representatives of mass and political organizations," who emphasized "the pride the whole

country feels for the heroic actions of our internationalist troops in Angola." Troops returned from Angola with substantial amounts of heavy equipment, said to include "tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, antiaircraft artillery, communications gear and other equipment." This equipment, "in perfect technical condition," was to be "immediately" transferred to regular units to increase "the combat readiness of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces." Returning troops were said to express enthusiasm for new duties at home. As one returning Cuban soldier asserted in a 20 May television broadcast, "We wish to help our country with all our strength and give our highest effort to whatever Fidel asks of us, anywhere, anything, at any time, for whatever is needed."²⁰

The return of these forces, however, added to Cuban problems in ways roughly analogous to the return of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, the lost war in Afghanistan and from other "soldier-internationalist" postings. Whether these Cuban forces contribute ultimately to strengthening Castro or provide a source of growing opposition remains to be seen. Meanwhile, these troops were greeted as heroes, returned combat and support equipment was redistributed and efforts were made to mobilize veterans in support of the special period measures. This has included work by provincial "Directorates for Assistance to Combatants, Families of Internationalists and Martyrs" to find work for returning soldiers. In one example, a provincial directorate claimed that of 2,600 soldiers returning to the sugar-producing Ciego de Avila area, all but 1 percent had found work.²¹ Capturing and retaining the support of such discharged veterans will be key to whatever success the special period can enjoy.

Preserving the Armed Forces

Under the special period, the Cuban military is seeking to maintain its combat and training readiness while reducing costs and contributing to the national economy. In an effort to cut military expenses while maintaining a strong mobilization and training base, Castro initiated legisla-



Fidel Castro

Castro [faces] a dilemma that offers no good choices. He can seek accommodation with the United States and regional neighbors, which would entail holding free elections, releasing political prisoners [and] renouncing the export of revolution. . . . [This] would mean the end of . . . the political power monopoly of Castro and his revolutionary associates.

[Or Cuba can proceed] alone, seeking new trading/joint-venture partners, benefactors or revenue sources, and somehow enforc[e] an even more severe economic austerity program at home. . . . Limited economic opportunities, [and] powerful external enemies . . . make the success of such a course problematic.

tion to reduce obligatory active military service in the armed forces from three years to two, according to the 19 March 1991 edition of *Granma*. Voluntary military and civilian donations

have also been made to the Territorial Troops Militia, a force (estimated at 1.4 to 2 million active and reserve members) intended for internal

The joint KGB-GRU signal intelligence site at Lourdes . . . [is] the most sophisticated Soviet SIGINT collection facility outside the Soviet Union. . . . Its shutdown would not only mean the loss of military intelligence to the Soviet Union/successor regime, but critical commercial and economic intelligence as well.

security but tasked to support the armed forces in the event of war.²² In addition, traditional employment of active and reserve forces in harvest and general agricultural support has been intensified, along with the practice of having military units grow their own food in subsidiary plots.²³

Military fuel use has been severely cut, an obvious constraint on training forcewide, despite explicit Cuban statements to the contrary. This is a particular problem for aviation fuel: as long ago as October 1990, Aeroflot was considering a shift of its Latin American operations from Havana to Miami, since fuel supply already had become such a problem in Cuba.²⁴ In the first quarter of 1991, the Western Army region (which includes Havana) claimed a 61 percent reduction in fuel consumption with no reduction in the pace and scale of training. Innovative, if awkward, approaches have included the use of firewood-powered gas generators to fuel tanks and other combat vehicles.²⁵ As in the civil sector, bicycles are used increasingly by military and police elements. It also appears that larger numbers of weapons and equipment have been put in storage. This is suggested by references to the mothballing of unspecified kinds of weapons in vacuum-packed polyethylene.²⁶


Under the Soviet concept, a special period could include a number of command and organizational changes in the military, security forces,

economic sector and government, as well as the institution of covert measures to improve the posture of forces. The deployment or activation of agents and intelligence-gathering resources, and preparations for special operations actions beyond national borders could be associated with peak crisis periods. While such changes and preparatory actions have obviously not been addressed in open Cuban writings, the undertaking of such analogous measures remains at least a potential in view of other Cuban parallels to the Soviet model. In this regard, the recent formation of rapid action brigades suggests heightened internal security concerns. Rapid action brigades consist of "groups of civilians organized by the state to defend socialism," and reportedly serve as a kind of vigilante auxiliary to the National Revolutionary Police.²⁷ They are reminiscent of the Soviet Workers' Militia groups activated in the late 1980s in the Soviet Union to deal with various kinds of public disorder.

Withdrawing Soviet Forces

The Soviet Union's stated intention to withdraw its forces from Cuba now influences Havana's planning considerations. While no timetable for these withdrawals has been announced (as of this writing), and no specific Soviet troops have been designated or excluded, statements by US Secretary of State James A. Baker imply a promise by Gorbachev to remove all Soviet forces.²⁸ These forces constitute three groups: a 3,000-man brigade based south of Havana; a 2,800-man military advisory and assistance group scattered throughout Cuba; and a 2,100-man signals collection complex at Lourdes near Havana.²⁹ A Cuban spokesman described these forces as "symbolic in nature as far as Cuba's defense is concerned."³⁰

Certainly the brigade is the most publicized of these elements, having become a controversial political issue in 1979. While US spokesmen usually refer to it as a "combat" brigade (to emphasize its line unit configuration), and the Soviets in turn publicly call it a "training" brigade (to suggest a benign instructional mission), it is in fact a motorized rifle brigade with three mo-



torized rifle battalions, a tank battalion, artillery battalion and combat and combat service support units.³¹ Its role appears to have been to protect Soviet facilities and personnel in Cuba and provide security support for the Castro regime. The additional 2,800 Soviet military advisers provide the usual scope of training and technical support to Cuban forces equipped with Soviet arms. Soviet adviser-pilots are rumored also to have flown air defense missions in the past.

A more significant Soviet presence by far is at the joint KGB-GRU signal intelligence site at Lourdes, initially established in the mid-1960s and expanded to become the most sophisticated Soviet SIGINT (signals intelligence) collection facility outside the Soviet Union. The complex reportedly covers some 28 square miles and consists of some 50 support

Under the special period, the Cuban military is seeking to maintain its combat and training readiness while reducing costs and contributing to the national economy. . . . Traditional employment of active and reserve forces in harvest and general agricultural support has been intensified, along with the practice of having military units grow their own food.

and processing buildings, an antenna field and a satellite ground station. Official US assessments of the complex indicate that it intercepts US commercial satellite communications.

The desperation of a Cuban government lacking other options for trade and revenue could result in Cuba's more visible emergence as a major drug-trafficking center. A move from Moscow's forward base in the region to an accomplice of the drug cartels may at some point seem to be the only chance for Cuba under Castro to remain "socialist."

commercial telephone calls, NASA space communications and naval and merchant marine communications. More specifically, it reportedly monitors US Navy Atlantic Fleet and some US Army communications.³² Its shutdown would not only mean the loss of military intelligence to the Soviet Union/successor regime, but critical commercial and economic intelligence as well.

Soviet troop withdrawals will remove what Castro likely regards as insurance against a US invasion, insofar as the Soviet presence symbolized the Soviet Union's commitment to a socialist ally. As a consequence, Cuban security concerns will be further heightened. The withdrawals will probably also be accompanied by a loss of more hard currency compensation, technical support resources and possibly shared intelligence. The removal of Soviet forces will serve to either harden Castro's resolve or force some move to accommodation.

A Drug Trafficking Option?

The Cuban role as an exporter of revolution and terror has been well documented in official and nongovernment assessments.³³ Cuba's role as a sponsor of narcotics trafficking, as a means for both profit and undermining of US institutions and society, is more disputed. Cuba's increasingly desperate requirements for hard currency more urgently raise the specter of a hard-pressed Castro government throwing itself into narcotics trafficking generally, and cocaine

trafficking in particular. Cooperative efforts with the Latin American drug cartels, cutting out a more independent share of the trafficking market and perverting Cuba's developed pharmaceutical industry to synthetic drug production all exist as options.

Narcotics sales offer vast profits—so vast that the Medellín Cartel offered to pay Colombia's national debt in 1985 in return for government amnesty. To be sure, the Castro regime has been accused of complicity in international narcotics trafficking for years. In 1981, for example, after the US Coast Guard seized his boat and two and a half tons of marijuana, Cuban Mario Esteves identified himself as a DGI (Dirección General de Inteligencia—a major Cuban intelligence service) agent assigned to distribute cocaine, marijuana and methaqualone tablets in the northeast United States and Florida. US indictments stemming from his testimony in the case included two Cuban Communist Party Central Committee members, a Cuban naval flag officer, a former Cuban ambassador to Colombia and another DGI employee.³⁴

Exile group spokesmen and some US officials have charged the Castro government with drug trafficking.³⁵ Castro's arrest and execution of Angolan war hero Brigadier General Arnaldo Ochoa and a military colleague on cocaine trafficking charges in 1989 only increased suspicions of government involvement, based on doubts that Ochoa and other Cubans involved could have acted without widespread government knowledge.³⁶ However one judges the murky charges and countercharges over past Cuban drug-dealing activities, the desperation of a Cuban government lacking other options for trade and revenue could result in Cuba's more visible emergence as a major drug-trafficking center. A move from Moscow's forward base in the region to an accomplice of the drug cartels may at some point seem to be the only chance for Cuba under Castro to remain "socialist."

Whether 11 million proud and talented Cubans will long tolerate life under the special period in peacetime—or the zero option—is most debatable. Whether smaller internal groups of

A Cuban supply truck in flames after an ambush by US-supported guerrillas in Angola, circa 1987.



Initial deployments of Cuban combat forces to Angola took place in 1975, reaching about 12,000 troops by 1976. With the immediate aim of providing direct military support for the Marxist government in Luanda, the force deployment—which reached more than 50,000 at its high-water mark—raised the specter of Cuban and other “Soviet surrogates being employed throughout Africa and the Third World to advance Soviet foreign policy initiatives.

dissidents or dedicated external enemies will give them the opportunity is questionable as well. Nevertheless, under one set of assumptions, Castro's Cuba could survive as a lingering remnant of the Cold War, existing for months, or perhaps even a few years, on limited support from a few sympathetic or equally isolated governments, severe rationing and perhaps drawing on narcotics trafficking profits as well. Even with the surprising tricks of history, the prolonged survival of communist Cuba under such circumstances is most unlikely.³⁷

A Castro government that was abruptly overthrown, eased out through the death or disability of its aging principals, or fundamentally altered through accommodation or abdication would raise complex security issues as well. As in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, antagonisms

between communist regime supporters and their presumably democratic successors would have the potential for sustained or intermittent violence. Refugee problems, depending on the circumstances of the transition, could become a regional consideration directly affecting a number of states.

Former Eastern European communist security personnel have created organizations suspected of coercive actions and terrorist planning (for example, Red Fist in the former German Democratic Republic); the prospect of former DGI free-lance activities in an unsettled region must at least be considered. Organized crime, including local and international drug trafficking, could gain a foothold in a post-Castro, free-market Cuba, where old institutions were destroyed and new ones had not yet taken hold.

Given these and other rough parallels, recent Eastern European political transitions may serve to inform Cuba in its own unique post-Castro circumstances. Finally, communist Cuba's immediate future may be most directly shaped by

the relative strength of two competing leadership imperatives: the dedication of Castro and his closest colleagues to a Marxist-Leninist Cuba, and their well-developed instincts for personal and national survival. **MR**

NOTES

1. "Cuba Will Survive Even if the Soviet Union Breaks Up," *Izvestiya*, 3 July 1991, as translated in FBIS-SOV-91-133, 29.
2. "Exile Officials Talk of Cuba After Castro," *Kansas City Star*, 19 May 1991.
3. Some 16 percent of Soviet citizens questioned believed the Castro regime would be ousted by the end of the year, 41 percent thought their old ally would still be in power and 43 percent were not sure. See "Viewpoint" report, Moscow *Interfax*, 1615 GMT, 28 June 1991, as translated in FBIS-SOV-91-126, 25.
4. Bill Brubaker, "Major League Baseball Is Setting Up a Play For the Talent in Cuba," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 26 August-1 September 1991, 11.
5. In October 1990, former Chief of the General Staff M. A. Moiseyev (later dismissed as a coup supporter) led a military mission on a four-day visit to the island to discuss continued military support. A UPI 10 October 1990 report (cited in *Periscope* electronic data base), quoting the Cuban armed forces chief of staff, Ulises Rosales de Toro, noted that the Soviet Union and Cuba had consolidated military ties. It was also noted that Cuba was providing medical treatment for Soviet veterans of Afghanistan. In April, former Soviet air defense commander, General I. M. Tret'yak (also dismissed as a coup supporter), visited Cuba to celebrate several revolutionary holidays, including the 30th anniversary of the Cuban antiaircraft defense and air force (see Havana Tele Rebelde Network, 1700 GMT, 17 April 1991, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-075, 1; and Havana Tele Rebelde Network, 1100 GMT, 16 April 1991, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-074, 2). In late May 1991 and again in July, former KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov (now awaiting trial for treason) reportedly visited Cuba (according to former Cuban Air Force General Raphael del Pina Diaz, to inform Fidel Castro of the upcoming Soviet coup and enlist his support. Diaz was interviewed in "Zagovorshchikov bylo devyat" [There were nine conspirators], *Izvestiya*, 13 September 1991; see also Jonas Bernstein, "A Cuban Trump Card," *Insight on the News*, 1 July 1991, 22; and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Report No. 177, 17 September 1991). In a June visit by a Cuban delegation to Moscow, the secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, Carlos Aldana, was warmly received by former Vice President Gennadiy Yanaev (awaiting trial for treason) and in another meeting by *Pravda* editor I. T. Frolov (subsequently dismissed as editor). One of the longest military supporters of the Castro regime, Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitri Yazov (awaiting trial for treason), reportedly was a member of the Soviet military advisory group during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis (see V. Kulikov, "It is Quiet in Havana: They Are Thinking," *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 3 September 1991, as translated in FBIS-SOV-91-173, 16).
6. *Ibid.*, 15; and Havana Radio Redoj Network, 2234 GMT, 11 September 1991, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-177, 2.
7. Suzanne Crow, "Cuba Reacts to Changes," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 167, 3 September 1991.
8. David Hoffman, "Soviet Brigade to Leave Cuba, Gorbachev Says," *Washington Post*, 12 September 1991; "Cuba Denounces Soviet Troop Withdrawal," and Havana Radio Redoj Network, 2234 GMT, 11 September 1991, 2.
9. Oleg Penkovskiy, *The Penkovskiy Papers*, translated by Peter Denabrin (New York: Avon Books, 1965), 245.
10. For a fine Western discussion of Soviet crisis planning and associated terminology, see John J. Yurechko, "New Soviet Thinking on Unwinnable Wars: Mobilization and Military Doctrine," ed. Jeffrey Simon, *European Security Policy After the Revolutions of 1989* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1991), 58-63.
11. Interview with M. A. Moiseyev, "Vazhnyy shag v voyennom stroitel'stve" (An important step in military development), *Krasnaya zvezda*, 15 March 1990.
12. Speech by Carlos Lage Davila, Havana Radio and Television Networks, 1242 GMT, 16 April 1991, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-077, 13.
13. Lee Hockstader, "New Cycles in Cuba's Economy," *Washington Post*, 19 August 1991; and "Meanwhile, in Cuba, the Cheese Stands Increasingly Alone," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 2-8 September 1991.
14. Havana Tele Rebelde Network, 1300 GMT, 9 September 1991, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-174, 4; and "Cuba Rations Cigars," *Washington Post*, 11 September 1991.
15. Lee Hockstader, "Communists Press Forth—By Oxcart," *Washington Post*, 12 September 1991.
16. *Ibid.*
17. United Press International Report, 2 April 1991, as cited in *Periscope* electronic data base. The withdrawal was sparked by the Congolese government's stated intention to end the one-party rule in effect since 1968.
18. Havana Radio and Television Networks, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-105, 1-2. By contrast, 59 Soviet soldiers died in Angola and 75 in Ethiopia (see A. Olynik, "Zvaniye, zasluzhennoye v boyakh" [A title earned in battle], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 May 1991).
19. Havana Radio and Television Networks quoting Defense Minister Rauli Castro, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-105, 1-2.
20. See Havana Tele Rebelde, 1100 GMT, 25 April 1991, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-081, 3; Havana Tele Rebelde, 1100 GMT, 16 May 1991, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-096, 1; Havana Tele Rebelde, 0000 GMT, 18 May 1991, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-097, 4; Havana Tele Rebelde, 1100 GMT, 20 May 1991, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-098, 1-2; Havana Tele Rebelde, 0000 GMT, 22 May 1991, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-099, 8.
21. Havana Radio Rebelde Network, 1155 GMT, 30 May 1991, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-108, 8.
22. Havana Radio and Television Networks, 1231 GMT, 16 April 1991, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-077, 15.
23. A. Kamorn, "Zero Option: The Cuban Military Prepares for Hard Times," *Izvestiya*, 16 May 1991, as translated in FBIS-SOV-91-100, 29-30.
24. *Periscope* wire service report, 2 October 1990.
25. *Ibid.*, 29.
26. *Ibid.*, 29.
27. Madrid EFE, 1730 GMT, 6 September 1991, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-174, 2-3.
28. Hoffman, "Soviet Brigade."
29. US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1988), 29; and Hoffman, "Soviet Brigade." Several thousand Soviet civilian technicians are present in Cuba as well, working on a variety of projects to include the nuclear power station at Cienfuegos (feared by some to be unsafe). Military troop figures, both higher and lower than cited, have been advanced in various sources. It has also been reported that a Soviet "air artillery brigade" is stationed in Cuba, presumably an air defense unit. See Madrid EFE, 1701 GMT, 11 September 1991, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-177, 2.
30. Havana Radio Redoj Network, 2234 GMT, 11 September 1991, as translated in FBIS-LAT-91-177, 2.
31. David D. Newsome, *The Soviet Brigade in Cuba: A Study in Political Diplomacy* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), 67.
32. US Department of State and US Department of Defense, *The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), 3-4; and Jeffrey Richelson, *Sword and Shield* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988), 100-101.
33. See, for example, Roger W. Fontaine, *Terrorism: The Cuban Connection* (New York: Crane Russak and Company, 1988), for a recent assessment of Cuba's terrorist activities around the world.
34. Alex Larzelere, *Castro's Ploy—America's Dilemma: The 1980 Cuba Boatlift* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988), 229-31.
35. See, for example, *Castro and the Narcotics Connection* (Washington, DC: Cuban American National Foundation, 1983).
36. Such skepticism was even aired in the Soviet weekly *Moscow News* earlier this year. See Alexander Makhov, "Drugs for the Proletarian Dictatorship," *Moscow News*, no. 10, 1991.
37. It is Castro's hope that time will see states in and out of the region become generous trading and joint venture partners and that US economic sanctions gradually will be eased without fundamental Cuban concessions.

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MR REVIEW ESSAY

A Glantzing Glimmer

By Lieutenant Colonel (P) Richard N. Armstrong, US Army; Harriet Fast Scott; Colonel William F. Scott, US Air Force, Retired; Lieutenant Colonel (P) John D. Skelton, US Army; Colonel Paul T. Mikolashek, US Army

Understanding the Eastern Front

World War II's Eastern Front remains a distant fight that Western military historians and students know impacted the war's outcome, but how the Soviet victory came about is a question with an often little understood answer. What did the Red Army do between Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk and Berlin?

Over the last decade, an exciting body of Soviet military history has flowed from the pen of a US Army officer with a remarkable career of research and study, Colonel David M. Glantz. Broadening the West's understanding of this forgotten front, Glantz began teaching and publishing at the Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; followed by his research and conduct of the Art of War symposiums at the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; his works with the US Army Soviet Army Studies Office (now US Army Foreign Military Studies Office [FMSO]), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and his editorial writings in the *Journal of Soviet Military Studies*.

Glantz's prodigious writings create a new, increased awareness of Soviet army experiences and accomplishments and culminate in a series of books published by Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., London. These books, reviewed below, are *Soviet Military Operational Art*, *Soviet Military Intelligence in War* and *The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver* from his Soviet Military Theory and Practice series and *From the Don to the Dnepr* from the Soviet Military Experience series.

Glantz's relentless pursuit of available Soviet military histories has led him through a mountain of memoirs, unit histories and battle and operational accounts from the prolific Soviet postwar military publishing houses. Combining Soviet publications with German and Japanese archival materials, he reconstructs highly detailed accounts of Red Army operations. Delving into the details, he finds Soviet operational accounts in the open press more accurate and verifiable with German and Japanese records than suspected in the West. Reading between the lines and recognizing what was not printed or stated in the

official publications, he identifies disasters and blunders, as well as triumphs and accomplishments in Soviet military operations. He reveals operations neither the Germans nor Soviets wanted to explain. His illuminating journey through Soviet and outside sources dispels myths about Red Army military theory, leadership, operational capabilities and fighting prowess and balances previously one-sided battle accounts based on German memoirs and histories.

With the advent of *glasnost* and the Soviet Union's becoming unglued, the West stands on the threshold of an information avalanche of Soviet military and society histories. The opening of Soviet military archives for research and study will improve our understanding of the Soviet military. This information explosion will propel historical rewritings and produce a fundamentally different picture of the fighting on the Eastern Front and World War II itself, altering the West's previous understanding as represented in the classic, ground-breaking works of Raymond L. Garthoff, John Erickson and Earl F. Ziemke.

Interestingly, Soviet military historians, with their bureaucratic and secretive restraints, could not write their history as well as Glantz. Their open press histories were published in limited editions, over time, restricting availability to researchers. They did not have total access to German and Japanese archival materials and only a limited, controlled access to their own archives. Newly released military archival material has already verified much of Glantz's works of reconstruction.

Ironically, now that the Soviets have begun rewriting their own history, Glantz is being asked by Soviet military historians for help in reconstructing their history stripped of ideology. A major challenge will be to reconstruct their history as the basis for a new relationship between the military and society.

Soviet military histories, the basis for much of Glantz's work, are fundamentally different in style and presentation from US military histories. In the West, we celebrate the individual. We recognize individual achievements, and we like our military history to revolve around battles and leaders whose accounts are told in flowing, entertaining narrative.

The historical account must be punctuated by incisive observations blown to general conclusions on events, warfighting and personalities.

Soviet military histories, on the other hand, are as dry as unbuttered popcorn. Relatively devoid of personalities, they have large doses of military art and science and are in the tradition of the General Staff study. Systematic in its approach, the General Staff study is intent on producing unmistakable military lessons and examples. With the Marx-Lenin influence, Soviet histories fail to exalt individuals and achievements but, rather, enumerate the collective effort for the ideological, socialist victory.

Glantz's works replicate this objective, unemotional approach. While he identifies Soviet commanders, there is no development of personalities and little development of the ironies of situations. Like the Soviet military publications, his are in the General Staff style of revealing operational examples for military theory and practice. A functional analysis of operations and rigorous attention to the various supporting aspects of warfare give these studies not only contemporary but also future value in understanding Red Army operations and the nature of the fighting on the Eastern Front during World War II.

As a torchbearer, Glantz lights previously shadowed areas, revealing many new research avenues. He leads the way in widening the source materials base and exploiting archival material from all World War II participants. His works are now standard reference sources in worldwide professional military libraries for students and historians. Military professionals in schools or those self-taught in advanced military studies can and do learn from his works.

It is fortunate that Glantz intends to continue capturing and translating as much of the Soviet archival material as possible for study in the West. His one-man show is a magnificent tour de force that makes him a phenomenon within contemporary military historiography as he pursues his unique life's work.—LTC (P) Richard N. Armstrong, US Army

SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONAL ART: In Pursuit of Deep Battle. 295 pages. 1990. \$45.00 clothbound. \$25.00 paperback.

Anyone who has ever attended a Glantz lecture will not soon forget his electrifying presentation. Whether it is a battle on the Russian Front in World War II or Soviet strategy in nuclear war, suddenly, you are there. Glantz's gripping lectures are perfect examples of "deep research." Details unroll with precision guidance. One longs somehow to capture this wisdom, to hold the moment. *Soviet Military Operational Art* is that distillation.

The Gulf War will be studied intensely by officers and generals at the Military Academy of the General Staff and other Soviet military academies. After all, Iraqi officers were trained by the Soviets, advised by Soviets and supplied with Soviet equipment. Had they been allowed by Saddam Hussein to use that training, the war might have been a different story. As General H. Norman Schwarzkopf said: "Saddam is neither a strategist, nor is he schooled in the operational art, nor is he a tactician . . ."

Successes in the Gulf War were due, in no small part, to a hardy group of Soviet military specialists, like Glantz, who for years pioneered the study of Soviet operational art and tactics. The notes in *Soviet Military Operational Art* are 99 percent from original Russian sources.

Glantz's sources are the writings of the Soviet Union's best strategic and tactical thinkers, past and present. Such military men generally are found in the General Staff or, before 1936, the Red Army staff. Among them are pre-World War II leaders such as A. A. Svechin, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, A. I. Yegorov and V. K. Triandafillov, and the postwar group that included marshals G. K. Zhukov, V. D. Sokolovskiy, M. V. Zakharov, V. G. Kulikov and N. V. Ogarkov.

"Operational art" as a category between strategy and tactics is a term newly adopted by US military thinkers. In the Soviet Union, operational art was developed in the 1920s as military theorists struggled to understand the nature of future war. What was the probability of war, and who would be the enemy? What kind of war would it be? How should the military be trained, and what weapons would be needed? If war does occur, how would it be fought?

These questions were the subject of heated debates in the 1920s and early 1930s, Glantz points out. The battle plan emerged gradually in the late 1920s. Called "deep battle" and "deep operations," it required three decisive weapon systems—tanks, artillery and aviation—which began to be produced in the first military five-year plan. Advocates of the new concept refined it in exercises and reinforced its realization in regulations.

In 1937 and 1938, Joseph Stalin turned on his officers, arrested hundreds of them and had them shot. Deep operations was ripped out of Soviet military practice by the roots. But the survivors who remembered the exercises in the early 1930s never forgot the lesson they learned: Deep operations worked.

Glantz continues to trace the development of operational art by the Red Army from the darkest days of World War II, as it faced disaster, to the triumphal entry into Berlin. Without the revival of deep battle, the outcome might have been quite different.

The Soviet High Command was faced with two problems when the war ended. First, Stalin's insis-

tence that victory was the result of his genius, his "permanently operating factors." Second, the United States had the atomic bomb; the Soviets did not. Until Stalin died in 1953, he ridiculed the idea of any one weapon being decisive. In secret, he began a crash program to create his own atomic weapon. In 1949, he was successful. At the same time, Stalin drove Soviet and captured German scientists to develop rockets capable of reaching distant targets.

After Stalin's death, Soviet military theoreticians were free at last to develop a new concept of modern war. The 1953 to 1960 period was known as the period of the Zhukov reforms. Later, it was described as a time when "a revolution in military affairs" took place. At that period's end, nuclear-tipped rockets with sophisticated guidance systems began to be introduced into every Soviet armed forces service. The Strategic Rocket Forces were created in December 1959.

At first, nuclear weapons were limited, leaving the battlefield much the same as it was in World War II. But as weapons accumulated and entered the services' armaments, Soviet operational art was faced with the prospect of a nuclear battlefield. As the author puts it, "nuclear weapons occupied center stage after 1960." Operational art was developed to "use the results of nuclear strikes." The Soviet General Staff prepared to fight and win the nuclear war.

By 1967, the Soviet Union had enough nuclear weapons to begin to exhibit flexibility in their use. War might not begin with nuclear strikes. New problems arose. As the Soviet Union reached parity and beyond with the United States, forces had to be tailored to fight with and without nuclear weapons.

Glantz devotes the last and most critical part of *Soviet Military Operational Art* to the refinement of the revolution in military affairs. High-precision conventional weapons are as lethal as their nuclear counterparts, he notes. How does this fit in with "defensive" Soviet military doctrine? "It remains a clear Soviet intention to achieve theater objectives without the use of nuclear weapons by either side."

The appearance of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) used in the 1973 Middle East War alarmed the Kremlin. What exactly would be the nature of future war? Marshal A. A. Grechko warned that armor had reached its effectiveness limit, while PGMs were just coming into use.

Ogarkov pointed out the ever-increasing scope of war. Until the 16th century, fighting forces were composed of regiments. Brigades were developed in the 17th century; divisions, in the 18th century. The War of 1812 saw an army being used as the major element of war for the first time. By the 20th century, several armies were uniting in *fronts*. By World War II, the basic operation was the *front* operation. Then,

several simultaneous *front* operations began to take place. Today, Ogarkov wrote, the strategic operation in a TVD (theater of military operations) has become the basic operation.

Glantz, with charts and text, outlines in satisfying detail the strategic operation concept in the TVD referred to by Ogarkov. "What has emerged is a Soviet concept of land-air battles juxtaposed against the US concept of AirLand Battle," he writes.

The only criticisms are technical. Not all abbreviations in the text appear on his abbreviation list. The book could have used a bibliography. Publishers must create a better system of notes. Why not simply number the notes consecutively all through the book? Thus, there would be only one note 13, not eight.

Soviet Military Operational Art is the first of a series of studies being sponsored by FMSO. It whets the appetite for more.—Harriet Fast Scott.

SOVIET MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN WAR. 422 pages. 1990. \$37.50 clothbound. \$25.00 paperback.

To some laymen, winning the Gulf War may have looked like a simple high-tech weaponry victory and a well-conceived battle plan. Less obvious is the role intelligence and deception played in making possible the rapid victory of the multinational forces assembled against Hussein's troops.

From the beginning of the allied buildup, one of the first acts of the combined military leaders was to deny the Iraqis aerial reconnaissance outside their own borders. This was followed by a carefully executed deception plan. At the same time, Iraq was open to satellite reconnaissance and, later, to allied reconnaissance aircraft. As Glantz concludes in his masterful work, *Soviet Military Intelligence in War*, "although *razvedka* [intelligence] does not guarantee success in battle, its absence can contribute to failure." This may be an understatement. The Iraqi political and military leadership's inability to obtain information on allied troop dispositions and planning doomed Hussein's hope of success from the very start.

Many books have been published on Soviet KGB (Soviet Committee of State Security) and GRU (Military Intelligence Service) exploits. While good reading, they generally cover only one intelligence aspect. In *Soviet Military Intelligence in War*, Glantz treats the subject as a whole. As one of the leading US authorities on the Soviet armed forces, he is eminently qualified for this task. He carefully documents from previously classified and other Soviet sources how the High Command's intelligence successes were dependent on careful planning, organization and training, plus the recognition by the top political

and military leadership of the need for intelligence.

Glantz explains the difference between the Soviet and US approaches to intelligence. The Soviets use a single word, *razvedka*, to include both intelligence and reconnaissance. "With an appropriate adjectival qualifier, it pertains to every possible means of intelligence collection and analysis." Closely allied with *razvedka* is *maskirovka*, which encompasses camouflage, concealment, deception, disguise, screening and masking.

Red Army theoreticians of the 1920s studied the experience of czarist armies in World War I in which intelligence had been a weak link. Later, Soviet strategists, when developing the concept of deep operations, recognized intelligence would be essential to its success. By 1941, Soviet military theorists "had developed a thorough understanding of the importance of intelligence and its critical role in the conduct of operations at every level of war."

Glantz shows it is one thing to understand a concept; it is another to employ it. Initially, the Soviets could not put theory and understanding into practice. On 22 June 1941, the Germans "achieved strategic, operational and tactical surprise" in their opening attack. In large part, this was due to Stalin and his paranoia. Warnings from Winston Churchill were considered "provocations." Another reason was organizational. The head of the GRU reported directly to Stalin and not to Zhukov, then chief of the General Staff.

The Soviet General Staff had little precise intelligence on German movements in the war's first weeks. Stalin had forbidden Soviet territory map making because war was to have been fought on enemy territory. Moscow often did not know how far German forces had penetrated and even their own troops' status. Although Soviet *razvedka* quickly improved, the High Command often failed to recognize German deception. For example, in the fall of 1941, Stalin insisted on concentrating his forces for Moscow's defense and failed to heed Zhukov's forecast of the Germans' swing to the southwest, where they quickly overran Kiev with huge losses of Soviet troops.

Soviet performance improved considerably during 1942, although major weaknesses still remained. Even then, only a quarter of the reconnaissance aircraft were equipped with cameras. Soviet analysts tended to give all intelligence data equal weight. As a result of these and other deficiencies, Soviet commanders significantly underestimated the size, strength and resilience of German forces in the Stalingrad area. When the Sixth German Army was surrounded, the Soviets estimated 85,000 to 90,000 soldiers were in the pocket. In fact, some 300,000 German troops had been surrounded! Soviet analysts had counted the number of divisions and other combat formations but had neglected to consider rein-

forcements and supporting personnel.

GRU and KGB analysts were quick learners. Adolf Hitler's drive for the Kursk bulge was accurately forecast. Collection sources, to include radio intercepts, partisan agents and air reconnaissance, had reached professional status. *Maskirovka* had equally improved. Dummy airfields were constructed and dummy tanks and artillery positions confused German air reconnaissance. Soviet intelligence had detected German intent—strategic, operational and tactical—while at the same time masking its own preparations for a counteroffensive.

In contrast, German intelligence was surprisingly poor. Its analysts had failed to identify Soviet dispositions. In particular, it had underestimated the Soviet ability to create huge reserves.

In *Soviet Military Intelligence in War*, Glantz objectively gives the strengths and weaknesses of Soviet intelligence in wartime. Readers may draw different lessons from this account that may be applicable today. I offer the following.

Between 1937 and June 1941, Stalin purged approximately 40,000 of his most senior officers. In the 1939–1940 "Winter War" with tiny Finland, the Soviet Union suffered some 800,000 casualties. Millions of Soviet citizens were in forced labor camps, where they died by the hundreds of thousands. Hitler's attack on 22 June 1941 caught Stalin by surprise. At this time, Soviet intelligence was woefully weak.

Yet, within a year, Soviet forces had regrouped and intelligence organizations had been reorganized. In a little more than two years after Hitler's attack, Soviet intelligence forecast the German drive for the Kursk bulge and pre-positioned its forces not only for an initial defense but also for a massive counteroffensive. *Maskirovka*—deception, camouflage and decoys—was employed with great success. The plan worked. From then on, the Red Army remained on the offensive, stopping only in Berlin.

Today, the Soviet Union is in turmoil. The economy is in shambles, nationalism is rampant and the Communist Party, the KGB and the military are themselves under assault. Many in the West have written off the Soviet Union as a military superpower.

It would be instructive for all those interested in national security affairs, from intelligence analysts to policy makers, to review the lessons found in Glantz's *Soviet Military Intelligence in War*.—COL William F. Scott, US Air Force, Retired

THE SOVIET CONDUCT OF TACTICAL MANEUVER: Spearhead of the Offensive. 263 pages. 1991. \$37.50.

With the continuing decline of Soviet military prowess, a cynic will ask, "Why read another book on

the Soviet army?" However, this book is as much about warfighting theory as it is about the Soviet army. In this context, the book is a useful addition to the profession's literature. It is, perhaps, inaccurately titled; a better title might be *The Evolution of the Forward Detachment in Soviet Theory*. Glantz describes the forward detachment (*peredovi otriad*) as being "the most important functional entity tasked with the critical combat function of tactical maneuver."

In writing this book, the author draws from a wide range of detailed Soviet sources, to include a "wide variety of hitherto classified sources." The forward detachment is a unique organization specifically designated to fulfill combat missions to contribute to the success of the force as a whole. The forward detachment normally leads the march formation (of a regiment, division, corps or army) and will, in turn, deploy its own reconnaissance, advance, flank and rear security elements.

Generally, the forward detachment for a Soviet division will be a reinforced combined arms battalion deploying ahead of the division's advance guard, but behind the division's reconnaissance element when the division is arrayed in a march formation. The forward detachment's exact composition will be influenced by mission, enemy and terrain considerations. At the army level, Soviet theory (and regulation) calls for the forward detachment to be of regiment size. The forward detachment may be used in offensive, defensive or pursuit operations.

Forward detachments receive their missions prior to the operation's commencement. A single force, such as a division, may employ more than one forward detachment at a time if multiple axes of operations are required. While the forward detachment is usually associated with offensive operations, it can play a major role in defensive operations as well. In offensive combat, the forward detachment is usually employed to seize and hold important objectives in the depth of the enemy defense to facilitate the main force's advance. During the defense, forward detachments "provide time for the main forces to establish the defense and prepare counterattacks and counterstrikes capable of defeating the enemy offensive, by holding advantageous positions in the security zone."

Glantz meticulously traces the evolution of forward detachment theory from the post-World War I period to the present. He points out that the theorists were way ahead of the technology necessary to make the forward detachment concept successful. Specifically, he talks about the need for armed and mechanized forces that can move rapidly ahead of the main force, yet communicate by radio with the main force. Starting slowly at first in World War II, the Soviets' forward detachment concept fully matured by 1945. By war's end, he concludes, the forward detachments

"were carefully tailored to perform particular missions . . . at greater depth and more independently." The Soviets, in Glantz's view, building on fairly sophisticated prewar theory, formed the forces and discovered techniques suited to conducting tactical maneuver. It was, he argues, this Soviet ability to conduct tactical maneuver that paved the way for larger-scale, operational-level success in World War II.

The basic Soviet theory behind the forward detachment concept has changed little since 1945. After all, from the Soviet perspective, the last year or so of World War II witnessed a series of successful operations where forward detachments were employed at the tactical and operational levels. Although some adjustments to forward detachment theory to account for nuclear weapons in the 1960s and 1970s did occur, the subsequent reduced likelihood of nuclear warfare essentially negated the need for those adjustments. Soviet forward detachment descriptions have remained relatively constant since the early 1970s, but the frequency of articles and studies on forward detachment operations, both historical and contemporary, markedly increased in recent years. During this period, the Soviets have stressed the need for a better balanced combined arms force for the forward detachment rather than a 1960s' (nuclear era) reliance on tank-heavy forces.

While describing Soviet enthusiasm for the warfighting contribution of the forward detachment, Glantz also points out the challenges inherent in protecting, sustaining, controlling and synchronizing the operation of a fast-moving forward detachment operating well forward of the main force.

In recent years, before the end of the Cold War confrontation in Europe, the US Army devoted considerable intellectual energy to addressing how to counter Soviet forward detachments on a future battlefield. Although the concern about the threat posed by the forward detachments may have been somewhat overstated, it does not undermine the tactical and operational significance of combined arms forces operating as forward detachments. Glantz's book makes an important contribution to the military professional literature and will be a useful addition to the military professional's library.—LTC (P) John D. Skelton, US Army

FROM THE DON TO THE DNEPR: Soviet Offensive Operations, December 1942 to August 1943. 430 pages. 1991. \$45.00 clothbound. \$25.00 paperback.

In terms of size, scope and intensity, "The Great Patriotic War" between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany is one of the most important conflicts in the history of warfare. In spite of this, it is difficult to

find a comprehensive and balanced account of this part of World War II. Glantz has done much to correct this. The Soviets have devoted considerable energy to the analysis, study and application of the lessons learned from the battles on the Eastern Front. Glantz relies heavily on this Soviet postwar analysis, as well as original German accounts to provide a detailed examination of the war's most critical period. This research, coupled with Glantz's insight, succeeds in overcoming the self-serving and biased writings of German authors and the political rhetoric so often accompanying Soviet books on the subject.

Four major campaigns were fought from December 1942 through August 1943, during which significant transitions in Soviet military strategy, operational art and force structure occurred. Glantz describes these transitions in terms of the process the Soviets used to educate themselves, restructure their army and implement these sweeping changes while their nation's very existence was threatened.

Glantz's analysis is thorough. In the four campaigns described, Glantz begins with a clear depiction of the strategic and operational settings and description of the area of operations. He then reviews both combatants' plans down to the tactical level. This is followed by a detailed account of what happened. He summarizes each campaign with his analysis of the event and the impact on Soviet military thinking. Such complete study gives a greater understanding of these campaigns for their own sake, and more important, a grasp of the evolutionary process transforming the Red Army between 1942 and 1943 and its continuing influence on its offspring—today's Soviet army.

The serious student of the Great Patriotic War will find this book a necessity. The casual reader may become frustrated with the detailed narrative. However, the introductions and conclusions of each chapter stand by themselves and make the book worthwhile. Although maps are abundant and clearly referenced in the text, the print quality on some of them is so poor it makes them nearly useless. Nevertheless, this is an important work and will serve as a

valuable reference for those interested in World War II and Soviet military art. The Soviets use the Great Patriotic War as a huge laboratory for experiments in the science of war; Glantz provides us with their lab notes on one key part of this experiment.—COL Paul T. Mikolashek, US Army

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Harriet Fast Scott, a noted Sovietologist and consultant on Soviet military affairs, is an adjunct professor at Southwest Missouri State University. As a member of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, she has traveled extensively in the Soviet Union and maintains one of the largest known private libraries of Soviet military publications in the United States. She is the coauthor of many writings on the Soviet military forces with William F. Scott.

Colonel William F. Scott, US Air Force, Retired, a noted Sovietologist and consultant to a number of research institutes, is an adjunct professor at the Defense Intelligence College, Washington, DC. While on active duty, he served two tours in the US Embassy, Moscow, first as a senior air attaché and, later, as air and defense attaché. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy, an M.A. from Georgetown University and a Ph.D. from George Washington University.

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MRWWII ALMANAC

"Air Raid, Pearl Harbor. This Is No Drill."

By Lieutenant Colonel Thomas D. Morgan, US Army, Retired Copyright 1991

"Air raid, Pearl Harbor. This is no drill." That was the message sent out by the US Navy command center in the clear and on all frequencies at 0758, Sunday, 7 December 1941, 3 minutes after the first wave of Japanese bombers and fighters attacked the

US Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor on the Hawaiian Island of Oahu.¹ By 0945, the last wave of Japanese planes withdrew and, except for sporadic strafing, the attack was over.

In less than 2 hours, 353 Japanese planes broke the

spine of the Pacific Fleet by sinking or seriously damaging 18 important ships and destroying over 180 US Army and US Navy aircraft—the bulk of air power in the Hawaiian Islands. In all, 94 ships of the Pacific Fleet were surprised at Pearl Harbor that fateful morning 50 years ago.

US casualties amounted to 2,403 killed or missing and 1,178 wounded. Most were sailors, and half the deaths occurred when the powder magazines of the battleship USS *Arizona* exploded in a tremendous blast that sank the ship instantly.² More than 1,000 sailors and Marines are still entombed in the wreckage of the *Arizona*, which is still a commissioned ship and is now a permanent World War II memorial.

Day of Infamy. The day after the attack, President Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed a joint session of the US Congress and asked for a declaration of war, calling Sunday, 7 December 1941, “a date which will live in infamy.”³ The controversy over who was at fault rages to this day. Embarrassing questions were raised about the unpreparedness of the Hawaiian defenses. The Army and Navy commanders there were sacked, and the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack published 40 volumes on the subject.⁴

A Rising Sun in the Pacific. The years leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor were tumultuous ones in the Pacific. Japan emerged as the strongest power in the Pacific after defeating, in 1904, the Russian Asiatic Fleet at Port Arthur with a torpedo-boat sneak attack and, in 1905, by sinking the Russian Baltic Fleet that was sent to avenge Port Arthur in the famous naval battle of the Tsushima Strait.⁵

Surprise attacks were part of *Bushido*, the code of the warrior, that governed Japan’s actions as military rule became dominant during the early part of the 20th century.⁶ Japan sided with the Allies in World War I and acquired former German possessions in the Central Pacific—principally the Marshall and Caroline islands—as its reward from the Treaty of Versailles. In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria, and in 1937, it seized northern China. Japan joined Germany and Italy in the Tripartite Pact of 1940 and occupied Indochina after the fall of France that same year. Roosevelt retaliated by restricting trade with Japan—placing an embargo on oil and steel and freezing Japanese assets in the United States—and by moving the Pacific Fleet from the West Coast to the US Territory of Hawaii. The scene was now set for an eventual showdown between the United States and the Empire of Japan.⁷

Grand Joint Maneuvers. The famous naval historian, Admiral Samuel E. Morison, said, “Never in modern warfare was a war begun with so smashing a victory by one side . . .”⁸ Almost no one expected a Japanese attack on Hawaii. The Philippines were

considered to be the prime target. In case of a Japanese attack there, the Rainbow 5 War Plan called for the Pacific Fleet to first strike and seize the Japanese-mandated islands in the Marshalls and Carolines as a prelude to relieving the Philippines (then still a US possession).⁹

Ironically, the Pearl Harbor attack came almost 10 years after the US Grand Joint Exercise Number 4, in 1932, proving a carrier-launched air strike on Oahu could be successful. Early on the morning of Sunday, 7 February 1932, planes launched from the carriers USS *Lexington* and USS *Saratoga* surprised US Army Air Corps planes on the ground and theoretically destroyed them, leaving the Hawaiian bases defenseless from further air attacks.¹⁰

In the after-action critique that followed, it was generally considered that a Sunday morning attack was “dirty pool.” The Japanese did not think so. Although considered by many Americans to be quaint, exotic and toy-like people, the “Gods of War” were entrenched around the throne of Japan in the form of a militaristic government bent on conquest in Asia. The Japanese learned from that 1932 exercise, as well as from the 1940 surprise carrier attack by the Royal Navy that destroyed the pride of the Italian Fleet in the harbor of Taranto. The British used 21 old-fashioned torpedo biplanes to sink three Italian battleships in an attack that shifted the naval balance of power in the Mediterranean to the Allies’ side.¹¹

Sunday Strike. At 0750, Sunday, 7 December 1941, sailors of the Pacific Fleet were preparing for morning duties. As the 183 torpedo planes, bombers and fighters of the Japanese first wave struck, the US colors were raised defiantly, and the battle of Pearl Harbor was on!¹²

The eight aging battleships of the Battle Force Pacific Fleet (the mightiest ship in the fleet in the 1920s—the 31,000-ton *Arizona*—was launched in 1915) were the priority targets for the Japanese pilots. The two Hawaiian-based aircraft carriers, the USS *Lexington* and USS *Enterprise*, were delivering aircraft to Midway and Wake islands, respectively, with a screen of cruisers; but, the rest of the Pacific Fleet (94 ships) was in Pearl Harbor anchorage because it was the Pacific Fleet commander’s habit to bring the fleet into Pearl for the weekend.¹³

The pride of the fleet—the battleships USS *Arizona*, USS *Oklahoma*, USS *West Virginia*, USS *California* and USS *Nevada*—were sunk or beached after being hit repeatedly by bombs and torpedoes. The old, defenseless battleship USS *Utah*, used as a target ship, was also sunk. The USS *Tennessee*, USS *Maryland* and USS *Pennsylvania* sustained light damage, and the USS *Maryland* was the first battleship returned to the battle fleet in February 1942.¹⁴

The Japanese attack fleet consisted of 34 ships,

the strike force being six aircraft carriers with a total of 423 planes on board. After carrier security and reserve aircraft were allocated, 353 planes made the actual attack—only 29 failed to return. A force of 27 submarines was scheduled to sink the fleet if it left Pearl Harbor. Five of the submarines carried midget submarines intended to infiltrate the harbor and sink the ships at anchor there.¹⁵

In direct contrast to the effectiveness of the air strikes, the submarine attack was a failure. No US ships were sunk by the submarines, and all five midget submarines were sunk. One was damaged and washed up on the beach where the Japanese ensign in command became the first enemy prisoner of war.¹⁶

The sinking of the *Arizona*, within a few minutes of the beginning of the attack, was the most dramatic incident of a day filled with drama. It lasted only a few minutes before sinking, absorbing about eight bomb hits and several torpedoes before a 1,760-pound bomb penetrated beside the No. 2 turret to the powder magazines, causing the ship to erupt like Mount Vesuvius. The *Arizona* broke apart and sank immediately in a mass of twisted wreckage, taking 1,177 members of its crew to their grave. Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, commander of Battleship Division 1, and Captain Franklin van Valkenburg, the *Arizona*'s skipper, were killed on the ship's bridge. The *Arizona* remains the final resting place for 1,102 sailors and Marines (75 of the original 1,177 killed were taken off later during salvage operations.)¹⁷

Lucky Phoenix. The light cruiser USS *Phoenix* received only one bullet hole in a range finder shield and was dubbed the "Lucky Phoenix." It survived the war in the Pacific unscarred. Sold to Argentina in 1951, it was sunk by a British submarine during the Falklands War while carrying the name HMS *General Belgrano*. After 41 years, its luck ran out in 1982!¹⁸

Rebirth of the Fleet. All US ships sunk at Pearl Harbor, with the exception of the *Arizona*, *Utah* and *Oklahoma*, were refloated and later saw battle action. The spunky *Nevada* provided naval gunfire support for the Normandy and Iwo Jima landings. The *West Virginia*, *Maryland*, *California*, *Tennessee* and *Pennsylvania* crossed the enemy's "T" at the battle of Surigao Strait in 1944 and exacted revenge by sinking the better part of the remaining Japanese Fleet. These ships also participated in the capture of Okinawa.¹⁹

While the Japanese destroyed the Pacific Battle Force and the Hawaiian-based air forces, the precious US aircraft carriers were out of their reach and thus were saved. The Japanese also neglected to destroy the repair shops, dry docks, submarine base and, above all, the oil storage "tank farm" at Pearl Harbor. The tank farm was of more value than the aging surface fleet because it represented several years' supply of fuel needed for the immediate prosecution of the

war.²⁰ The survival of the irreplaceable carriers and the logistics assets at Pearl Harbor sowed the seeds of Japan's eventual defeat and unconditional surrender in 1945.

Remember Pearl Harbor! All of the Japanese ships that participated in the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, except two—a destroyer and a supply ship—were sunk by the war's end.²¹ Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the reluctant architect of the Pearl Harbor attack, stated that Japan had "only awakened a sleeping giant and now his reaction will be terrible."²²

For "awakened" Americans, "Remember Pearl Harbor!" was the great patriotic rallying cry that mobilized and sustained the American public in the war effort. As a result of the Japanese attack, the lives of most contemporary Americans were dramatically changed. "Ask anyone who was alive and of the age of reason on December 7, 1941, [to remember] where he was and what he was doing when he heard the news. I have never met anyone who could not do so . . ."²³ Pearl Harbor is forever etched in their memories. **MR**

NOTES

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3. John Toland, *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1982), 315.
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5. A. P. Hyde, "Pearl Harbor: Then and Now," *After the Battle*, No. 38, (1982):3-4.
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Lieutenant Colonel Thomas D. Morgan, US Army, Retired, is a Battle Command Training Program controller/trainer with R & D Associates, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy, an M.P.A. from the University of Missouri and an M.A. from Pacific Lutheran University. He is the author of "BCTP: Training Leaders," in the July 1990 Military Review.

Halting of the German Juggernaut: Moscow, December 1941

By Colonel David M. Glantz, US Army

After suffering almost five months of successive, often catastrophic, military defeats and conducting a continuous strategic defense and withdrawal to a depth of nearly 900 kilometers, a desperate Red Army struck back at its tormentors in December 1941, near Moscow. On 5 December 1941, General G. K. Zhukov's Western Front, with a combat strength of 388,000 men and 550 tanks, initiated a massive counteroffensive against the estimated 240,000 men and 900 tanks of German Army Group Center deployed on the Moscow axis.* The hastily conceived Soviet Moscow counteroffensive shocked the Germans by its audacity and ferocity. Within 30 days, the exultant Soviet forces threw the tired and disheveled German forces away from the approaches to Moscow. The German army, while suffering its first setback since the beginning of World War II, fought for its very existence in the bitter cold and deep snows of the Russian winter. The roster of Russian cities and towns abandoned by the Germans—Kalinin, Klin, Kaluga, Volokolamsk, Belev, Mzensk, Livny—attests to their growing desperation.

In early January 1942, the Soviet army renewed its offensive from Lake Il'men in the north to the Don River in the south, this time hoping to seize Smolensk in a giant pincer and destroy German Army Group Center. Lacking adequate mobile forces to

turn German defeat into outright rout, the Soviet High Command threw into battle every specialized and elite force at its disposal, including naval infantry, diversionary forces, cavalry, ski troops and virtually all their remaining precious airborne forces. Beleaguered German forces, organized into hedgehog defenses across the front and caught in encirclements of up to corps size, fought desperately to restore and maintain a continuous front.

By late February 1942, the Germans had fought the Soviet counteroffensive to a standstill. The exertions and agonies of both sides had not settled the question of who would ultimately prevail. They had, however, forever vanquished the specter of German military invincibility. Months earlier and a continent away, the Japanese government had made the decision to move south and east against the power of the United States. This decision, underscored by the Tokyo-Moscow Nonaggression Pact, permitted the Soviets to allot greater attention and forces to the defeat of Germany. Those forces made their presence known at Moscow in December 1941. In this sense, the momentous events at Moscow and Pearl Harbor became inexorably entwined. **MR**

* Comparative strengths stated are those contained in the newly released, formerly classified Soviet account of the Moscow operation, which was published under the direction of Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov in 1943.

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MR BOOK REVIEWS

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION by Richard Pipes. 946 pages. Alfred A. Knopf, New York. 1990. \$40.00.

As this review is being written, the Soviet Union is disintegrating, with virtually all of the republics now having declared their independence. There is even debate about what to call the Soviet Union, since it is no longer a union or soviet. The father of the Russian Revolution, Vladimir Ilich Lenin, is no longer revered as a god-like, infallible figure; his mummified body may soon be removed from the mausoleum on Red Square to an earthen grave in the city that until very recently bore his name. A number of his statues have already joined those of Joseph

Stalin and others in a grotesque collection area for fallen idols.

With the unraveling of the Soviet Union, it would be useful to review the events that brought the Communists to power more than 70 years ago. Richard Pipes, professor of history at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and former National Security Council adviser on Soviet and East European affairs, has written the definitive work on the Russian Revolution, which he notes is "arguably the most important event of the century." Actually, *The Russian Revolution* is the second volume of a trilogy, the first being *Russia Under the Old Regime*; a sequel, *Russia*

Under the New Regime, will deal with the civil war and the period of Lenin's dictatorship.

In this monumental work, Pipes describes the decay of czarism and the collapse of the monarchy. He then recounts how the Bolshevik party seized power, first in Petrograd and then in the provinces inhabited by the Great Russians. By shameless exercise of terror, the Bolsheviks set about imposing on this region a one-party apparatus, methodically snuffing out any who might oppose their rule.

Concerning Lenin, Pipes writes: "The evidence shows that Lenin, its most determined instigator, regarded terror as an indispensable instrument of revolutionary government. He was quite prepared to resort to it preventively—that is, in the absence of active opposition to his rule." To carry out his campaign of Red terror, Lenin chose the monster Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinski, the founder of the dreaded Secret Security Police, the *Cheka*. (In the exciting postcoup days of August 1991, his huge statue was pulled down and placed alongside those of the toppled figures of Stalin and Lenin.)

Pipes has written a brilliant study of an extremely complex period of history. He admits that it is difficult for the historian to deal with the Russian Revolution dispassionately. Until very recently, at least, the Soviet government controlled the bulk of the source materials, deriving its legitimacy from the revolution and wanting it "treated in a manner supportive of its claims."

Further, "by single-mindedly shaping the image of the Revolution over decades it has succeeded in determining not only how the events are treated but which of them are treated." It has been reported that this book will be published in the Soviet Union. If true, *glasnost* is alive and well. After reading this book, many citizens will conclude, with Pipes, that "the Revolution was only the beginning of their sorrows."

COL Otto P. Chaney, USA, Retired,
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

THE TURN: From the Cold War to a New Era, the United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1990 by Don Oberdorfer. 514 pages. Poseidon Press, New York. 1991. \$25.00.

Don Oberdorfer has been a diplomatic correspondent for *The Washington Post* since 1976. His credentials gained him 122 interviews with such key US players as presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush; secretaries of state George P. Shultz and James A. Baker; defense secretaries Caspar W. Weinberger, Frank C. Carlucci and Richard B. Cheney; and national security advisers Ramsey Clark, Robert McFarlane, John M. Poindexter, Colin L. Powell and Brent Scowcroft. On the Soviet side, he interviewed for-

eign ministers Eduard Shevardnadze and Aleksandr Bessmertnykh; Politburo member and Presidential Adviser A. N. Yakovlev; and chief of the General Staff S. F. Akhromeyev.

The result is a diplomatic history, primarily from a Western perspective, of the shifting nature of US/Soviet relations during the past seven years. This is a timely and ambitious work that provides an ordered approach toward understanding this critical period in superpower relationships. From the author's personal access to key players, conferences and events, he has constructed a logical, very readable narrative that will prove a classic work on the end of the Cold War. Oberdorfer provides a good contemporary history with new material that will help interpret current issues. As an honest observer, he even points out when his newspaper reporting was wrong or missed the mark as to the significance of certain events.

Unfortunately, Oberdorfer's footnotes often lack the detail that would allow the reader to separate Oberdorfer's personal opinions from what was said at certain interviews. Further, Oberdorfer has not read some of the recent Soviet press and thus missed some key developments in the events covered in this book. For example, before this book went to press, *Izvestia* conducted a further investigation of the Korean Air Lines 007 aircraft downing by Soviet air defense forces. Oberdorfer apparently has not read it since his book continues the Soviet myth about warning shots being fired in front of the passenger plane. Further, his discussion of the November 1983 ABLE ARCHER exercise is a bit overstated.

These are minor criticisms, however, of an exceptional effort. It is a well-written and important work for the Soviet analyst and military professional who is concerned with civil-military relations and superpower politics at the highest level. The general reader will find it a fascinating account of the truly monumental, fast-moving changes that affect his daily life.

LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Foreign Military Studies
Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE, VOLUME I: And Why It Matters by Peter Vincent Pry. 247 pages. Taylor & Francis Hemisphere, New York. 1990. \$53.00 clothbound. \$32.00 paperback.

THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE, VOLUME II: Nuclear Wars, Exchanges and Outcomes by Peter Vincent Pry. 308 pages. Taylor & Francis Hemisphere, New York. 1990. \$60.00 clothbound. \$42.00 paperback.

Peter Vincent Pry has a Ph.D. in international relations (national security studies) from the University of Southern California, Los Angeles. He served in the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and

has written several books on national security topics. He is an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); but both volumes have a note that the views expressed are Pry's and do not necessarily represent the CIA's views.

Together, these two volumes constitute a major work. The timing is lousy, yes, but these volumes contain a valuable discussion of what needs to be considered when trying to compare strengths and weaknesses of the United States and the Soviet Union. An enormous amount of detailed research and development and reference searching went into preparing both volumes. Using the best sources, Pry first defines strategic balance and what that includes. To go much further, he has to settle on unclassified stockpile figures for warheads and delivery vehicles for both sides and their allies. How close his assumptions are is guesswork, but his discussions are convincing. Another condition to ponder is that his discussions are based on 1987 numbers. Then too, the Soviet Union was modernizing its nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities (efforts that continue today).

Since 1987, the communist political strength has crumbled, the Warsaw Pact has dissolved and the Soviet Union itself has apparently started to fall apart. It would seem the step-by-step analysis in these two volumes loses its value. Not so. Almost every conclusion Pry reaches is that the United States comes in a poor second to Soviet capabilities. As the Soviets get deeper into civil war and the breakup of the union, who knows what may happen to their stockpile control. If fragments now secured by Soviet armed forces are captured by the breakaway republics, we probably will be assessing our relative strengths frequently.

Volume I defines some of the variables that must be considered to set up static models. Volume II uses these variables to design a war game series permitting study of our actions and their potential results. (Again, we lose.)

The ground work that went into producing these books is much too valuable to waste. With updating as required, they can give our planners a base from which to improve our capabilities. They are not books you need for your private collection. They should, however, be in libraries that support universities, senior military staffs, intelligence and nuclear activities, congressional committees, and related federal and civilian planning groups.

COL Mark H. Terrel, USA, Retired, Corvallis, Oregon

THE SOVIET UNION AFTER PERESTROIKA: Change and Continuity by Paul Holman. 117 pages. Brassey's (US), Inc., McLean, VA. 1991. \$9.95.

The subject of this book is easily the most timely and vital topic of the day. Six tightly written essays

examine key dimensions of national security in the Soviet Union, concluding differently that *perestroika* is not going the way its architects intended.

US Naval War College Professor Paul Holman opines that economic and political restructuring, while bravely conceived, mark a long descent into chaos, predicting armed resistance by disgruntled power figures. Professors Paul Craig Roberts and Karen LaFollette, of the Institute for Political Economy in Washington, DC, examine historical Russian views of money and production, predicting chronic instability until the concept of private property is fully accepted, which, they say, will be many years.

John J. Dziak, senior Soviet analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, offers a trenchant performance history of the KGB (Soviet Committee of State Security), the GRU (Military Intelligence Services) and the MVD (Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs). He shows convincingly that Soviet intelligence and security forces are more active than ever during the *perestroika* era, the significance being that so many news media and political figures in the West think that *perestroika* has been ushering in an era of retrenched activity among the Soviet security services. Andrew F. Krepinevich and Fred F. Littlepage serve with the director of New Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense. They conclude that the apparent decline of Soviet military power mandates a different but still very significant military security role for the United States and the European Community.

Sergey Fedorenko, former chief, Division of Conceptual Problems of US National Security, Institute for the United States and Canada, USSR Academy of Sciences, serves as a research fellow at the Naval War College. He shows how Mikhail Gorbachev has outrun his power base to defeat his own goals, thus creating a likely milieu for counterattack by the Communist Party and security forces. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. is president, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts. He sketches out a role for future US national security that will, to be sure, include a strong presence in regional conflict resolution but will also require a strategy heavily driven by the reality of the Soviets' huge military capabilities and possession of strategic resources.

This little book has an executive summary, with no author given, that one wishes could be projected into American homes via the popular news media. Sadly, the book has no index, no bibliography and no editorial summary beyond the executive summary. Some of the events are now outdated by developments since the August 1991 attempted coup d'état. So, what value has this slim volume now?

First, this book came close to predicting the August 1991 attempt to oust Gorbachev. More senior national security officials should have comprehended this likelihood, for these eight authors are factual and convincing. Second, even with the cut-and-tape format in which the book appears, it is the best analysis, to date, of recent national security processes in the Soviet Union and of the people who control them. Third, the essays do what most national security analyses fail to do; they link economic behavior to political and military processes. This book deserved more heed than it got in early 1991; the processes it describes, the linkages it demonstrates and the caveats it derives are still valid. And that is why this little book also merited better editing.

**Russell W. Ramsey, Air Command and Staff College,
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama**

DETERRENCE AND THE REVOLUTION IN SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE by Raymond L. Garthoff. 209 pages. The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. 1990. \$29.95 clothbound. \$11.95 paperback.

Over the last two decades, the concept of deterrence has received too much attention from US and Soviet planners. Unfortunately, both sides have defined deterrence differently due to the varying stages and underlying premises of military thinking in the two countries. As a consequence, each side has developed an awesome strategic arsenal that is of marginal practical utility beyond its deterrent (primary) role.

Some members of the Soviet General Staff are now engaged in the search for a conventional deterrent force, one they believe will have more practical utility. The recent revolution in military-technical affairs (such as micro circuitry, laser technology, and others), underscored by the overwhelming US success in the Gulf War, has been the catalyst for this development. The proclaimed aim of this policy is to attain qualitative superiority over the West in conventional armed forces and to attain conventional parity similar to that attained in the 1970s in strategic arms. Such Soviet thinking has serious implications for fu-

ture Conventional Forces in Europe-type agreements and NATO/US Army, Europe, reductions.

To understand the background that has led to this current search for a conventional deterrent force, one would be advised to read Raymond L. Garthoff's *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine*. While the book does not include the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the resulting air and ground war, it does provide the best synopsis available on the development of two independent deterrent concepts. Garthoff had three goals in mind when he wrote this book. First, he wanted to explain Soviet military thinking on deterrence and war prevention from 1945 to 1985. Second, he sought to explain the impact of "new thinking" on these concepts. Finally, he wanted to lay the foundation for rethinking US policy in this arena.

Garthoff's work is the first to cite the recently declassified military-theoretical journal of the Soviet General Staff, *Military Thought*, as a primary source. It provides the reader with a bird's-eye view into the logic and development of General Staff thinking on deterrence. He also relies heavily on his own works on military policy, doctrine and deterrent theory over the past 40 years, works for which he has gained notoriety in Soviet studies. For those unfamiliar with Garthoff's background, he was the US ambassador to Bulgaria and served on the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks delegation.


Garthoff's book includes a transitional chapter that melds the traditional approach to deterrence thinking with Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking," highlighting where the old and new coincide and contradict. He uses the Soviet doctrinal construct throughout to provide an ordered, logical framework that serves as a thread of continuity through the decades. The methodology succeeds in making interesting reading out of the sometimes boring and confusing arms control jargon. Garthoff's book is for serious readers of international affairs. It is not particularly long, and chapter lengths are reasonable. This book should be mandatory reading for anyone interested in arms control concepts or Soviet doctrine.

**LTC Timothy L. Thomas, USA, Foreign Military
Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

Combat Service Support Training Package

The Exportable Model Program provides training and standardization in combat service support training exercises to Reserve and Active component units. The primary emphasis of the training is to exercise group and battalion commanders and staffs in their areas of responsibility, refine command and staff procedures, enhance communication skills and develop unit Army Training and Evaluation Program/Mission Training Plan proficiency. The US Army Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Virginia, has 11 separate training packages for the following types of units: area support groups; corps support groups; corps support battalions; maintenance battalions; petroleum supply battalions; transportation motor battalions; ordnance battalions; and supply and services battalions. For information, write to Commander, USACASCOM, ATTN: ATCL-LEA, Building P-1109, Fort Lee, VA 23801-6000.

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1941-1991

2,403 killed,
missing and
died of wounds
1,178 wounded

